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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the relationships between profit, profit persistence, risk 
and competition within the US commercial bank sector. In particular, the thesis asks 
three questions: how profit and profit persistence are affected by changes in regulation 
designed to enhance competition; how profit persistence varies over time according to 
changes in market and economic conditions; how different aspects of banks’ risk is 
affected by competition and market structure. Understanding the nature of these 
relationships is important given the prominent role banks play in the allocation of 
resources, the provision of capital to the economy and the stability of the financial 
system. Moreover, these roles in turn, have an effect on bank performance and wider 
economic growth and stability. Such issues have especially come to prominence 
following the financial crisis and thus there is a need for empirical evidence on which to 
base policy.  
 
To examine these relationships the thesis implements panel estimation techniques and 
obtains data on all commercial banks, primarily over the period 1984-2009, thus 
including births and deaths. The key findings show, first, that profit persistence is 
relatively low compared to previous US banking studies and compared to 
manufacturing firms. Moreover, persistence varies with regulatory changes, although 
not always in the expected direction, notably the increase in persistence following the 
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Second, additional time-variation in persistence is 
linked to bank specific, market structure and economic factors. Notably, persistence 
varies with bank size and market share, market concentration and output growth, but the 
precise nature of these relationships varies across the sample and by bank size. Third, 
that there is a difference in the nature of the relationship between competition and loan 
risk on the one hand and competition and total risk and leverage on the other. We also 
find that the relationship between risk and market structure varies according to bank 
size and that the economic cycle influences banks’ risk. 
 
The implications and contribution of this thesis lie in establishing empirical evidence 
for understanding the nature of the relationships between competition, profits and risk. 
This is particularly prescient given the move towards new regulation following the 
financial crisis. Key results here show that no simple relationship exists between bank 
size or market concentration and competition and risk, therefore policy should account 
for such differences, whether according to bank size or type of risk.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction. 
1.1. Background to the thesis. 
Understanding the nature of competition and risk in banking is important given the 
prominent role banks play in the allocation of resources, the provision of capital to the 
economy and the stability of the financial system. Moreover, these roles in turn, have an 
effect on bank performance and wider economic growth and stability.  This thesis 
examines the dynamics of profitability and risk of US commercial banks over the period 
1984-2009. This is a period marked by notable changes within the banking industry, 
both in terms of deregulation and technological advances. Geographical deregulation 
occurred via the 1994 Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, 
which repealed geographical banking restrictions imposed via the McFadden Act of 
1927.  As such, banks were able to enter into other states without permission leading to 
a convergence in banking regulations.  Product deregulation was codified via the 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernisation Act, which repealed the Glass-
Steagall Act (1933) and permitted Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) to own 
affiliates engaged in banking, insurance underwriting and securities activities. As a 
result, the separation between commercial and investment banking became less distinct 
and traditional investment banks became increasingly involved in commercial lending. 
The effect of such deregulation has been a drastic change in the structure of the US 
banking industry as commercial banks have grown rapidly. Alongside this, the number 
of commercial banks in the US has been halved, while the number of branches has more 
than doubled.   
10 
 
Technological advances via process innovations such as the creation of the 
automated teller machine (ATM) and internet banking has also increased bank 
efficiency and reduced the cost of producing banking services by diminishing the 
importance of geography for banks and customers. Product innovations such as the 
creation of the money market mutual fund (MMMF) made investments more accessible 
to the average household as they transformed large-denomination money market 
instruments (commercial paper, negotiable CDs and Treasury securities) into smaller 
denomination investments. The process of securitised lending has had a significant 
impact on the structure and performance of the US banking industry, whereby banks 
originate loans but do not finance them. Banks which use this lending technology have 
benefited from large production and financing efficiencies.  Furthermore, small 
businesses and households have had access to credit which would otherwise have been 
unavailable to them.  However, the global financial crisis which started in 2007 is 
closely tied to the failings of this lending technology. That is, as the US housing market 
collapsed, large numbers of home owners began defaulting on their mortgage loans, of 
which most of these were subprime loans. Such loans, to substandard borrowers, were 
produced using the originate-to-sell transactions lending model that large retail and 
investment banks had adopted during the 1990s and 2000s. Subprime loans were a 
significant factor in the growth of these banks and as their value dramatically declined 
so too did the value of the securities backed by them.  Banks and other financial 
institutions thus incurred large losses which precipitated a wave of bank failures and a 
massive decline in overall industry earnings over the following two years.  
Overall, deregulation and technological advances had a dramatic impact on the 
economics of the US banking industry.  The largest US banks dramatically increased in 
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size following deregulation and now compete on a global scale. The number of banks 
has significantly reduced in response to the changing environment, while the number of 
branches has drastically increased.  Banks have become more diversified in the products 
and services they offer and consequently, the industry has experienced a decrease in the 
proportion of revenue generated from traditional interest-based income while fee-based 
income has increased.  This is mostly driven by larger banks, as they generate a greater 
proportion of their revenue from non-interest income than smaller banks.  Ultimately, 
these changes have transformed the structure, conduct, performance and risk of the US 
banking industry.   
  
1.2. Aims, Hypotheses, Methods and Key Findings 
This thesis examines two key issues. First, the thesis assesses the impact of major 
regulatory changes on competition through modelling the dynamics of bank profit and 
the persistence of profit. In particular, profit persistence provides a proxy for the degree 
of competitive pressures such that where the degree of competition is high then 
abnormal profits would be eroded quickly. The presence of persistence in (abnormal) 
profits is an indication of the existence of impediments to competition.  Therefore, we 
examine how regulation has affected the degree of profit persistence. In particular, 
where regulatory changes were designed to enhance competition we would expect such 
persistence to decline. In a related exercise, we then extend the analysis to consider 
whether persistence varies more generally over time and hence relax the usual 
assumption that holds persistence fixed. Thus, we also trace the dynamics of profit 
persistence over time in order to examine how competition has evolved and those 
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factors that are linked to change in profit persistence.  It is our belief that due to the 
continued nature of product innovation there will be changes in market structure and the 
degree of competition and hence the persistence of profits.  As such, profit persistence is 
likely to change over time and thus this time-variation will be linked to a variety of 
factors arising from market structure, bank characteristics and even more general 
economic conditions. 
The second main research question considered within this thesis is the 
determinants of bank risk. Notably, we can examine different aspects of bank risk, such 
as loan portfolio risk and overall risk, and examine how market structure (and from that 
we can infer the degree of competition) affects the level of risk. Thus, the analysis of 
risk can be couched in terms of the debate between the competing competition-stability 
and competition-fragility hypotheses. Furthermore, we can examine whether the 
relationship between risk and competition differs across different types of bank, for 
example whether large banks differ from smaller banks. Such an examination may be of 
interest given the recent debate regarding the level of risk within large banks.  The 
overriding view is that bank risk is related to market structure (and hence competition), 
however, the nature of that relationship is unclear from the existing literature. That is, 
whether increased competition leads to a more stable banking system because large 
banks that exert market power are able to charge higher rates on loans, which may in 
turn increase the risk of default on those loans (competition-stability).  However, there 
also exists an alternate view, whereby more concentrated banking systems are more 
robust to shocks, notably as large banks are able to diversify their income streams and 
build up greater capital buffers (competition-fragility).  We aim to examine this issue 
here. 
13 
 
This thesis sets out several research questions: considering how acts of 
deregulation affect competition through the persistence of (abnormal) profit; whether 
such persistence is more generally time-varying and whether that time-variation is 
linked to explicit factors; what is the nature of the relationship between competition 
(market structure) and bank risk.  More specifically, we consider research questions that 
ask whether banks’ profits exhibit persistence and thus indicate a degree of hindrance to 
the competitive process. Related, we wish to consider whether deregulation affects the 
degree of profit persistence and thus, whether such Acts designed to enhance 
competition have the desired effect as proxied by persistence. More generally, we seek 
to consider whether persistence exhibits a greater degree of time-variation than just that 
attributed to deregulation. That is, given the amount of technological and other change 
within the banking sector, our contention is that persistence may exhibit more frequent 
changes rather than just discrete shifts. While these research questions consider the 
relationship between competition and profits, we also seek to examine the relationship 
between competition and risk. Therefore, we ask whether market structure impacts upon 
risk and thus whether we can provide evidence for the competition-stability or 
competition-fragility view. In doing so, we consider different aspects of the 
relationship, including, for example, different measures of risk (such as loan portfolio 
risk or total risk) and different segments of the banking market (such as separating 
banks by size). In examining these research questions we build a panel of data on US 
commercial banks over the period 1984-2009.1 The data is analysed largely using a 
                                                          
1 We obtain data from 1976 to 2009; however, some key variables are only available from 1984. 
Therefore, estimations take place over the shorter sample, except where noted in Chapter 5 as the longer 
sample is preferred when considering time-variation. Several figures also include the full data where 
appropriate and it is noted.  
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fixed effects panel approach, while alternative GMM (generalised method of moments) 
are used to ensure robustness of the results to potential endogeneity issues.  
The results in the thesis suggest the following. First, regarding profit persistence, 
the autoregressive parameter is statistically significant, suggesting that profits do exhibit 
some persistence such that the competitive process does not act unimpeded. Second, 
with respect to the effects of deregulation, the impact on persistence differs. That is, 
while both the Acts considered were designed to increase competition and hence should 
decrease persistence, the effect on persistence is not ubiquitously downward.  The 
results show that following the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act that allowed for interstate banking, profit persistence did indeed decline.  
This is consistent with the view that this Act enhanced competition by allowing efficient 
banks to move in to areas previously occupied by less efficient banks that were 
previously protected from competition.  However, with regard to the 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act profit persistence increased. While at face value this might suggest 
that competitive pressures had eased following the Act, an alternative interpretation 
would be that banks were able to diversify their activities following the Act and thus 
were able to protect their profits, hence leading to an increase in persistence. 
Third, we reveal evidence that profit persistence is time-varying in addition to 
changes surrounding deregulatory acts.  Using a series of fixed and expanding window 
regressions we are able to show that persistence declines in the late 1980s and rises in 
the late 1990s/early 2000 before falling during the financial crisis period.  Using these 
regressions, as well as a sequence of threshold-type regression,s we are further able to 
confirm the presence of time-variation.  Fourth, we consider what factors may affect 
such time-variation.  Our analysis suggests two key results. First, that the time-variation 
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is related to bank specific factors, market structure factors and economic factors. 
Second, that there is noticeable time-variation within the effect of these different factors 
on persistence. Furthermore, that both of these conclusions hold in the regression for all 
banks, as well as the regression organised by bank size. 
The final set of results considers the relationship between bank risk and 
competition and in doing so, considers the competition-fragility versus competition-
stability hypotheses. The results here suggest that there is a difference in the nature of 
the relationships between loan risk and other measures of risk.  Specifically, the results 
for loan risk appear to support competition-stability hypothesis, whereby increased 
competition leads to a lower level of non-performing loans. In contrast, increased 
competition leads to lower Z score values (greater risk) and lower equity-to-asset ratios. 
This appears to suggest that banks view the risks associated with different aspects of 
bank behaviour differently. Hence, while increased market concentration may lead to 
greater credit-risk taking behaviour, it leads to lower overall risk and higher capital 
buffers.  The results here also suggest a difference between large banks and other-sized 
banks, with large bank risk exhibiting a weaker relationship with market structure but a 
stronger relationship with the economic cycle. 
 
1.3. Contributions 
The contribution to the literature can be described as follows.  The thesis embarks on a 
large scale exercise examining the relationship between competition, profit persistence, 
deregulation and bank risk over a longer time series than typically considered and using 
a data set comprising of all commercial banks that existed over the sample period.  
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Thus, the sample of banks includes those that enter and exit, as opposed to studies that 
only including living entities.  It is hoped that such a large sample should provide robust 
results.  In terms of the specific results, the thesis reports on how the Acts of 
deregulation affected profit persistence and thus the competitive process.  In particular, 
it is important to note that although the two acts considered where designed to enhance 
competition, they had opposite effects on persistence, with the first Act (1994) reducing 
persistence and the second Act (1999) leading to an increase in persistence.  Thus, it is 
important to recognise that the outcome of such deregulatory acts may not be as 
intended and this can have implication for future regulation.  
 This thesis also presents evidence of time-variation within profit persistence that 
has not previously been considered. That is, by relaxing the unrealistic assumption of a 
constant persistence parameter, especially when considered over a time series of more 
than twenty years, this thesis shows that persistence is related to a range of factors 
including bank specific, market structure and economic cycle ones. Again, these results 
are important, not only for recognising the presence of such time-variation, but also in a 
policy context for understanding whether there exists a relationship between bank size 
and market share for example, or market concentration and competition as proxied by 
persistence.   
 Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature on bank risk and market structure 
and the debate regarding the applicability of the competition-fragility versus the 
competition-stability hypotheses.  In particular, the results here confirm that there is a 
distinction to be made between different parts of a bank’s activity.  That is, the 
relationship between risk and competition differs across an analysis of a bank’s overall 
risk or a bank’s loan portfolio risk; with increased competition increasing the former 
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risk and reducing the latter risk.  This again has implications for the conduct of 
regulatory policy. Furthermore, our results show a difference between large banks, 
whose risk is less affect by market structure, and other sized banks.  Again, this can feed 
in to the policy debate about bank market structure and bank size.  
 
1.4. Structure Outline 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
key regulatory and structural changes that have occurred within the US banking sector, 
with our main focus on commercial banks.  Particular emphasis is given to the 
legislation implemented in response to the Great Depression in the 1930s and the 
ensuing removal of these regulations in the latter part of the 20th Century. 
Chapter 3 considers the two main approaches that exist within the large body of 
literature that examines the microeconomics of competition in banking; that is the 
Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) paradigm, with its revisionist/Chicago critique, 
and the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approach.  In addition, further 
literature related to competition in banking, including for example, conjectural 
variations Cournot models and structural demand models, is also considered. 
Chapter 4 seeks to examine the degree of profits persistence in US commercial 
banks and the effects on persistence of regulatory changes largely designed to increase 
competition and thus lower persistence.  Furthermore, we provide a preliminary look at 
the effects of the liquidity crisis that began in 2007 on persistence.  This chapter 
contributes to the existing literature by not only examining a larger dataset than 
previously considered, both in the time and cross-sectional dimension, but also by 
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explicitly incorporating key changes in the modelling which allows us to comment on 
the effectiveness of the legislation.  Using a panel model approach to examine the 
persistence of US commercial bank profits, this chapter will attempt to examine how 
persistence has changed following two major pieces of regulatory change in the US 
banking sector, namely the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act and the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  In summary of the results, this 
chapter reports the following key findings. First, the general level of persistence in 
profit is relatively low, more so than that reported for manufacturing firms and as 
previously reported for US banks by Goddard et al. (2011).  Second, the degree of profit 
persistence fell following the passage of the Interstate Banking Act of 1994, which may 
be indicative of an increase in competition arising from cross-state activity. Third, profit 
persistence increases following the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which allowed 
banks to diversify into non-traditional banking activities.  While the Act did not 
necessarily reduce competition, it did allowed banks alternative sources from which to 
generate income and hence diversify their activities.  Finally, persistence declined 
following the financial crisis that began in 2007, when US home prices began a sharp 
decline and an unusually large number of mainly subprime mortgages were defaulted 
on.  Trillions of dollars of securities backed by these subprime loans suffered a fall in 
value and as a result imposed large losses on the portfolios of banks and other financial 
institutions that held them.  In addition, industry earnings in 2008 and 2009 had fallen to 
around zero. 
 Chapter 5 seeks to examine whether there is time variation in the persistence of 
profit parameter, in contrast to the vast majority of studies which assume that the 
persistence parameter remains constant over the full time series period.  This contributes 
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to the literature as, with the exception of the previous chapter, there has been no 
previous attempt to examine time-variation within the persistence of US bank profits.  
Furthermore, we seek to examine whether any time variation is linked to bank specific, 
market, or economic factors; and whether the nature of the relationship of persistence 
with these factors is itself time-varying. 
 Chapter 6 seeks to add to the literature on competition and bank risk, by building 
on the work of Berger et al. (2009) which examined the cross-sectional relationship 
between market structure and bank risk-taking for a range of countries.  The authors 
used a panel structure for US banks in order to analyse this relationship.  In particular, 
we consider three measures of risk; loan-risk, total risk and the equity buffer and 
examine the relationship of each measure with market structure, while controlling for 
certain bank-specific characteristics.  Having examined this relationship for all banks, 
we further consider whether the risk characteristic differs between banks of different 
size, or banks that are performing above or below the average.   Furthermore, in the 
model employed in this chapter we attempt to examine the impact of a key regulatory 
change, namely the 1999 Financial Modernisation Act, on banks’ risk-taking behaviour.  
Within the banking literature, this has emerged as an important policy-debate as 
researchers seek to determine whether this Act, and thus the effective repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, has increased banks’ risk.  In preview of the results, our 
findings indicate that there is a difference in the nature of the relationships between 
loan-risk and other measures of risk.  Furthermore, there also appears to be a distinction 
between small and medium sized banks on the one hand, and large banks on the other.  
Finally, a further examination of bank risk behaviour according to whether the bank 
exhibited above or below profits, or whether the bank exhibited positive or negative 
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growth, reveals less of a difference between banks. However, across all categories of 
banks, GDP growth was found to be an important factor.  
 Chapter 7 concludes by summarising the main results.  We also put forward 
some potential future research questions.  Of particular note, our results reveal that the 
effects of two acts of deregulation on profit persistence (competition) are opposite.  It is 
worthy of further research to consider this further and examine how similar deregulatory 
events have affected persistent in different markets.  This thesis marks the first attempt 
to examine time-variation in persistence, with the results revealing such time-variation.  
Future research could be conducted towards establishing a body of evidence with regard 
to whether persistence is universally time-varying and the cause of the variation.  
Finally, the relationship between bank risk and competition remains an open question 
and in particular with regard to how competition affects the risk of different parts of a 
bank’s business. Our results demonstrate a difference between loan portfolio risk and 
overall risk, an examination of different aspects of bank behaviour would be interest.   
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Chapter 2. Overview of US Banking. 
 
2.1. Introduction. 
The US banking system is distinctly different from banking structures found in other 
western economies, attributable to the unique manner in which the central bank and 
bank supervisory functions have evolved in the US.   Historically, the US banking 
industry has been subject to extensive government legislation, in comparison with other 
industrialised nations.  This includes regulations governing the prices banks can charge 
(i.e. interest rates), the activities they are permitted to engage in, the risks that they may 
take, the capital levels they are required to hold as well as the locations in which they 
may operate.  Furthermore, macroeconomic shocks and competition have also acted as 
catalysts for regulatory change. 
In response to the Great Depression, extensive regulatory policy governing US 
banking was first implemented throughout the 1930s.  Further dramatic transformation 
of the banking industry has occurred following widespread deregulation over the course 
of the last few decades.  As a result, the nature and composition of the banking industry 
changed significantly also.  For instance, the number of commercial banks has halved as 
a result of thousands of mergers and acquisitions, while the largest banks have 
experienced a dramatic increase in size.  Despite the trend of consolidation, when 
compared to other economies, the US banking system still comprises a relatively large 
number of banks.  In contrast to most other western economies however, the banking 
system is not as highly concentrated. 
Prior to deregulation, the growth of US banks was constrained for many 
decades, thus the top US banks have typically remained relatively small in comparison 
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to the largest European and Japanese banks.  For instance, from the 1950s until the 
1980s, the number of commercial banks in the US remained relatively stable at 
approximately 14000.  Of these, more than 95 percent were community banks, i.e. 
commercial banks with assets of less than $1 billion, and accounted for approximately 
one third of the industry’s total assets.   Following deregulation, by 2009 the number of 
commercial banks had fallen dramatically to just below 7000 banks.  Banking and 
branching regulations protected commercial banks from large bank competition, thus 
giving small banks a competitive advantage in lending and deposit-taking at the local 
level.  Following deregulation commercial banks grew rapidly, mostly as a result of 
mergers and acquisitions.  DeYoung (2010) reports that on average, approximately 350 
commercial banks were acquired each year during the 1980s.  Throughout the 1990s 
approximately 500 commercial banks were acquired each year, while on average, 
roughly 300 commercial banks were acquired each year during the 2000s.  
Consequently, more than 10000 bank charters have been merged out of existence since 
the 1980s.    
In addition to the increased merger and acquisition activity, the US banking 
sector also experienced a period of increased bank failures, thus contributing further to 
the decline in the number of commercial banks.  The late-1980s to the mid-1990s 
witnessed the largest number of bank failures in the US since the Great Depression, 
totalling more than 1500.  From 1970 onwards, bank mergers and failures have greatly 
reduced the number of US commercial banks; however, throughout this period a large 
number of banking charters have also been granted.  Such a large volume of new bank 
start-ups or “de novo” banks is rare in other economies, and is the outcome of a system 
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whereby bank charters may be granted not only by the federal banking authority (OCC) 
but also by the 50 separate state banking authorities. 
The decline in the number of commercial banks has been accompanied by a 
change in the size distribution of banks also.  That is, the net reduction in the number of 
banks occurred wholly among small banks, via failures or mergers and acquisitions.  In 
contrast, the number of very large banks has remained relatively stable. 
During the 1970s, commercial banks were the main supplier of loans to US 
businesses.  Carey et al. (1993), report that large commercial banks were the major 
source of both long-term and short-term financing to large businesses.  DeYoung, 
Hunter and Udell (2004) report that the primary source of credit for small business 
enterprises came from smaller community banks.  They find that during the 1970s, 
small community banks allocated between 20 and 30 percent of their loan portfolios to 
commercial lending.  
Commercial banks were also the main providers of all basic financial products, 
excluding insurance products, required by the typical US household during the 1970s.  
Once again, due to technological constraints and the existing regulations, small 
commercial banks were able to compete with large commercial banks in providing most 
of these services. 
In common with other industrialised nations, the US banking system also 
includes savings banks and thrifts (savings and loan associations), some of which are 
mutually owned, while others are stock banks.  Their original function was to provide 
long-term residential mortgages (which still account for approximately 80% of their 
assets), funded by short-term savings deposits.  However, regulatory changes in the 
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early 1980s permitted them to offer money market accounts, current or notice of 
withdrawal (NOW) accounts, flexible rate mortgages (in addition to the traditional fixed 
rate mortgages) and some commercial and personal loans.  The Savings and Loans 
Crisis during the 1980s resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of savings and 
thrift banks.  Again, in common with commercial banks, numbers have continued to fall 
from more than 3500 to just over 1000 institutions.   
Credit unions are another type of financial institution found in the US banking 
system.  These institutions are owned by members including employees, police and fire 
associations, and teachers.  Member salaries are paid into the credit union, thereby 
enabling basic deposit and loan facilities.  Credit unions are exempt from income tax 
and therefore able to offer more attractive deposit and loans rates compared to 
commercial or savings banks.  In 2009, credit unions in the US numbered just under 
10000. 
Following deregulation during the 1980s, more than 4000 new investment banks 
and securities firms were created.  Just prior to the stock market crash in October 1987 
there were approximately 9500 investment banks and securities firms.  However, a 
combination of both the crash and higher capital requirements increased the number of 
mergers which therefore significantly increased concentration. For example, in 1987 the 
largest investment bank (Salomon’s) had capital of $3.21 billion, but a decade later, the 
largest bank (Merrill Lynch) had $33 billion of capital. 
  Other types of financial institution found in the US include insurance firms and 
finance companies.  Finance companies acquire loans from banks which are 
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subsequently used to fund short and long-term lending.  The finance company sector 
experienced rapid growth following deregulation.   
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the key regulatory and structural 
changes that have occurred within the US banking sector.  Particular emphasis is given 
to the legislation imposed in response to the Great Depression in the 1930s and the 
subsequent removal of these regulations in the latter part of the 20th Century, with the 
main focus on commercial banks. 
 
2.2. Historical Background 
The First Bank of the United States was created in 1791 and operated until 1811.  The 
war of 1812 and the resultant accumulation of federal debt prompted the creation of the 
Second Bank of the United States, which was chartered in 1816.  This was met with 
strong opposition by many outside of the northeast who were opposed to a centrally 
controlled financial system, and subsequently the re-chartering of the Second Bank was 
vetoed in 1832.  During the 1830s and 1840s, a number of states passed free banking 
statutes that spurred bank entry. 
A number of Acts passed during the Civil War, including The National Banking 
Act of 1863, created a federal charter for banks.  As a result, the dual banking system 
that exists in the US today originated, whereby commercial banks may operate under 
either a national bank charter or a state bank charter.  Federal Law gives the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a bureau of the US Treasury Department, the 
authority to grant national bank charters and serve as the primary regulator and 
supervisor of national banks.  State law gives each of the 50 state governments the 
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authority to grant state bank charters, and the banking commissions in each state share 
supervisory and regulatory authority over these banks with the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve (the Fed)  (DeYoung, Banking 
in the United States). 
Private clearinghouse systems were later developed in the nineteenth century in 
order to regulate bank activities and provide some forms of private sector monitoring.  
Following the Panic of 1907 and the collapse of the banking system, the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913 was passed, which created a federally-chartered central bank and a 
system of regional Federal Reserve Banks (the Fed).  The complex nature of bank 
supervision in the US has given rise to a large degree of overlap between supervisory 
authorities.   
 
2.3. Overview of Key Regulations. 
This section outlines the key regulatory changes that have occurred in the US banking 
sector.  The five main areas of focus are restrictions on entry and geographic expansion; 
deposit insurance; product-line and activity restrictions; pricing restrictions and capital 
regulation. 
 
2.3.1. Restrictions on entry and geographic expansion. 
Much of the legislation designed to restrict the geographical expansion of banks 
originated during the period when the United States Constitution prohibited states from 
issuing fiat money and from taxing interstate commerce.  In order to generate revenues 
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in light of this, states exerted their authority over banks to obtain fees for granting bank 
charters in addition to levying taxes on banks.  Furthermore, states often owned or 
purchased shares in banks. 
In order to establish a bank it was necessary to obtain a bank charter from the 
state government.  States only received charter fees for banks incorporated in their own 
state and not for those incorporated in other states, thereby giving rise to the prohibition 
on interstate banking and the restriction of competition among banks.  The 1927 
McFadden Act granted states this regulatory authority over national bank’s branching 
activities within their borders.  While the Act did allow banks to enter other states by 
establishing multi-bank holding companies, most state governments typically did not 
grant the approval required to do so.    In addition to the restrictions imposed on 
interstate banking, many states also imposed restrictions on intrastate banking by either 
granting charters for a specific location, or limiting the establishment of bank branches 
to a particular city or county.  Again, the impact of this was to eliminate competition 
from out-of-state banks as well as from the branches of other banks within the same 
state.  Unit banking laws were passed by some state governments, which prohibited 
banks from having any branches at all.  From the 1930s to the 1970s, most states 
imposed partial or blanket restrictions on intrastate branching, in addition to the existing 
interstate restrictions. 
While the 1927 McFadden Act permitted states to restrict branching of national 
banks, the Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act gave 
states the authority to restrict entry by out-of-state banks and holding companies.  This 
act prohibited a BHC from acquiring banks outside the state where it was headquartered 
unless the target bank’s state permitted such acquisitions.  As most states did not grant 
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permission, the amendment effectively prevented interstate banking, thus putting an end 
to the practise adopted by many banks in an attempt to circumvent state branching 
restrictions, whereby multi-bank holding companies which operated in many states were 
formed 
The process of repealing the prohibition on interstate banking began in 1978 
when the state of Maine passed a law which stated that out-of-state BHCs would be 
authorised to enter the state (via the acquisition of existing banks, rather than by 
entering de novo), in exchange for reciprocal agreements by states that permitted entry 
by Maine banks.  Alaska and New York were the first states to reciprocate in 1982, and 
by 1992 all states excluding Hawaii had passed similar laws.  The Reigle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 enabled banks and holding companies 
to enter other states without permission, thereby completing the transition to full 
interstate banking in the US.  The only limit on inter-state expansion of commercial 
banking companies this Act imposed was that they were prohibited from acquiring other 
commercial banks should their percentage of the national deposit market exceed 10%.  
The Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act allowed all 
US banks to acquire banks in other states from September 1995.  Furthermore, from 
June 1997 BHCs were allowed to convert subsidiaries into branches.  State law still 
stipulated that they were only allowed to enter via acquisition rather than de novo 
branching, although in the case of a failed or failing bank, the FDIC has the authority to 
override these restrictions.  Ultimate authority to regulate interstate bank acquisitions 
lies with The Federal Reserve.  To prevent excessive concentration, a BHC or FHC is 
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prohibited from holding more than 30% of total deposits in any given state2 and 10% of 
total deposits nationally.  The Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act made nationwide banking possible in the US for the first time in its history.  
Following the merger with Bank of America in 1998, Nationwide bank claimed to be 
America’s first national bank with branches in 22 states and a share of total insured 
deposits approximating 8%. 
A number of studies have sought to examine whether the Act conveyed any 
benefits, such as increased efficiency and lower costs, as a result of subsidiaries being 
converted to branches.  Using a sample comprising BHC, Carrow and Heron (1998), 
report that the Act had a positive welfare effect.  Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) 
demonstrate how those states that implemented the reciprocal regional agreements 
(1978-1992), which deregulated branching laws, experienced significant permanent 
increases in economic growth as a consequence.  However, Freeman (2002) cautions 
that the Jayaratne and Strahan findings are over-estimated.  Freeman argues that in the 
sample used by Jayaratne and Strahan, real incomes in the states that deregulated were 
on average 4% below trend, and recovered slowly.  These states deregulated branching 
laws to encourage new bank entry because, as a result of poor economic conditions, 
their own state banks were underperforming or even failing.  Freeman concluded that 
Riegle Neal therefore, did not have a powerful impact on growth rates.  Nippani and 
Green (2002) examined the performance of banks in six different asset categories, both 
before and after the implementation of Riegle Neal.  Performance was measured using 
variables including return on equity, return on assets, net interest margins and the ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans.  Their findings confirm that following the 
                                                          
2 States can opt to waive the 30% limit 
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passage of the Reigle-Neal Act, the US banking sector experienced a significant 
increase in the degree of consolidation.  However, a stronger macro-economy was 
largely responsible for the improvement in most performance measures, as 
demonstrated by the significance of real gross domestic product and the bank prime rate 
in the regression analyses undertaken by Nippani and Green (2002).  Thus, the increase 
in consolidation and the accompanying reduction in competition that can potentially 
offset any efficiency gains, may account for the apparently small impact that the Act 
had on the economy and bank performance. 
More recently, research has expanded to examine the impacts of the Reigle-Neal 
Act on the economy in general. Ho and Ishil (2011) argued that the Act lead to a 
subsequent increase in consumer welfare due to the changes in market structure that 
resulted. Notably, gains were highest where a larger number of banks located. Acharya 
et al (2011) suggested that as a result of the Act a reallocation of resources took place 
across sectors other than just banking. The results suggest that improved bank access 
effects were particularly evident in sectors characterised as having young, small and 
external-capital dependent firms. Amore et al (2013) and Cornaggia et al (2014) both 
examined the effect on innovation following the Act. Examining manufacturing firms, 
Amore et al argued that allowing interstate branching had significant beneficial effects 
on innovation activities, especially for external-capital dependent firms and firms 
located close to entering banks. Cornaggia et al report a similar result with small 
innovative firms dependent upon external funding benefitting from interstate branching. 
In slight contrast, Chava et al (2013) suggested the effect on innovation depended on 
local market conditions and whether deregulation led to an increase or decrease in local 
market power. Finally, Beck et al (2010) report that the effect of deregulation on the 
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distribution of income was to narrow that distribution particularly from the lower end, 
through increasing relative wage rates.  
 
2.3.2. Deposit Insurance Legislation. 
Federal deposit insurance was first introduced in 1933, in an attempt to restore 
confidence in the financial system.  While the aim of insuring bank deposits was to 
reduce bank runs, this often led to banks undertaking greater risk also.  For example, 
during the period 1907 to 1917, eight states introduced deposit insurance schemes 
which all subsequently collapsed during the 1920s as a result of banks engaging in 
excessive risk-taking behaviour (Calomiris and White, 2000).  Between 1930 and 1980 
deposit insurance coverage experienced a number of incremental increases.  Since 1980 
however, it has remained flat and thus inflation has reduced its real value by 
approximately 50 percent over the last few decades. 
Some authors have argued that there is evidence to suggest that the branching 
restrictions outlined above have led to reduced risk-taking, which has increased stability 
and therefore reduced the need for deposit insurance.  For instance, examining data 
from the 19th Century during which period private banks issued currency, Gorton 
(1996), provides evidence that notes in circulation which were issued by new banks 
from branch banking states were discounted substantially less than notes issued by 
banks from unit banking states.  Calomiris (1993) reports that states with branch 
banking held both lower reserves and bank capital.  Furthermore, he finds that bank 
failure rates in Arizona, Mississippi and South Carolina (states that permitted branching 
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but were affected by the 1920s agricultural bust) were lower for banks with branches 
than for those without.   
There is limited evidence to suggest that small and rural banks supported both 
restrictions on bank branching (in order to reduce competitive pressures from large 
banks) and deposit insurance (in order to increase deposit supply).  In contrast, large 
and urban banks generally favoured branch banking in order to compete with small 
banks directly and thus opposed deposit insurance as a subsidy to small, poorly 
diversified banks.  During the period 1950 to 1980, deposit insurance coverage 
increased substantially.  White (1998) argues that small banks supported each of the 
increases, while large banks opposed them.  From the 1980s onwards deposit insurance 
coverage has not increased but inflation has reduced its real value by approximately 50 
percent.  Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) argue that globally, deposit insurance has 
been expanding; while Laeven (2004) argues that coverage levels are higher in countries 
characterised by weaker and riskier banking systems. 
Commercial bank failures as a percentage of healthy banks for the period 1934-
39 averaged 0.38% annually.  Between 1940 and 1981 this percentage did not rise 
above 0.08%, then in 1981 it increased dramatically to 0.29% and continued to steadily 
rise to reach its maximum value of 1.68% in 1988.  In an attempt to reduce demands on 
its insurance funds, the FDIC began the process of merging problem banks with healthy 
banks. 
The wave of bank and thrift failures that occurred during the 1980s and early 
1990s halted the increasing coverage of deposit insurance in the US.  During this period 
even the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Association (FSLIC), the federal insurer 
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of thrift deposits, failed.  The FSLIC was replaced by the Savings Association Insurance 
Fund (SAIF) alongside the FDIC which supervised deposit insurance for thrifts, with 
the passage of The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) in 1989.  
In 1991 the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) was passed, which introduced 
risk-based premiums in an attempt to reduce the risk-taking incentives inherent in 
deposit insurance.  Banks were required to generate sufficient revenue from deposit 
insurance premia in order to obtain a target ratio of 1.25 percent of deposits insured by 
the fund.  This Act also instructed the FDIC to resolve failed banks in the least costly 
way to the deposit insurance fund, motivated by the collapse of large banks such as 
Continental Illinois and Bank of New England during the 1980s, which resulted in the 
bail out of all creditors in order to avoid systemic disruptions.  In addition to least-cost 
resolution, the FDICIA also introduced prompt corrective action which required 
regulators to respond quickly when institutions experience trouble. 
In 2002 small banks began issuing fully insured certificates of deposit through 
Certificates of Deposit Account Registry Service (CDARS).  CDARS operates via a 
network of banks whereby a customer’s large deposits are split up and distributed 
among a number of banks (as accounts below the $100000 deposit insurance limit) 
which are each members of the network.  This effectively enabled large depositors to 
circumvent deposit insurance limits. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act was passed in 2005 (which is part of 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (S 1932) that was signed into law on February 8 
2006).  This Act created a new Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) that merged the old Bank 
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Insurance Fund with the Savings Institution Insurance Fund.  It also increased deposit 
insurance for retirement accounts to $250000, allowing for the adjustment of deposit 
insurance limits for inflation as of April 2010, and furthermore, increased the FDIC’s 
flexibility in setting risk-based premiums.  There still exist constraints on risk-based 
premiums however, which require that dividends must be paid to member institutions 
once the new DIF reserve fund reaches 1.35 percent of total insured deposits, in order 
that the reserve ratio does not exceed this threshold. 
 
2.3.3. Product-Line and Activity Restrictions. 
Product-line and activity restrictions refer to those regulations governing both bank 
products as well as the activities that banks are permitted to engage in.  The first explicit 
restrictions which prohibited banks from engaging in non-bank financial activities, such 
as underwriting and insurance, were imposed with the passage of the Banking Act of 
1933.  The four sections of the Act that separate banking and non-banking activity (16, 
20, 21, 32) are collectively known as the Glass-Steagall Act (Mester, 1996).  The 
distinction between banks, insurance and securities firms was further highlighted by the 
passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.  This distinct separation of activity 
remained until the mid-1980s, when the Federal Reserve and the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) began relaxing the restrictions on banks, thereby 
enabling them to engage in activities such as investment banking and insurance.    
While Glass-Steagall and the subsequent Banking Acts of 1956 and 1970 
prohibited banks and bank holding company affiliates from underwriting, certain 
securities were deemed ‘eligible’ by regulators (including municipal general obligation 
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bonds, US government bonds, and real estate bonds (Kwan, 1998)).  In 1987, the 
Federal Reserve allowed subsidiaries of three BHCs to underwrite certain securities 
(such as municipal revenue bonds, commercial paper, and mortgage-related securities) 
providing the revenue generated did not exceed 5 percent of the subsidiary’s gross 
revenue (Bhargava and Fraser, 1998).   The Federal Reserve derived the legal authority 
for this decision from a clause in Section 20 of the 1933 Banking Act. 
In 1989 the Federal Reserve continued the expansion of BHC powers by 
allowing the ‘Section 20 subsidiaries’ to underwrite corporate debt and equity 
securities, again subject to the 5 percent revenue limitation.  The revenue limit on 
Section 20 subsidiaries was incrementally increased by the Federal Reserve, which also 
subsequently allowed other activities such as those related to government securities, to 
be placed in these subsidiaries.  
  As BHCs involvement in non-bank financial operations continued to increase, 
the Federal Reserve enforced firewalls between banking and non-banking activity 
within the subsidiary structure of the BHC.  The purpose of such firewalls was to 
prevent both financial and information flows between securities and banking 
subsidiaries.   Furthermore, they were intended to protect banking activity from 
unforeseen shocks to non-bank activity.  In July 1996 the Federal Reserve began easing 
the restrictions between banking and non-banking activities. 
The Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (also known as the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act) completed the dismantling of Glass-Steagall.  Under this Act, Financial 
Holding Companies (FHCs) were permitted to own affiliates engaged in banking, 
insurance underwriting and securities activities.  The first full-service financial 
36 
 
conglomerate to exist in the US since the 1920s was formed as a result of the merger of 
Citicorp and Travelers, which preceded the passage of the Act by roughly six months. 
Since GLBA, the separation between commercial and investment banking has 
become less distinct.  Furthermore, traditional investment banks have become 
increasingly involved in commercial lending.  As commercial and investment banking 
activities have become less segregated, this has enabled commercial banks to become 
more involved in the corporate securities markets.  For instance, as Loughran and Ritter 
(1994) report, throughout the 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in the number of 
initial public offerings (IPOs).  Furthermore, throughout this period, firms increasingly 
used bond financing.  The 1980s also witnessed the growth of original issue high yield 
debt (so-called junk bond) market.  Consequently, firms became less reliant on 
commercial bank borrowing, as public markets now offered a new source of funds.  
Thus banks have become increasingly exposed to increased competition from other 
financial institutions. 
Both the Reigle-Neal Act and the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act were instrumental 
in ratifying deregulation that began in the 1970s and spanned several decades.  Both 
Acts also helped accelerate the adoption of new financial processes and information 
technologies by US banks. 
Sufi (2005) analyses how financial conglomerates have come to dominate the 
market for debt underwriting.  In 1996, the top five debt underwriters were all stand-
alone investment banks (Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch and First Boston).  However, by 2003, four of the top five underwriters were 
owned by full-service financial conglomerates (Citigroup, JPMorganChase, Bank of 
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America, Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse).  Furthermore, Sufi also argues that 
traditional investment banks have expanded their activities to include commercial 
lending.  For example, according to Loan Pricing Corporation, Goldman Sachs ranked 
seventh and Lehman Brothers ranked ninth in arranging syndicated loans during the 
first half of 2005. 
Kroszner (1998) analyses the similarities between this convergence and that 
observed in the 1920s.  In particular with respect to the pressures on commercial banks 
to become more involved in the corporate securities markets.  The increasing frequency 
with which firms accessed the public equity and debt markets was one of the most 
notable developments in the 1920s.  Throughout this period there was an increase in the 
volume of new equity issues, in particular during late 1928 and 1929 whereby a 
dramatic increase was experienced.  This trend was mirrored in the 1980s when the 
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) increased dramatically.  Loughran and Ritter 
(1994) report that from the 1970s to the 1980s the number of IPOs nearly tripled from 
an average of 120 per year to an average of 350 per year. 
In both the 1920s and the 1980s more firms were beginning to use bond 
financing.  Smaller and lesser known firms were able to access the bond markets and as 
a result the average rating of corporate bonds declined.  That is, the proportion of bonds 
that were initially rated below investment grade rose steadily during the 1920s, from 12 
percent in 1921 to 43 percent by 1929 (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994).  The same 
phenomenon is observed during the 1980s when the original issue high yield debt (junk-
bond market) began to grow.  The number of bonds initially rated below investment 
grade increased from 24 in 1981 to 200 by 1986, and the amount issued rose from $1.2 
billion to $30.9 billion during this period (Asquith et al. 1989). 
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As public markets were increasingly used as a source of funds for firms, reliance 
on commercial bank borrowing declined.  Over the course of the last few decades banks 
have also been exposed to greater competition from other financial institutions.  
Commercial bank share of the total assets of U.S. financial institutions has remained 
roughly constant at 60 to 65 percent over the period 1880 to 1922.  Between 1922 and 
1929, commercial banks then experienced a dramatic decrease in share to 54 percent, 
while investment companies (i.e. mutual funds), securities brokers and dealers, finance 
companies and insurance companies all experienced an increase in share.  Between 
1980 and 2004, commercial banks again experienced a dramatic decrease in share 
(which throughout the period 1960 to 1980 had remained relatively stable between 35 
and 38 percent) to 24 percent by 2004. 
Recessions marked both the beginning and the end of the 1920s and the 1980s, 
while both decades also experienced lengthy periods of economic growth in between.  
Furthermore, both periods also suffered a major stock market crash (October 1929 and 
October 1987) toward the end of each period, although one marked the start of the Great 
Depression whereas the other was relatively mild.  Both recessions were accompanied 
by a major wave of depository institution failure and closure.  During the Great 
Depression, the banking problems were system-wide and led to a near collapse of the 
entire financial system (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Calomiris and Mason, 2003).  
However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the problems experienced in the thrift and 
banking industries whilst considerable, did not have the same consequences (Barth 
1991, Kroszner and Strahan 1996, and White 1991). 
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2.3.4. Pricing Restrictions. 
Regulations governing pricing policies have restricted both bank deposit and bank loan 
pricing policies.  Federal Reserve’s Regulation Q, which imposed ceilings on bank 
deposit interest rates, provides an example of price restrictions affecting the deposit 
side.  When market interest rates were higher than the imposed ceiling rates, banks 
faced reduced deposit supply which consequently forced them to decrease lending.  
During the 1970s, high inflation and loose monetary policy caused market rates to 
increase far beyond the ceiling rates.  Furthermore, high inflation also increased the 
costs of holding non-interest bearing required reserves at bank members of the Federal 
Reserve System.  As a result, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) was passed by Congress in 1980 which lowered reserve 
requirements and ended most deposit rate ceilings. Thus although most states still have 
usury ceilings in place they are generally not indexed to inflation and in the recent low 
inflation environment have therefore not been binding on traditional bank lending.  For 
‘sub-prime’ borrowers who are generally riskier, the ceilings may still bind in various 
circumstances.  Flannery and Samolyk (2005) show that payday lenders, which provide 
small-value short-term loans (typically less than $300 for approximately two weeks), 
typically charge annualised interest rates that are at the state level maximum. 
Usury laws restricting the rates that banks are permitted to charge on loans date 
back to the Colonial period in the US.  Standard interpretation of lending-side 
regulations is that they exist to protect politically powerful borrowers.  For example, 
Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) report that tighter usury restrictions were found in 
those states with more powerful incumbent elites.  Furthermore, these states were less 
likely to respond to external pressure for repeal.  In contrast to this view, Glaeser and 
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Scheinkmann (1998) argue that such restrictions exist to reduce the impact of 
incomplete credit markets.  In this model agents borrow to smooth consumption during 
negative income shocks, and usury laws transfer wealth to low-income states, which 
encourages a move toward optimal risk sharing. 
In 1978 the Supreme Court ruled that Section 85 of the National Banking Act 
allowed a lender to charge up to the maximum amount allowed in its home state, 
irrespective of the location of the borrower.  This encouraged states to raise their usury 
limits to compete for those banks providing credit card lending services, as this lending 
is not geographically based.  The result was a rapid increase in the supply of credit card 
loans which was predominantly concentrated among high-risk borrowers (as credit 
restriction resulting from interest rate ceilings mostly targets this segment of the 
market), accompanied by a long and steady increase in personal bankruptcy rates.   
 
 
2.3.5. Regulation of Bank Capital. 
Such restrictions, imposed in order to ensure sufficient capital in the banking industry, 
date back to the 19th Century when a minimum absolute amount of capital was typically 
required in order to obtain a bank charter.  However, restrictions governing bank 
capital-asset ratios did not emerge until the 1980s, and came about in response to 
historically low capital ratios within the banking industry.  Leverage ratios have 
gradually increased over a period starting in the 19th Century until the early 1980s as a 
result of the introduction of deposit insurance (during the Great Depression), the 
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increase in bank size and diversification, in addition to better risk management practices 
that have evolved over time (Peltzman 1970, Calomiris and Wilson 1996). 
Regulations governing minimum capital-asset ratios have become increasingly 
complex in response to the changing nature of banking, whereby a larger proportion of 
bank business is associated with off-balance sheet activity, thereby generating revenues 
from non-interest sources.  Off-balance sheet activities also represent an important 
component of bank risk that is not measured by total assets or loans.  The initial 
minimum requirements imposed on banks were based on the raw ratio of equity capital 
to total assets.  However, as bank business has become increasingly associated with off-
balance sheet activities such as credit guarantees and unfunded loan commitments, 
existing regulations were no longer deemed adequate (Boyd and Gertler, 1994).  
Mishkin and Strahan (1999) note that these off-balance sheet activities have provided a 
dramatic increase in bank revenues from non-interest sources as well as representing an 
important component of bank risk that is not measured by total assets or loans.  The 
1988 Basel Capital Accord included off balance sheet exposures as well as accounting 
for credit risk in constructing risk-based assets. 
Over the last decade banks have employed increasingly sophisticated risk 
management models, and these new financial technologies have fuelled changes to 
capital requirements.  For example, in 1996 new capital requirements for market risks 
were adopted using banks’ internal risk measurement models.  Value-at-Risk models, 
which estimate quantiles of profit and loss distributions for bank trading positions were 
the key innovation leading to changes in regulations regarding capital requirements. The 
strength of these models is that they are able to quantify the likely magnitude of bank 
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losses during normal market conditions.  Sophisticated versions of these models are 
further able to avoid making strong distributional assumptions (Jorion, 2000). 
Basel II was introduced following the successful introduction of market risk 
capital requirements.  The three “pillars” of this Accord are a focus on trying to update 
capital requirements, ensure effective regulatory supervision and enhance the role of 
market discipline.   
 
2.4. Technological Changes and Financial Innovation. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of financial and technological innovations 
occurred.  Together with extensive deregulation over the final quarter of the last 
century, these factors were responsible for eroding the deposit-based funding 
advantages of US commercial banks.  Distribution networks were transformed as a 
result of innovation, i.e. with the advent of internet banking, in addition banks’ reliance 
on traditional interest income also declined.   
The money market mutual fund (MMMF) introduced in 1971, was the first of 
such innovations.  MMMFs made investments more accessible to the average household 
as they transformed large-denomination money market instruments (commercial paper, 
negotiable CDs and Treasury securities) into smaller denomination investments.  They 
allowed investors limited cheque-writing privileges and were also not subject to 
Regulation Q.  In the late 1970s tight monetary policy forced money market interest 
rates as much as 10 percentage points above the Regulation Q ceiling on deposit interest 
rates resulting in the dramatic growth of MMMFs during this period as they were not 
constrained by Regulation Q.  This created the process of “disintermediation” whereby 
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household funds flowed out of bank deposit accounts and into MMMFs.  In 1982 The 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act granted banks and thrifts the authority to 
offer money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), which are transaction accounts with 
no interest rate ceiling, thereby enabling them to compete directly with MMMFs.  The 
Act also permitted thrift institutions to make commercial loans thereby encouraging 
more direct competition with community banks. 
Another major innovation to influence retail banking during the 1970s was the 
automated teller machine (ATM).  The introduction of the ATM improved service 
quality by providing greater convenience for retail customers.  Bank revenues were also 
enhanced by charging transactions fees to customers of other banks; furthermore, bank 
branch efficiency was improved as ATMs replaced more expensive human tellers.  
DeYoung, Hunter and Udell (2004) report that the average banking office in the US has 
become more productive since the 1980s, as indicated by an increase in assets, 
operating income, and the number of transactions per banking office.  The authors argue 
that this helps to explain the large increase in the number of bank branches since the 
1970s.  
In contrast to most developed countries, by the end of the 20th Century, 
approximately two-thirds of US payments transactions were still conducted using 
cheques and cash.  However, electronic payments technologies are rapidly replacing 
paper-based payments.  Evidence to support this is provided by Gerdes and Walton 
(2002) and Humphrey (2002).  Both studies report an annual decline in the number of 
cheques paid in the US by approximately 3% during the late 1990s.  While Gerdes and 
Walton report an annual increase of 7.3 percent in payments made by credit cards, 
Humphrey reports this increase to be 35.6 percent per year.  Similarly, Berger (2003) 
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analyses the volume of automated clearinghouse (ACH) transactions handled by the 
Federal Reserve for the period 1990 to 2000.  Berger reports that both automatic 
payment of recurring monthly bills and automatic deposit of wage and salary payment 
transactions increased at a rate of 14.2 percent annually throughout the period.  The 
Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finance 2004 indicates that US consumers now 
hold smaller precautionary balances.  For instance, between 1983 and 2001, the fraction 
of household financial assets held in transactions accounts decreased from 7.3 percent to 
4.6 percent.  This decline can be attributed to the fact that electronic payments are more 
predictable than cheque-based payments in terms of dispersal and receipt dates. 
Internet banking is yet another innovation to transform banking in the US.  Its 
advent has further diminished the importance of geography, and reduced the cost of 
producing basic banking services.  This is supported by a number of authors including 
DeYoung (2005), DeYoung, Lang, and Nolle (2007) who report that small banks may 
enhance their profitability by offering internet banking services.  Currently there are 
only a few US banks that offer services exclusively via the internet.  The predominant 
internet banking strategy is the “click-and-mortar” model whereby banks combine a 
transactional internet site with networks of traditional brick-and-mortar offices and 
ATMs. 
Securitised lending is another financial innovation that has had a massive effect 
on the structure and performance of the US banking industry.  A loan securitization 
refers to a trust that purchases existing home mortgage loans (or auto loans, or credit 
card receivables) from banks using funds raised by selling “mortgage-backed securities” 
(MBSs) to third-party investors.  The return on the MBSs is dependent on the 
performance of the mortgage loans held in the trust.  This process therefore enables 
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banks to sell their otherwise illiquid loans to the securitization and use the revenue they 
receive from doing so to fund additional loans or alternative investments.  Berlin (2007) 
reports a growing secondary market for syndicated loans.  These are loans made to large 
firms by syndicates of large banks, thus providing similar liquidity benefits to 
securitized loans and reducing the cost of loans to large firms.  The introduction of 
MBSs has enabled community banks to better diversify their loan portfolios by 
purchasing MBSs from securitizations of mortgages from other areas of the country.  
Many large retail banks have also transformed themselves from traditional originate-
and-hold mortgage lenders to originate-and-securitize mortgage bankers.  As a result, 
large retail banks are now less reliant on traditional interest-based income while non-
interest income from loan origination fees, loan securitization fees, and loan servicing 
fees has increased.   
The growth in securitized mortgage lending was boosted by the introduction of 
two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), namely the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae, founded in 1938) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mae, founded in 1970).  Approximately half of total residential 
mortgage debt in the US are either securitized by, or held in the portfolio of, these two 
GSEs.  Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, both enterprises had large lines of credit at the 
US Department of the Treasury, and were perceived to be “too-big-to-fail”.  This 
effectively gave them a funding advantage over private sector mortgage securitizers.   
Another financial innovation fundamental to loan securitization is credit scoring.  
First introduced in the 1950s, credit scoring refers to the process whereby quantitative 
information concerning individual borrowing such as income, employment or payment 
history is transformed into a single numerical credit score.  Mester (1997) reports the 
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now widespread use of credit scoring in consumer, mortgage and micro-small business 
lending.  Credit scores are widely used; for instance lenders apply them when analyzing 
loan applications, investment banks use them to construct pools of loans to be 
securitized and bond-rating companies use credit scores to assign risk ratings to asset-
backed securities.  While most lenders rely on third-party credit bureau scores for 
screening purposes, some banks (mostly larger ones) have developed their own credit-
scoring formulas.  Credit-scoring has significantly reduced the unit cost of underwriting 
individual loans thereby increasing the minimum efficient scale of consumer loan 
underwriting which financial institutions undertake.  Various authors including Berger, 
Frame and Miller (2005); and Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley (2001) have argued that 
the introduction of credit-scoring has provided greater incentive for lenders’ to offer 
additional credit. 
 
 
 
2.5. Structure of the U.S. Banking Industry. 
As mentioned above, the US banking industry was subject to extensive regulations for 
many decades, which consequently stifled the growth of existing banks.  Thus, relative 
to the largest European and Japanese banks, the biggest US banks have typically been 
smaller.  Deregulation has drastically altered the structure of the US banking industry as 
commercial banks have grown rapidly, predominantly via mergers and acquisitions of 
other US banks.  Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present summary information regarding the number 
of commercial banks since the mid-1980s, including the number of bank additions and 
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deletions. More specifically, Table 2.1 shows the number of banks and branches by year 
over the period 1984 to 2009.  At the start of the sample period there were more than 
14000 commercial banks and over 42000 branches.  By 2009 the number of banks had 
fallen to less than 7000, while the number of branches had roughly doubled.  Figure 2.2 
graphically represents the information regarding the number of banks. Table 2.2 shows 
the changes to the number of commercial banks in terms of additions and deletions to 
the number of bank charters. For instance, on average, approximately 350 commercial 
banks were acquired each year during the 1980s, approximately 500 each year during 
the 1990s, and approximately 300 each year during the first half of the 2000s.  
Furthermore, since the 1980s, more than 10 000 bank charters have been merged out of 
existence.  For comparison, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the number of commercial 
banks remained stable at roughly 14000 banks; following deregulation however, the 
number of commercial bank charters fell to less than 7000 by 2009.  
Additionally, a wave of bank failures has also contributed to the fall in US commercial 
bank charters.  During the late 1980s and early 1990s, more than 1500 insolvent banks 
were dissolved by regulators, primarily as a result of both an unexpected increase in 
interest rates and sustained regional declines in real estate values. 
While the number of US commercial banks diminished as a result of mergers 
and failures, more than 7000 new banking charters have also been granted since 1970.  
When small banks are acquired by large out-of-state banks, this inevitably causes a 
degree of dissatisfaction among both employees and customers, thus prompting them to 
change banks, or even establish new banks (a relatively straight-forward task in the US, 
given the small amount of investment capital required to start up a new bank). 
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Table 2.1. Number of Institutions and Branches. 
 
Year Institutions Branches 
2009 6823 82437 
2008 7072 82287 
2007 7266 78462 
2006 7384 75913 
2005 7510 72869 
2004 7615 70264 
2003 7753 67631 
2002 7871 66317 
2001 8064 65046 
2000 8297 64284 
1999 8564 63726 
1998 8759 62066 
1997 9125 60392 
1996 9510 57823 
1995 9922 56363 
1994 10432 54585 
1993 10945 52540 
1992 11450 51643 
1991 11909 51968 
1990 12329 50479 
1989 12697 48088 
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1988 13119 46468 
1987 13705 45488 
1986 14193 44528 
1985 14402 43442 
1984 14483 42390 
Notes: Entries are the number of commercial banks and their branches over the period 
1984 to 2009. Source: FDIC Commercial Bank Reports, Table CB01. 
 
In particular, the majority of the decline in bank numbers occurred in the 
community bank sector, i.e. banks with less than $1 billion in assets and especially 
within the smallest size group of banks.  This decline does not appear to have been 
confined to a particular region or market though, but was rather relatively uniform.  
Again, most of this decline was attributable to mergers and acquisitions; although, bank 
failures also accounted for a significant proportion of the decline.  While small banks 
have experienced a large fall in numbers, these community banks still account for the 
largest share of banking organisations.  Alongside the decreasing numbers of small 
banks within the US banking sector, there has also been an increase in the number of 
large banks.  Following deregulation and the removal of barriers to competition, the 
largest banks have grown even bigger, with industry assets becoming increasingly more 
concentrated among these banks.    
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Table 2.2. Number of Bank Additions and Deletions by Type. 
 
 
Year 
Additions Deletions Year 
End 
Total  
New Charters 
 
Conversions 
Unassisted 
Mergers 
Failures 
Mergers Paid Off Other 
2009 24 10 158 114 6 13 6826 
2008 90 19 259 19 0 25 7083 
2007 175 19 293 1 0 14 7277 
2006 177 12 309 0 0 1 7391 
2005 167 11 271 0 0 17 7512 
2004 120 25 262 3 0 20 7622 
2003 110 18 225 2 0 13 7762 
2002 90 13 275 6 4 25 7874 
2001 125 16 359 3 0 -2 8081 
2000 188 22 456 6 0 17 8300 
1999 227 18 418 7 0 37 8569 
1998 187 28 559 3 0 4 8786 
1997 182 51 599 1 0 16 9137 
1996 139 35 553 5 0 22 9520 
1995 96 28 608 6 0 39 9926 
1994 45 12 547 12 0 -2 10455 
1993 47 12 480 56 5 31 10955 
1992 40 10 429 86 11 4 11468 
1991 76 31 446 101 4 -58 11948 
1990 138 20 392 151 8 -23 12334 
1989 170 8 413 196 9 -19 12704 
1988 191 3 600 201 6 8 13125 
1987 196 36 541 176 11 -29 13746 
1986 215 31 346 120 21 -41 14213 
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1985 279 43 334 93 22 -45 14413 
1984 356 8 331 73 4 0 14495 
Notes: Entries are the number of commercial bank additions and subtraction by type 
over the period 1984 to 2009. Source: FDIC Commercial Bank Reports, Table CB02. 
 
Following deregulation, the largest US banks have rapidly increased in size.  
During the mid-1980s only the largest US commercial banking company (Citibank) had 
more than $100 billion in assets, but by the mid-2000s nearly twenty US banking 
companies had more than $100 billion, and three exceeded $1 trillion.  Indeed the lower 
part of Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of all bank assets held by the top 5%. As can be 
seen this has increased from the low 70%s in the mid-1980s to the high 80%s at the end 
of the sample. As mentioned above, bank mergers have contributed greatly to this 
growth, which while having little effect on the structure of local banking markets, has 
influenced the nature of competition in these markets.  For instance, DeYoung, Hasan 
and Kirchhoff (1998) and Evanoff and Ors (2002) report that following the acquisition 
of a local bank by a large out-of-market bank, the cost efficiency of other local banks 
tends to improve, presumably as a result of increased competitive pressure. 
Following deregulation, US banks have expanded not only within domestic 
markets, but now compete in foreign, global markets also.  Through rapid geographic 
growth and expansion into investment banking services, US commercial banking 
companies now rank among the world’s largest in terms of syndicated lending, debt 
underwriting, and equities underwriting. 
Consolidation and geographic expansion has also altered the nature of bank 
delivery systems.  For example, since 1980 the number of commercial banks has 
halved, yet the number of bank branches has nearly doubled.  By increasing the number 
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of branches it owns, a bank is able to establish a greater market presence and limit entry 
by competitors.   
Consolidation during the 1980s and 1990s has been accompanied by an increase 
in the portion of industry income generated from fees rather than interest, as larger 
banks generate a greater portion of their income from non-interest activities than smaller 
banks.  DeYoung and Roland (2001) have argued that the increase in non-interest 
income at US banks has fundamentally altered their risk-return profiles.  Several other 
empirical studies have investigated the riskiness of non-interest income.  DeYoung and 
Rice (2004a) found that marginal increases in non-interest income are associated with a 
worsening of banks’ risk-return trade-off.  Stiroh (2004a, 2004b) found no evidence of 
diversification gains at banks that combine interest and non-interest income.  Clark, 
Dick, Hirtle, Stiroh, and Williams (2007) emphasize how the increasingly retail-focused 
strategies of large US banking companies expose these banks to economic and business 
cycle volatility. 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis which began in 2007 demonstrates the income 
volatility associated with fee-driven transactions banking.  Investors in sub-prime 
mortgage-backed securities suffered large capital losses as borrowers defaulted.  In 
addition they suffered huge losses in fee income from originating and securitizing the 
underlying sub-prime mortgage loans.  Diversified financial institutions that invested 
heavily in sub-prime mortgage-backed securities (e.g. Merrill Lynch, CitiGroup) 
suffered large but ultimately sustainable losses - even though CitiGroup and other US 
financial institutions required large infusions of capital from foreign investors.  
However, mortgage banking companies with non-diversified strategies were not able to 
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survive the crisis, due to dramatic reductions in non-interest income from their 
mortgage origination and securitization activities. 
Finally, Figure 2.1 shows how these changes have impacted average profitability 
of the banking sector from the mid-1980s. What can be seen from this figure is that 
profitability increased from the early 1980s. This may in part be linked to 
macroeconomic events such as the emergence from the recession of the early 1980s and 
the resulting economic expansion, which in turn was aided by low international 
commodity prices. This period also saw the emergence of inter-state banking which 
may have increased competitive pressures, hence leading to an increase in the 
profitability of the sector. A small downturn in profitability is noticed in the early 
2000s, again this may be associated with the mild economic recession that resulted from 
the dotcom crash. While there is no obvious change in profitability following the 1999 
GLBA. Finally, there is a downturn in profitability associated with the onset of the 
financial crisis.  
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2.6. 2007 Financial Crisis (Subprime Mortgage Market Crisis). 
In the summer of 2007 the subprime loan market began to experience significant 
problems as several lenders filed for bankruptcy.  The resultant huge losses incurred 
were not confined to those firms operating in the subprime mortgage market, but were 
rather far-reaching throughout the financial sector, with many other firms suffering 
credit and liquidity problems.  In June 2007 Bear Stearns bailed out two of its hedge 
funds, costing the company $3.2 billion.  At the start of August 2007 a leading home 
loan provider, American Home mortgage, filed for bankruptcy.  This was followed a 
few days later by BNP Paribas’ suspension of three of its hedge funds worth €2 billion.  
By the end of June, Countrywide, the leading subprime lender, raised $2billion in 
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capital from the Bank of America in order to improve its financial condition, and was 
subsequently acquired by the Bank of America. 
In March 2008, the Fed funded a loan to JPMorgan Chase which enabled them 
to acquire Bear Stearns when it collapsed.  In contrast however, the Fed did not provide 
any financial assistance to Lehman Brothers a few months later, and subsequently the 
firm was forced to file for bankruptcy in September 2008.   The Fed did assist insurance 
giant American International Group (AIG), extending an $85 billion loan in exchange 
for a 79% ownership stake.  AIG received further loans and capital injections from the 
Fed and the Treasury in order to prevent its collapse. 
In 2008, the government also took action to assist the mortgage market.  The 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act, passed in July 2008, authorised the Federal 
Housing Authority to guarantee up to $300 billion in new thirty-year fixed-rate 
mortgages for subprime borrowers.  By September 7 2008, the Government-Sponsored-
Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were effectively nationalised, in order 
to ensure they remained solvent, as a result of their deteriorating financial situation. 
Despite the interventionary government policy the financial climate continued to 
deteriorate, and in October 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was 
passed.  This Act authorised the Treasury to use up to $700 billion to stabilise the 
financial sector as well as increasing the limits on bank deposits insured by the FDIC.  
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) is part of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilisation Act signed into law on October 3 2008.  The initial proposal was to allow 
the US Treasury to purchase or insure up to $700 billion of troubled assets from a wide 
range of financial instruments including mortgage-backed securities held by US 
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financial institutions.  The aim of this program was to promote stability and strengthen 
the US financial sector.  Subsequently the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act reduced the amount authorised to $475 billion and by March 
12 2012, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) further reduced this amount to $431 
billion. 
During the period 28th October 2008 to 14 August 2009, $204 billion had been 
injected by the Treasury into 668 financial institutions.  Furthermore, over this period 
36 institutions had repaid $70 billion back to the Treasury.  FDIC unlimited insurance 
coverage was also extended to all noninterest-bearing transaction accounts.  The Fed 
also sought to lower home mortgage rates by agreeing to purchase housing-related 
securities issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and Federal 
Home Loan Banks in addition to lending money against securities backed by car loans, 
student loans, credit-card debt and small-business loans.  Furthermore, from 18 
September 2007, the Fed lowered its target federal funds rate ten times from 5.25% to 
0-0.25% on 26 September 2008. 
In response to the financial crisis of the late-2000s, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed on 21 July 2010.  This Act is the most 
drastic change to financial regulation in the US, since the Great Depression.  It extends 
to all Federal financial regulatory agencies, and affects most aspects of the US financial 
services industry.  The major components of the Act include the consolidation of 
regulatory agencies to improve accountability and transparency in the financial system; 
protection of the American taxpayer by ending bailouts (thus eliminating the “too big to 
fail” attitude) and the protection of consumers from abusive financial services practices. 
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As discussed in Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010), the financial crisis that began 
in 2007 resulted in a large increase in the number of bank failures.  Between 1st January 
2007 and 31st March 2010, 2.4% of all federally insured banks (206 commercial and 
savings institutions) in operation on 31st December 2006 failed.  These failed banks held 
6.5% of total US bank deposits ($373 billion) as of 30th June 2006.  This is in stark 
contrast to the decade preceding the 2007 financial crisis, whereby, on average only 4 
banks a year failed; but more similar to the period of bank failures that occurred during 
the 1980s and early 1990s when, for example, more than 100 bank failures occurred 
each year from 1987 to 1992.  See Figure 3.  Throughout the 2007-10 financial crisis 
states that experienced more severe economic distress were typically also characterised 
by higher bank failure rates.  This regional pattern of bank failures suggests that banks 
still remain vulnerable to local economic shocks, in spite of deregulation intended to 
remove branching restrictions. 
Wheelock (2010) also compares the Federal Reserve’s responses to the crises of 
1929-1933 and 2007-2009, in order to determine whether lessons were learned and thus 
whether the impact of the more recent crisis was in any way curbed by the Fed.  The 
author reports that the economic recession brought about by the 2007-2009 crisis was 
mild in comparison to the Great Depression and is widely believed to be the result of 
aggressive interventionary policies. 
Deregulation and the creation of branch networks facilitated both geographic 
diversification and scale economies for banks, thus theoretically rendering them less 
vulnerable to local economic shocks.  While the 2007 financial crisis affected most 
areas of the U.S. the extent to which house prices and personal incomes declined varied 
considerably across both state and local markets.  Therefore, by operating branches in 
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different markets, some banks may have been able to protect themselves somewhat 
against downturns in local real estate markets and economic activity.  Some banks with 
extensive branching networks still suffered significant losses however, as a result of a 
lack of diversification across markets (both product and geographic), and heavy 
investment in nonprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (for example, 
Washington Mutual).  Wheelock (2010a) finds that throughout the period January 1 
2007 until March 31 2010, the state of Georgia had the highest number of bank failures 
(36 out of 346 banks); while Nevada experienced the highest failure rate (ratio of failed 
to total banks), with 5 out of 28 banks failing.  Fifteen states had no bank failure over 
the same period, with six of these states in the Northeast. 
The financial crisis starting in 2007 came about as a result of a decline in house 
prices and significant increase in mortgage delinquency rates.  Savings institutions, 
which historically have focused on residential mortgage lending, were especially 
vulnerable to the decline in house prices.  Following deregulation, in more recent years 
both competitive pressures and potential profit opportunities have led to an increase in 
real estate lending by commercial banks. 
A strong negative correlation exists between state bank failure rates throughout 
the 2007-2010 crisis and growth of per capita personal income and gross state product.  
Furthermore, states with the largest decline in personal income or gross state product 
also tended to have the highest bank failure rates and the largest increases in 
unemployment rates. Bank failure rates were typically higher in states experiencing the 
biggest drop in house prices and the greatest rise in home mortgage delinquency rates. 
Prior to 2007, these states had also experienced the largest increases in both subprime 
mortgages as well as house prices. 
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 The 2007 financial crisis and recession produced a marked increase in the 
number of bank failures which, along with a wave of mergers, resulted in a large decline 
in the number of banks.  In total, between December 31st 2006 and December 31st 2010, 
the number of US banks fell by 12 percent, continuing a trend of consolidation that 
started in the mid-1980s.  In addition, total US deposits held by the 10 largest 
commercial banks increased from 44 to 49 percent over the same period (Wheelock 
2011a).  Wheelock also reports that the average concentration of local banking markets 
changes very little over time, as too does the average number of dominant banks in 
them, even during the recent financial crisis and recession when numerous bank failures 
and several large mergers occurred.  That is, in markets where local offices already 
existed for both the acquiring and acquired banks, on average there was no significant 
increase in concentration, in particular, given that most banks that failed during the 
recent crisis were small.  However, such mergers typically resulted in larger increases in 
concentration in rural markets, compared to urban markets (Wheelock 2011b).  The 
author also reports that throughout this period unassisted mergers potentially had a 
greater influence on the structure of the banking industry, as they accounted for more of 
the decline in the number of US banks than bank failures did.  Furthermore, the author 
also argues that the relevance of local market characteristics in analysing competition in 
banking may become less important as technology continues to evolve, thereby 
lowering the costs of obtaining banking services from other geographical areas. 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
2.7. Summary and Conclusion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the structure and performance 
of the US banking system.  The chapter begins by providing a brief historical 
background of the evolution of the US banking system, from the origins of the First 
Bank of the United States in 1791 to a peak of approximately 14000 banks in the 1980s 
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and falling to just below 7000 currently.  The creation of the unique dual banking 
system, the FDIC and Federal Reserve System are also discussed. 
 The chapter then discusses the evolution of the key regulatory changes that have 
impacted upon the US banking system.  Extensive interventionary government policy 
aimed at protecting the banking sector by reducing competition was first introduced in 
response to the Great Depression during the 1930s.  This highly restrictive legislation 
remained in place until the 1980s, when the process of deregulation began.  The five 
key areas that regulatory policy focused on are discussed, namely, restrictions on entry 
and geographic expansion; deposit insurance; product-line and activity restrictions; 
pricing restrictions and capital regulation. 
 The impact of technological and financial innovation on the banking sector is 
then reviewed.  During the 1970s and 1980s a large number of new financial tools, such 
as MMMFs and securitised lending were created, in addition to technological advances, 
such as the creation of the ATM.  Combined with the effects of deregulation, these 
innovations completely transformed the banking industry.  As banks expanded their 
products and services into these new areas, the proportion of their income generated 
from traditional fee-based activities declined while at the same time non-interest income 
from these new areas of business began to rise.  Advances in technology also had a 
significant impact on banks operations and delivery networks.  For example not only 
were banks able to expand their operations geographically with the advent of internet 
banking, but also innovations such as the ATM enabled banks to operate more 
efficiently as they replaced more costly and inefficient people. 
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 We then consider an overview of the structure of the commercial banking 
industry, and how it has evolved in response to deregulation.  The extensive regulatory 
policy imposed during the 1930s in an attempt to restore stability was aimed at 
protecting incumbent banks by restricting competition.  Consequently the growth of 
banks was also restricted, and therefore prior to deregulation, the largest banks in the 
US were much smaller than the largest European and Japanese banks.  Mostly via 
mergers and acquisitions, the largest US banks dramatically increased in size following 
deregulation throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and now compete on a global scale.  The 
number of banks has also changed drastically over this time period in response to the 
changing environment.  In the early 1980s there were roughly 14000 banks, by 2009 the 
number had more than halved to less than 7000 banks.  At the same time, the number of 
bank branches has roughly doubled from approximately 42000 branches in 1984 to just 
over 82000 branches in 2009.  During the late 1980s and early 1990s there were also 
more than 1500 bank insolvencies, mostly via mergers and acquisitions of failing banks.  
The US banking industry has also experienced a large volume of new bank charters, 
totalling more than 7000 since the 1970s.   
 With the removal of restrictive regulatory policies, banks have become more 
diversified in the products and services they offer.  As a result, the industry has 
experienced a decrease in the proportion of revenue generated from traditional interest-
based income while fee-based income has increased.  This is mostly driven by larger 
banks, as they generate a greater proportion of their revenue from non-interest income 
than smaller banks.  
Finally, this chapter examines how the 2007 financial crisis impacted on the US 
banking industry.  In the summer of 2007, the sub-prime mortgage market began to 
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experience problems which had far reaching consequences throughout the entire 
financial sector.  A number of large financial institutions collapsed, were forced to file 
for bankruptcy, or received government aid.  Furthermore, the government sponsored 
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were effectively nationalised in order to ensure 
they remained solvent.  An extraordinary amount of government aid was injected into 
the financial sector in an attempt to restore stability and public confidence.  In addition, 
new legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act was passed, which aims to consolidate regulatory agencies in order to improve 
accountability and transparency in the financial system.  In addition, the Act seeks to 
ensure the protection of the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, thus eliminating the 
“too big to fail” attitude, and the protection of consumers from abusive financial 
services practices. 
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Source: FDIC
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Chapter 3. Competition in Banking. 
3.1. Introduction. 
Competition in banking encourages efficiency in the production and allocation of 
financial services.  In banking, the level of competition has implications for 
entrepreneurship, access to finance, the allocation of capital funds, the competitiveness 
and development of manufacturing and service sectors, the level of economic growth 
and the extent of financial stability.  Competition can make markets work more 
efficiently by encouraging innovation, lower prices and higher quality products to 
enhance consumer choice and welfare. 
Moreover, competition is believed to be a good thing because a competitive 
banking system is more efficient and therefore important for economic growth.  For 
consumers competition is good because it keeps bank tariffs low and service levels 
high, while it also forces banks to become more efficient and stable.  Interest rates on 
loans are lower, while higher interest rates are paid on deposits.  Thus, competition 
maximizes welfare by ensuring that the greatest quantity of credit is supplied at the 
lowest price.  More recently however, research has sought to examine whether 
competition may lead to banking system instability.  That is, while competition is 
believed to be beneficial as mentioned above, conversely too much competition may 
lead banks to engage in excessively risky behaviour in order to make a profit.   
Over the last decade or so, banking markets have experienced a number of 
dramatic changes.  Historically, regulation in the banking industry was protective, and 
often had the effect of inhibiting competition and growth.  However, over the last few 
decades structural changes (for instance the creation of a single European financial 
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services market, and deregulation in the US which opened up competition by enabling 
banks to operate across state lines) and conduct deregulation, has consequently led to a 
change in the competitive environment within which banks operate.  Examining the 
changing nature of competition in banking and its impact on bank strategy and 
performance is thus of importance as the results have implications for future 
competition, regulatory and supervisory policy. 
There exists a large literature examining the microeconomics of competition in 
banking and is presented here in three sections; namely SCP in Banking, New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation and Other Approaches.  Those studies which adopt the Structure 
Conduct Performance (SCP) approach, seek to determine the extent of competition 
within a given market structure based on the assumption that there exists a link between 
market structure and the conduct and performance of firms and industries.  Under this 
approach it is argued that greater industry concentration, resulting in increased 
individual market power of large banks, is more likely to lead to anti-competitive 
behaviour by banks. 
SCP studies both in general, and those focused on the banking industry, have 
been criticised because the measures of market structure typically used may potentially 
be subject to endogeneity.  This problem was particularly pronounced in the majority of 
the earlier banking studies which attempted to relate measures of bank rates of return to 
measures of market concentration.  The SCP hypothesis was typically tested using a 
simple measure of concentration (for instance the n-firm concentration ratio, or the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) as an exogenous indicator of market power.  In general, 
concentration measures were unable to allow for differences in the size or type of 
commercial banks.  Bank prices and measures of profitability were typically specified 
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as the endogenous indicators of bank conduct and performance respectively.  
Furthermore, the models employed were usually static cross-section comparisons or 
short-run in nature and typically focused on local U.S. banking markets.   
In response to the recognised shortcomings of the SCP approach (such as its 
reliance on accounting data and endogeneity issues pervading the relationship between 
variables of interest), the Chicago/ Revisionist critique was developed in the 1970s.  At 
the centre of this critique is the efficiency hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973) which stipulates 
that greater profitability and increased concentration exists in response to more efficient 
firms dominating a market, leading to greater profitability and increased concentration; 
rather than as a result of a causal relationship between market concentration and 
efficiency. Therefore, high concentration and subsequent high prices or profits is a 
reflection of more efficient performance by banks, rather than an indication of more 
effective collusion within the markets.  As such, a highly efficient bank may earn 
greater profits as a result of its ability to better maximise returns. 
 In response to shortcomings of the SCP and Efficiency Hypothesis paradigms, 
the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approach was developed.  With a 
focus on bank level rather than industry level conduct/strategy, NEIO studies seek to 
examine the response of prices (and in some instances quantities) to changes in 
competitive conditions.  Thus, the extent of competition or collusion within a market 
can be inferred by examining the behaviour of incumbent banks.  The two main 
empirical techniques used to test bank conduct directly are the Panzar-Rosse (PR) and 
Bresnahan-Lau (BL) approaches. 
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.   The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews SCP 
within banking and the revisionist critique. Section 3 reviews the efficiency in banking 
literature that developed after the SCP literature. Section 4 reviews the NEIO literature, 
while Section 5 reviews other approaches. Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
3.2. SCP in Banking and Revisionist Critique. 
The Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) paradigm, which has its roots in the field of 
Industrial Organisation, stipulates that there exists a link between market structure and 
the conduct and performance of firms and industries, thus allowing us to define the 
extent of competition prevailing in a given market structure.  Bank performance 
(usually measured by profitability indicators such as bank profit rates, interest rates 
banks charge on loans, and interest rates they pay on deposits) is determined by the 
conduct of banks, which in turn is influenced by structural industry-level variables 
(including concentration, economies of scale, and entry and exit conditions). For 
instance, under perfectly competitive conditions in which the industry contains a large 
number of banks and consumers and is therefore not highly concentrated (structural 
variables), banks are price-takers and therefore adopt pricing strategies based on those 
adopted by their competitors (conduct variables).  In such a market, banks would earn 
normal profits and interest rates would reflect competitive levels (performance 
indicators).  On the other hand, under the highly concentrated market conditions of 
monopoly (structural variable), the incumbent bank would be able to determine its own 
pricing strategy above the level that would occur under competitive conditions (conduct 
variable) resulting in bank performance variables such as profit rates and interest rates 
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charged on loans being higher (while interest rates paid on deposits would be 
comparatively lower).  Conduct variables include forms of strategic behaviour adopted 
by firms, for instance price setting or collusion amongst incumbent firms, as well as 
expenditure on advertising, R&D and innovation.  With its focus upon market structure, 
the SCP approach argues that industry concentration or individual market power of 
large banks increases the likelihood of anti-competitive behaviour leading to lower 
interest rates on deposits, higher interest rates on loans and higher profits of incumbent 
banks.  Allowing a gauge of the extent of competition is important for antitrust policy.   
There are a number of significant drawbacks to the SCP hypothesis, for instance, 
a common finding in the literature was that the simple measures of concentration 
employed (i.e. HHI and CRn) had only very weak relationships with measures of 
profitability when including the market share of the firm in the regression equation.  
That is, under the traditional SCP approach, the market shares of all banks were 
generally treated as equal in calculating the concentration measure, and thus this 
approach was unable to explain why profitability varies between firms.  In response, 
new perspectives on industrial organisation were developed that challenged the 
usefulness of the structure-performance framework for analysing the determinants of 
competitive behaviour, as it fails to account for differences in productive efficiency. 
During the 1970s the Chicago school, represented by academics including 
Stigler (1968) and Demsetz (1973, 1974) developed the Chicago/Revisionist critique in 
response to the shortcoming of the SCP approach.  Central to this critique is the 
efficiency hypothesis which argues that large banks make high profits because they are 
more efficient.  The link between high concentration and high prices or profits is merely 
an artefact of the efficiency performance relation, rather than necessarily reflecting 
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more effective collusion in markets that are more concentrated.  That is, a highly 
efficient bank may have higher profits as a result of its ability to better maximise 
returns.  The bank may therefore naturally gain a larger share of the market and/or use 
its own success to take over banks which are performing less well.  Both situations 
would lead to an increase in concentration in the market.  In such circumstances it is 
possible for concentration to lead to higher bank profits without negatively influencing 
the credit supply, as predicted by the market power theories. 
 
3.2.1. Structure and Prices. 
The SCP line of research dates back to the 1960s, whereby the studies undertaken 
typically estimated measures of bank performance as functions of the concentration of 
deposits among banks in the local market areas.  Edwards (1964) and Meyer (1967) 
used U.S. data for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) over the time period 
1955 to 1957 to examine the relationship between market concentration and the interest 
rates charged on business loans.  Fraser and Rose (1971) use data from the years 1966 
and 1967 for 78 Texan cities to examine the relationship between market concentration 
and the interest rates banks charge on loans, the interest rates paid on time and savings 
deposits and the service charge revenue on demand deposits.  They find that when 
market interest rates are higher the influence of market concentration appears to be 
smaller. 
Further studies have examined the relationship between market concentration 
and interest rates paid on time and saving deposits and found that there does not appear 
to be a significant relationship.  Examples of such studies include Fraser and Rose 
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(1971) who suggest the influence of Regulation Q3 ceiling rates as a possible 
explanation.  This highlights one of the short-comings of the early studies; failure to 
account for the impact of regulation on bank performance.  For instance, bank 
performance may be affected by the imposition of ceiling rates (for example on time 
and savings deposits) when market interest rates are high relative to these ceiling rates, 
irrespective of the level of concentration within the local market.  Confirmatory 
evidence is provided by other authors including Klein and Murphy (1971) and Ware 
(1972).  In contrast, several studies provide evidence that refutes the regulation Q 
explanation.  Examples of these include Rose and Fraser (1976) using data from 1973 
for 90 Texan counties and Rhoades (1979) using data for 184 SMSAs from 1970 and 
1972.  
More recently, Besanko and Thakor (1992) examined loan and deposit markets 
within the context of a theoretical model where banks can differentiate themselves from 
competitors.  Their results suggest that as competition increases within a market (as 
more banks enter the market), loan rates decrease and deposit rates increase.  Guzman 
(2000), using a simple general equilibrium model, compares the effect on capital 
accumulation of an economy with a monopoly banking system versus one with a 
competitive banking system.  The results demonstrate that downwards pressure on 
capital accumulation is observed under a monopoly banking system.  Both of the above 
mentioned models reinforce the theory that market power is detrimental to consumers 
and growth, thus lending support to the SCP hypothesis. 
                                                          
3 Regulation Q prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits in accordance with Section 11 
of the Glass-Steagall Act, from 1933 to 2011.  In addition, from 1933 to 1986, it also imposed maximum 
or ceiling rates of interest on other types of bank deposits such as savings or NOW accounts 
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Indeed, much of the early empirical literature uses U.S. data to examine the 
relationship between bank profitability (or prices) and concentration.  For example, 
examining U.S. banks in more concentrated local markets (as measured by HHI or 
CRn), Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan (1991) found these banks charge higher 
rates on SME loans and pay lower rates on retail deposits.  Furthermore, Hannan and 
Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) find that the deposit rates for such banks 
are slow to respond to changes in open-market interest rates. 
Hannan and Liang (1993) use time-series data on monthly deposit rates (for 
several different deposit categories) for a random sample of 300 banks included in the 
Federal Reserve System’s surveys of deposit rates, in order to test for the existence of 
market power.  The sample period extends from October 1983 to May 1989.  In 
addition, the authors also seek to determine whether the estimates obtained differ across 
both markets and banking products, in a manner consistent with hypothesised 
differences.  Based on the observed relationship between deposit rates and security rates 
(adjusted for operating costs) over time, a test that can reject perfect competition 
(perfect price-taking behaviour) is developed by the authors.  They report that, for the 
majority of banks, the hypothesis of perfect price-taking behaviour can be rejected in 
favour of behaviour based on the assumption that banks are each faced with a deposit 
supply curve that is upwards sloping to some extent.  The results also show evidence 
that banks exercise greater market power in the case of money market deposit accounts 
than long-term certificates of deposits.  Finally, the authors also find evidence to 
support the hypothesis that banks operating in more concentrated local markets exert 
greater market power in the pricing of money market deposit accounts, whereas this is 
not true in the pricing of long-term certificates of deposits. 
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Heitfield and Prager (2004) analyse interest rates paid on interest checking 
(NOW) accounts, savings accounts and money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) to 
test two assumptions.  Namely, markets for at least some types of banking products are 
local in scope, and market concentration measures can serve as effective proxies for 
banks’ abilities to extract monopoly rents.  The authors use balance sheet data for most 
banks operating in the US in 1988, 1992, 1996 and 1999.  For both NOW and MMDA 
accounts, the authors find that geographic markets appear to be smaller than state-wide.  
For savings accounts, the authors find that the hypothesis of state-wide markets cannot 
generally be rejected, except in the case of 1992.  Examining the effects of 
concentration measures on interest rates, the authors report that local concentration 
measures are negatively related to rates paid on NOW accounts for all years considered, 
across all market specifications and for all concentration ratios employed.  A negative 
relationship between local concentration and the deposit interest rate for savings 
accounts is also uncovered in most of the cases considered.  The results for the MMDA 
accounts are weaker, however overall findings support the view that local market 
concentration is an important influential factor in the pricing behaviour adopted by 
banks.  The authors also report strong evidence of a negative relationship between state-
level concentration and deposit interest rates offered on NOW and MMDA accounts, 
which holds true even in markets that are not state-wide.  The authors therefore argue 
that this indicates that the SCP paradigm, which assert that pricing power is driven 
solely by market concentration, may be too simplistic. 
Jackson (1997) examines price rigidity (speed of adjustment of consumer 
deposit rates) using a dataset of US monthly survey data for the period December 1983 
to November 1985, across high, medium and low concentrated markets.  Employing 
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rational distribution lag and partial adjustment models, the author reports greater price 
rigidity in both low and high concentrated markets, compared to that exhibited in the 
medium category. 
Martin, Saurina and Salas (2005a) investigate the existence and determinants of 
interest rate dispersion in loans and deposits using a dataset comprising two hundred 
Spanish banks and more than thirty products for the time period 1989 to 2003.  The 
authors find persistent interest rate dispersion across loan and deposit markets, as well 
as across products, which they attribute to variables that affect the private net benefits of 
consumers’ investment in information (including search costs).  Furthermore, product 
specific inflation, rather than changes in the interest rate of the economy, has a greater 
influence on interest rate dispersion.  Finally, the authors report that interest rate 
dispersion has been effectively reduced by the Spanish Central Bank’s regulation of 
standards of transparency.  In Martin, Saurina and Salas (2005b), the authors investigate 
the level and determinants of retail banking interest rate differences among Spanish 
banks for the period 1989 to 2003.  Supporting the relative version of the Law of One 
Price, the authors find evidence that interest rates of bank loans and deposits for twenty 
five products adjust to their long term values rather rapidly in response to external 
shocks.  However, they also report that the evidence contradicts the absolute version of 
the Law.  Finally, the authors also find that different credit risk across banks and loan 
products is an important factor influencing both short and long run interest rate 
dispersion. 
Kwangwoo and Pennacchi (2009) develop a model of multimarket spatial 
competition, in which small, single-market banks compete with large multi-market 
banks (LMBs) for retail loans and deposits.  Accounting for prior empirical evidence 
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that firstly, relative to small banks, LMBs have more standardised operations and thus 
set retail interest rates that are uniform across many local markets, and secondly, that 
they also have access to wholesale financing; competition is then analysed for retail 
loans and deposits when LMBs command a greater presence in local markets.  The 
authors argue that LMB rates on retail loans will be significantly lower than smaller 
bank competitors if any significant funding advantage LMBs hold is not offset by a loan 
operating cost disadvantage.  This is notably significant in more concentrated markets.  
Furthermore, competition for retail loans is intensified where there is a greater presence 
of LMBs, and also reduces smaller bank loan rates.  Lending support to previous 
empirical studies, the authors also argue that greater market share by LMBs increases 
competition in small business lending, but reduces competition in retail deposit taking. 
Sharpe (1997) examines the relationship between pricing and switching costs for 
the consumer deposits market.  The author tests the hypothesis that the existence of 
household switching costs reduces the competitive pressures on pricing, using a dataset 
comprising panel data for deposit interest rates and proxies for exogenous consumer 
turnover in different markets.  Two types of retail deposit accounts are considered, 
namely the six month certificate of deposit (CD6M) and the money market deposit 
account (MMDA).  For the CD6M, the empirical results indicate that concentration has 
a significant negative impact on deposit interest rates, in both restricted and liberal 
branching markets.  Using the proportion of movers as a proxy for the fraction of 
consumers facing relatively low switching costs, the author also reports evidence of a 
significant positive effect in restrictive branching states, but no apparent effect in liberal 
states.  When examining MMDA interest rates, the results again suggest that 
concentration has a negative effect on deposit rates, while the proportion of movers has 
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a positive effect.  However, in this case, concentration has a much greater effect in 
markets where there exist a relatively large proportion of movers, while the proportion 
of movers only has a significant effect in less concentrated markets. 
Numerous other authors have undertaken studies to test the link between 
concentration and higher profits.  For instance, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) examine 
the relationship between concentration and loan pricing using a European dataset.  
Competitive conditions, cost structures, and risk are all controlled for.  Separate 
concentration and price measures for each of four products (loan, demand, savings, and 
time deposits) are develop, as different banking products may be affected differently by 
concentration.   For loan and demand deposit markets, increased concentration is 
associated with less competitive prices.  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) 
access the effects of concentration on credit availability while controlling for regulatory 
policies such as entry, ownership structure, and restrictions on bank activities.  Using 
data for a number of developed and developing countries, their results indicate that in 
concentrated banking markets firms face higher financing obstacles.  However, various 
factors can mitigate this negative effect, including efficient legal systems, less 
corruption, high levels of financial and economic development and foreign bank 
presence.  Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003) study the effect of concentration 
and various regulatory policies affecting competition on the net interest margins.  Entry 
restrictions, restrictions on bank activity and restrictions on opening a bank are some of 
the policies considered.  All are found to increase net interest margins.  Furthermore, 
concentration is also correlated with higher margins, but when regulatory policies and 
general environmental factors (e.g. property rights) are controlled for, the effects 
become insignificant. 
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Further research examining whether high concentration endogenously reflects 
the market share gains of efficient firms was undertaken by authors including Smirlock, 
Gilligan, and Marshall (1984), Rhoades (1985), Smirlock (1985) and Shepherd (1986).  
The implications from this suggest that the analysis of performance should focus more 
on the conduct and strategic decision making of individual firms rather than on industry 
structure, as the performance of individual firms is largely determined by the 
differences in efficiency between firms.  Various authors have attempted to address this 
issue.  For example, Demsetz (1973) argues that a positive relationship between profit 
rates and concentration may be explained by differences in the levels of efficiency of 
the largest and smallest firms in the market, and may not necessarily be the result of 
more effective collusion in more concentrated markets. 
 
3.2.2. Structure and Profitability. 
Gilbert (1984) undertakes a survey of empirical studies which seek to uncover evidence 
on how the performance of depository institutions is influenced by market structure.  
Within this survey, the author examines studies which attempt to estimate the relation 
between measures of bank market structure and performance by applying the SCP 
hypothesis to banking.  Bank market structure studies consider not only the theoretical 
basis for employing the structure-performance framework in order to analyse 
competition among banks, but also the issues involved in measuring performance and 
structure variables.  Gilbert concludes from this survey that estimates of the influence of 
market structure on measures of bank performance are highly variable amongst studies, 
thus these earlier studies provided no conclusive evidence to support the structure-
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performance hypothesis that higher market concentration leads to more effective 
collusion (less competition) among banks. 
Berger et al. (2004) also provide a review of a number of papers that examine the 
impacts of bank concentration and competition on bank performance.  The authors 
discuss the evolution of the literature, from the early 1990s when the empirical research 
typically tested the SCP hypothesis applied to U.S. banking industry data, to more 
recent research which tests a number of different models of competition, typically 
dynamic in nature therefore enabling the examination of the effects of bank 
consolidation over time.  Furthermore, researchers have expanded the focus of their data 
from local U.S. banking markets to include other definitions of U.S. banking markets, in 
addition to studying banking data from other countries, including developing nations. 
 
3.3. Efficiency; The Quiet Life Hypothesis and its application to banking. 
As the research focus turned from the SCP hypothesis to bank efficiency, a large body 
of literature developed to examine efficiency issues such as scale (size), scope (product 
mix) and productive efficiency (technical and economic efficiency).  Studies that 
examine scale and scope efficiencies address the question whether financial institutions 
produce the optimum output mix of services and financial products, in terms of both 
size of institution and composition of the output mix respectively. Thus, financial 
institutions are scale efficient when the size of their operations is optimal such that any 
change to the size of the institution would render it less efficient.  Similarly, financial 
institutions are scope efficient when the product mix they provide (i.e. their degree of 
diversification) is such that further diversification would render the institution less 
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efficient.  Studies which focus on productive efficiency examine whether banks utilise 
all of their resources efficiently, i.e. whether they produce the maximum output 
attainable from the least input.  These studies address the question whether banks’ use 
of resources is such that it maximises the production of services available (economic 
efficiency).  Furthermore, they examine the effectiveness with which a given set of 
inputs (resources, technology and labour) is used to produce an output (technical 
efficiency).  X-efficiency refers to the degree of efficiency maintained by financial 
institutions under conditions of imperfect competition.  That is, under perfect 
competition, theory dictates that banks must maximise efficiency in order to make 
normal profit, those that do not will be forced to exit the market.  The concept of X-
efficiency asserts that firms may still exist in conditions of less than perfect 
competition, by operating inefficiently.    
Berger (1995) examines the relationship between bank size, efficiency and 
market concentration and bank performance using U.S. data.  More specifically, Berger 
evaluates the influence of market structure (measured by concentration), firm size and 
efficiency on bank performance by estimating a series of equations in which efficiency 
is controlled for.  The results suggest that, typically, both larger and more efficient 
banks earn higher profits.  Berger interprets these results as providing evidence that the 
relative market power (which is partly the result of product differentiation) of larger 
banks enables these banks to perform better than smaller banks.  It is also reported that 
more efficient banks earn higher profits as a result of superior management techniques 
and technology, irrespective of bank size. Furthermore, Berger reports that bank 
performance is not significantly affected by market concentration and economies of 
scale.   
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More recently, research has expanded to analyse not only scale and scope 
economies, but also productive inefficiencies or deviations from the efficient production 
function/frontier.  Measuring X-efficiency attempts to capture the efficiency of a bank 
(given its inputs, outputs, and prices) relative to other banks.  An industry-wide ‘best-
practice’ cost frontier is calculated and an individual bank’s efficiency is based on its 
distance from the frontier (the distance is referred to as the bank’s X-efficiency).  There 
are three main approached used to estimate the best-practice frontier.  The stochastic 
frontier approach (SFA), the distribution free approach (DFA), and the thick frontier 
approach (TFA). 
Berger et al. (1993) review the mainly U.S. literature, and show that X-
inefficiencies explain approximately 20% of the costs faced by banks, while less than 
5% of the costs are due to inefficiencies arising from failure to exploit scale and scope 
economies to the full.  In their study, Frame and Kamerschen (1997), controlled for 
measures of X-efficiency and scale efficiency and allowed concentration and market 
share in local U.S. banking markets to be functions of these efficiency measures.  Their 
results found some evidence favouring both the effect of market power and efficiency 
on profitability, but the results were generally weak and varied by market type.  Using 
bank level data from the Call Reports for the period 1984 to 1999, and merger and 
acquisition information from the Board of Governors Merger and Acquisition database, 
Evanoff and Ors (2002) analyse the impact of entry on incumbent banks, in both urban 
and rural banking markets.  The impact of both actual and potential competition 
resulting from market-entry mergers and reductions in entry barriers on bank cost and 
profit efficiency is evaluated.  The analysis is conducted using X-efficiency measures 
generated from the estimation of annual cost frontiers and alternative profit frontiers.   
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The authors report that, consistent with economic theory, as mergers occur, incumbent 
banks respond to the increased competition by reducing their costs and improving their 
level of efficiency.  The increased efficiency is in addition to the efficiency changes, 
arising in response to the increase in potential competition, and as a result of the initial 
elimination of entry barriers.  Furthermore, the authors also report that again consistent 
with economic theory, new entrants via mergers consequently encourages incumbent 
firms to adjust to the more competitive environment by increasing their productive 
efficiency.  Overall the results suggest that an improvement in competition is associated 
with higher X-efficiency. 
Research and public policy concerns regarding concentration in product markets 
have typically considered only the social loss that arises in highly concentrated markets 
in which incumbents are able to exercise market power.  As a result of the higher prices 
charged in these markets, output is restricted relative to the competitive level and thus 
there is a misallocation of resources.   The welfare triangle (which represents the 
difference between the loss in consumer surplus and the gain in producer surplus as a 
consequence of non-competitive pricing) is typically used to demonstrate the social cost 
of this misallocation of resources. Studies that have attempted to measure this loss have 
mostly produced extremely low estimates. In addition, there are several mechanisms 
through which market power may lead to both greater operating inefficiency as well as 
higher costs.  Numerous authors, including Williamson (1963) and Leibenstein (1966), 
report significant cost differences within industries as a result of inefficiencies.  Scherer 
(1970) speculated that concentration may lead to efficiency costs as high as 10% of total 
costs, a significantly greater estimate than the welfare triangle measurement of social 
loss arising as a result of mispricing.  Another social loss associated with concentrated 
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markets, the exercise of market power and reduced competitive pressures, is a less 
concerted effort by managers to maximise operating efficiency.  Inefficient management 
practises may therefore result in higher cost per unit of output in concentrated markets, 
in addition to the higher prices and reduced output that arise when incumbent firms are 
able to exercise market power.  Inefficient management practises leading to operating 
inefficiency, is referred to as the quiet life effect.  That is, in highly concentrated 
markets, firms are able to charge prices above the competitive level.  Managers may opt 
to forego a proportion of higher profits in order to benefit instead from a ‘quiet life’ 
whereby they do not have to work as hard to minimise costs.  Berger and Hannan 
(1998) seek to investigate the application of the quiet life hypothesis to the commercial 
banking industry.  Efficiencies are measured against the same national efficient frontier 
for more than 5000 banks with similar availability of close substitutes (relatively 
homogenous products), access to virtually the same technology, but located in different 
local markets with different degrees of market concentration. This enables banks to 
charge different prices for their deposit and loan products in different local markets.  
Under these circumstances, the authors are therefore able to isolate the effects of 
concentration on efficiency, from other inter-industry influences such as differences in 
products, technology and external competition.   The authors report that banks in more 
concentrated markets are less cost efficient than other banks, all else equal.  The total 
effect of concentration on U.S. banking costs is calculated by applying the estimated 
relationship between concentration and efficiency on all commercial banks, which is 
then compared to the social welfare loss from higher prices as calculated by the welfare 
triangle.  The results indicate that the efficiency cost of concentration is likely to be 
several times larger than the social loss measured by the welfare triangle.  There are a 
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number of reasons why market structure may influence cost efficiency.  Koetter et al 
(2012) estimate adjusted Lerner indices (to account for the possibility of foregone rents) 
for a large sample of U.S. commercial banks in order to test the quiet life hypothesis 
that banks with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents.  
The authors report that Lerner Indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies indicate that 
U.S. commercial banks do in fact enjoy a quiet life, while instrumental variable 
regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies.   
 
3.4. New Empirical Industrial Organisation. 
Over time new methods, collectively termed as the New Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (NEIO) approach, were developed to counter the problems inherent in the 
SCP approach.  This approach focuses on bank level conduct/strategy by examining 
how prices (and in some instances quantities) respond to changes in competitive 
conditions (such as increases in costs).  From an examination of such behaviour we can 
infer whether the market under consideration can be characterised by competition or 
collusion.  The two main empirical techniques implemented within this literature 
designed to test conduct directly, are the Panzar-Rosse (PR) and Bresnahan-Lau (BL) 
approaches. 
The markup test of Bresnahan (1982, 1989) and Lau (1982), involves estimating 
a structural model with separate demand and supply equations.  This method measures 
market power by parameterising the markup of price over estimated marginal cost.  The 
Panzar-Rosse revenue test involves estimating a reduced form equation in which gross 
revenue is related to a vector of input prices and other control variables. 
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3.4.1. The Bresnahan Lau (markup) test. 
The fundamental principal underlying the BL test is that under equilibrium conditions, 
profit maximizing firms will choose prices or quantities such that marginal cost equals 
the perceived marginal revenue.  Under perfect competition this coincides with the 
demand price, and under perfect collusion with the industry’s marginal revenue. 
The true marginal revenue function is represented as P + h(Q, Y, α), where P is 
the industry price, Q is the industry’s aggregate output quantity, Y is a vector of 
exogenous variables, α is a vector of demand system parameters to be estimated and h(∙) 
the semi-elasticity of market demand Q/(∂Q/∂P), where ∂Q/∂P is derived from a 
separately estimated market demand function (Bresnahan, 1982).  The average firm’s 
perceived marginal revenue is represented by P + λh(Q, Y, α).  From this equation, λ is 
defined as a parameter indexing the degree of market power of the average firm in the 
industry. When λ = 0, the industry is competitive with price equal to marginal cost. 
When λ = 1, the industry is defined by perfect collusion whereby firms act to maximise 
joint profits.  Values of λ between 0 and 1 describe varying degrees of imperfect 
competition or market power.  The structural model in this approach consists of a 
market demand function and either an individual or average firm supply function.  The 
model can be estimated using either industry aggregate data (as originally derived by 
Bresnahan, 1989), or firm-specific data (including Shaffer 1999, Shaffer and DiSalvo 
1994, and others). 
The estimates of conduct obtained when using aggregate data are asset-weighted 
averages of the underlying bank-specific parameters.  The industry’s marginal cost 
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function is calculated as the horizontal summation of the constituent banks’ marginal 
cost functions. 
A number of studies have applied the markup test to banking data, including 
Shaffer (1989, 1993, 1999, 2001), Berg and Kim (1994), Suominen (1994), Gruben and 
McComb (2003) and Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) who incorporated some variation in 
their version of the model.  The major advantages of the test are a test statistic which is 
easily interpreted, the capacity to use industry aggregate data, and a direct relationship 
to a natural measure of excess capacity, which ultimately produce a means of accurately 
measuring conduct, even if demand and costs are imperfectly measured. 
Shaffer (1989) applied the BL technique to the U.S. banking industry, with the 
results strongly rejecting collusion, but not perfect competition.  In addition, Shaffer 
(1993) also employed the BL technique to test Canadian banking market contestability 
for the period 1965 to 1989.  The results show that banking behaviour was consistent 
with perfect competition over this period.  A slight, but statistically significant, increase 
in competition is found after 1980, at which time changes were made to the Bank Act. 
Various other studies have been undertaken using the BL procedure.  These 
include Berg and Kim (1998), in which results for retail vs. corporate banking markets 
were compared using the BL procedure.  Shaffer (2001) analysed competition in 15 
countries in Europe, North America and Asia using the BL technique, and reported 
varying results for the different countries. 
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3.4.2. Panzar-Rosse Method. 
The Panzar and Rosse H-statistic (1982, 1987) captures the elasticity of bank interest 
revenues to input prices, by calculating the H-statistic.  The H-statistic is generally  
interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition in the banking market, and only 
offers a valid estimate if the market is in long-run equilibrium whereby return on bank 
assets is not related to input prices. 
H can be estimated using a log-linear regression in which the dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of total revenue and the explanatory variables include the 
logarithms of each input price, typically along with other control variables. 
ln(Pit)= αi + β1 ln(W1,it) + β2 ln(W2,it) + β3 ln(W3,it) + γ ln(Zit) + δD + εit   (3.1) 
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. P is the ratio of gross interest revenues to 
total assets, which represents a proxy for the output price of loans.  W1 is the ratio of 
interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (proxy for input price of 
deposits); W2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of 
labour) and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets 
(proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). Z represents a matrix of control 
variables which includes the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio of net loans to total 
assets, and the logarithm of assets (to control for bank size effects). Finally, D is a 
vector of year dummies and αi denotes bank-level fixed effects.  The H-statistic is 
calculated by β1 + β2 + β3. 
Panzar and Rosse demonstrated how the value of H is negative for a neoclassical 
monopolist, collusive oligopolist, or conjectural-variations short-run oligopolist.  For a 
competitive price-taking firm in long-run equilibrium, or a firm employing a constant 
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markup pricing strategy, H is equal to unity; while for a monopolistic competitor H can 
take on values between 0 and 1.  That is, under conditions of perfect competition, any 
increase in input prices will raise both marginal costs and total revenues by the same 
amount.  In this circumstance, the H-statistic will therefore equal 1. Under monopoly 
conditions, an increase in input prices causes marginal costs to rise, output to fall, 
effecting a decline in revenues.  Therefore, under a monopoly, the H-statistic is less than 
or equal to 0.   
Shaffer (1982) applied the PR approach to a cross section of banks in New York 
State using data from 1979.  The results support the rejection of the hypotheses of both 
monopoly and long-run perfect competition.  Nathan and Neave (1989) use the PR 
model to test for competitiveness in the Canadian banking, trust, and mortgage 
industries over the three years 1982-1984.  For the banking industry for each of those 
years the hypothesis of pure collusion is rejected.  Bank revenues behaved as if earned 
under monopolistic competition, while perfect competition could not be ruled out for 
1982.  Tests for the trust and mortgage industries also reject pure collusion.  Vesala 
(1995) also applied the PR test to banks in Finland, while Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 
applied this method to the Greek banking system.  In general, studies that applied the 
PR model to European banking systems found that both monopoly and perfect 
competition systems could be rejected in favour of monopolistic competition.  Using 
this method, or minor variations of it, other studies have considered banking data from 
multiple European countries.  For example, Molyneux, Lloyd-William and Thornton 
(1994) tested for contestability in German, British, French, Italian and Spanish markets, 
using a sample of banks from these countries for the period 1985-1989.  The authors 
conclude that commercial banks in these markets operated in a monopolistically 
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competitive market.  Other studies include Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) and De Bandt 
and Davis (2000), which both report evidence of some degree of market power in at 
least one subsample tested.  Molyneux, Thornton, and Lloyd-William (1996), were not 
able to reject monopoly behaviour when applying the PR test on data for Japanese 
banks.  Bikker and Haaf (2002) examine competitive conditions for 23 countries using 
the PR model.  For all countries, the results are consistent with monopolistic 
competition.  This is a typical result of the contestability literature.  The authors attempt 
to formally relate competitiveness (as measured by the H-statistic) with market structure 
(the degree of concentration).  Although they find that competitiveness is negatively 
related to concentration, the results are weak.   
Claessens and Laeven (2004) build on this work by attempting to relate the 
competitiveness of a country’s banking sector with structural and regulatory indicators 
of the financial system.  They use panel data over the period 1994-2001 to construct H-
statistics for 50 countries.  Consistent with Bikker and Haaf, the authors find that the 
markets of each country exhibit varying degrees of imperfect competition.  For some 
countries with a large number of banks, the authors find relatively low levels of 
competition (e.g. U.S.).  The authors then attempt to identify factors that explain the 
contestability of banking sectors across countries.  They regress the H-statistic on a 
variety of country statistics, such as the presence of foreign banks, activity restrictions 
on banks (to engage in security market, insurance, and real estate activities), the entry 
regime, market structure, competition from the non-bank sector, general 
macroeconomic conditions and the overall development of a country.  Claessens and 
Laeven find that contestability is positively related to foreign bank presence, less-severe 
entry restrictions, and few activity restrictions.  In all specifications contestability is 
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positively related to concentration and negatively related to the number of banks 
(statistically significant at the 5 and 10 per cent levels), depending on the specification. 
Coccorese (1998) and Hempel (2002) have also applied the PR test to banking 
datasets that include at least one European nation; while Gelos and Roldos (2002) and 
Philippatos and Yildirim (2002) have additionally included several developing nations 
in their studies.  Shaffer (2002a) reports a rejection of the hypothesis of monopolistic 
pricing when the PR test is applied to time-series data from a monopoly bank. 
Shaffer (2004) proposes two simple variations on the PR test and applies them to 
a selected sample of banks in order to examine patterns of competition in banking.  The 
first variation accounts for the fact that physical capital is often fixed in the short run, 
thus precluding any immediate effect of its price on equilibrium revenues.  The second 
variation is intended to mitigate the effects of an imperfectly elastic supply of bank 
inputs, by fitting a revenue equation to lagged input prices.  The sample period used 
extends over 42 quarters, from March 1984 through June 1994, for four thrift banks.  
The author reports that for all four banks the H test statistic is significantly positive, 
therefore rejecting the hypotheses of monopoly.  Furthermore, it is significantly less 
than unity, therefore rejecting the hypotheses of long-run competitive equilibrium, 
contestable markets, constrained size maximisation or fixed markup.  The author 
provides further evidence that thrift institutions may be a source of significant 
competition to community banks, even in small numbers.  Market power may also be 
small even in markets supplied by only one bank and one thrift institution. 
Goddard and Wilson (2009) undertake a study of competition in banking which 
offers a methodological contribution to the existing literature in the form of an 
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investigation of the implications for the estimation of the H-statistic of a form of 
misspecification bias in the revenue equation.  That is, misspecification bias arises in 
the situation where there is partial, not instantaneous, adjustment towards equilibrium in 
response to factor input price shocks, thus necessitating the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable among the covariates of the revenue equation.  The study examines 
the implications for the estimation of the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic of departures from 
assumed product market equilibrium conditions for the G-7 countries by applying FE 
(static revenue equation) and GMM (dynamic revenue equation) estimators of the H-
statistic to unconsolidated company accounts data for six national banking sectors for 
the period 1988 to 2004.  The principal finding of this study is that a dynamic, rather 
than static, formulation of the revenue equation should be used to identify the Rosse-
Panzar H-statistic as most countries are characterised by positive short-run persistence 
and partial adjustment.  The H-statistics obtained using both FE and GMM are also 
consistent with the conclusion that the FE estimator of the H-statistic is biased towards 
zero. 
Bikker et al (2012) apply the PR model in order to ascertain the role of scale, 
costs and equilibrium in terms of competitive conduct.  The authors demonstrate that 
neither a price equation, nor a scaled revenue function, yield a valid measure for 
competitive conduct.  In particular, they demonstrate that a price equation or a scaled 
revenue equation produces a poor measure of competition for industries characterised 
by oligopoly or monopoly. Moreover, even the use of an unscaled revenue function is 
not appropriate without the introduction of further variables that allows us to assess 
whether the market is in equilibrium. This is important because should the market not 
be in equilibrium then even a competitive bank can have an H statistic of less than zero, 
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indicating a monopolist or oligopolist. The authors undertake an empirical analysis of 
competition in banking using a sample in excess of 100000 bank-year observations for 
more than 17000 banks in 63 countries for the period 1994 to 2004.  For each country, 
the authors estimate the H-statistic using three different versions of the PR model.  That 
is, H based on an unscaled revenue function, a revenue function with total assets as the 
explanatory variable and a price function with total revenue divided by total assets as 
the dependent variable.  They confirm their theoretical model that only an unscaled 
revenue equation can yield a valid measure for competitive conduct. 
In a related context, Delis et al (2008) also argue that some standard measures of 
competition (Bresnahan-Lau and Panzar-Rosse) can underestimate the degree of market 
power when using a static empirical formulation. Using an empirical example for the 
markets of Greece, Latvia and Spain, they demonstrate that a dynamic panel 
reformulation of the static equations for the measures of market power lead to more 
accurate estimates of competition over their static counterparts.  Although the paper 
notes that the dynamic panel modelling approach increases estimation complexity and 
that their results may have elements that are specific to the data considered, they argue 
that the results can reveal elements of collusion missed by the standard approach and the 
broader considerations are worth further investigation. 
One of the weaknesses of the PR approach, which is relevant to all of the cited 
studies above, relates to the geographic extent of the true market for banking services.  
That is, for most countries the relevant market is smaller in geographic scope than the 
country itself.  Therefore, a country-wide measure of competitiveness may be 
misleading, as it represents an average of values that differ widely across local areas 
within a given country.  The implication for this is that country-wide measures of 
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market structure do not accurately measure the market structure that is relevant to the 
behaviour observed. 
Carbo et al (2009) undertake a review of cross-country comparisons of 
competition and pricing power in European banking.  In order to examine whether 
different measures of competition yield similar results, the authors compare structural 
and non-structural indicators of competition across European banking markets for the 
period 1995-2001, in particular using measures from the NEIO approach.  Furthermore, 
they identify a number of bank-specific and country-specific factors that explain 
differences in structural and non-structural measures of competition.  The authors note 
that existing indicators of competition tend to give conflicting predictions across 
countries, within countries and over time.  Finally the authors employ a procedure 
developed in the frontier efficiency literature to identify a new indicator of bank pricing 
power.  Their results indicate that when differences in cost efficiency, fee income, real 
output growth and inflation are taken into account, then European banks’ pricing power 
appears weaker than indicated by other traditional competition indicators. 
 
3.5. Other Approaches: Persistence of Profits. 
The persistence of profits (POP) refers to the ability of firms to earn abnormal profits 
which, in a competitive market, would otherwise be eliminated by market forces.  The 
POP strand of literature emerged in the 1970s as a revisionist critique of the prevailing 
structure, conduct, performance paradigm (SCP) put forward by Bain (1956).  The POP 
approach argues that the differences across firms are more significant than those 
differences between industries, and hypothesises that in the absence of barriers to entry, 
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competitive market forces will erode any abnormal profits in the long run.  Thus, a 
competitive market in which firms earn above normal profits should encounter entry by 
new firms.  These new firms compete directly with existing firms, by offering identical 
products at lower prices, forcing the latter to reduce prices.  Consequently, profits are 
also reduced to the point whereby the competitive rate is once again achieved.  The 
reverse competitive process is apparent in markets where firms earn below normal 
profits.  In this instance firms either exit the market, or undertake action to return their 
profit rate to the competitive level. 
A central premise of the SCP approach is that profit differentials between firms 
within a particular industry occur as a result of the structure of that industry (e.g. the 
level of industry concentration).  The persistence of these profit differentials is also 
explained by industry structure.  Typically, tests of the SCP approach estimate cross-
sectional regressions of a measure of profitability on an index of market concentration 
and other explanatory variables (including expenditures on R&D and advertising). 
Seminal contributions by Mueller (1977, 1986) paved the way for a body of 
literature which sought to examine the dynamic structure of a company’s profits by 
employing the persistence approach.  Mueller (1977) tests the competitive environment 
hypothesis by examining whether profits converge to a single mean value over time.  As 
each time period brings new random shocks, firms never achieve a conventional stable 
equilibrium.  Thus, although abnormal earnings decay towards the competitive level, 
individual firms’ access to specialist knowledge (or other advantages unavailable to 
competitors) allows for long run persistence of profits.  Mueller estimates a set of firm 
specific regressions in which the dependent variable is profit rate, and the independent 
variable is a deterministic, decaying time trend.  For the majority of firms yielding 
93 
 
above average profits at the start of the sample period, the coefficient on the time trend 
was found to be negative.  Conversely, a positive coefficient was obtained for the 
majority of firms yielding below average profits at the start of the sample period.  The 
results of this study suggest that there is a tendency for profit rates to converge over 
time, as competitive pressures eliminate abnormal profits and restore equilibrium.  
However, it is also noted that for a significant number of firms, the trend coefficients 
obtained were either small or incorrectly signed; suggesting that, in many cases, it is 
highly probable that convergence will take place slowly, if it occurs at all. 
Mueller (1986) developed a stochastic time series model, which subsequently 
provided the basis for the majority of research into the persistence of profits.  This study 
demonstrates how persistence of profits can be estimated using a simple first order 
autoregressive equation.  Examining Federal Trade Commission (FTC) survey results 
for the period 1950-1972, and extending his original sample to include 551 firms, 
Mueller found evidence of significant persistence in the ranking and profitability of very 
high and very low performers.4  These findings again indicate the persistence of long-
run profitability differences across firms, with the most profitable group of firms 
earning profits of 30 percentage points above the norm in the long run. 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) and Geroski (1990) employ a similar 
methodology to Mueller (1986), in order to examine the profit performance of 134 large 
firms in the UK, West Germany and France, for the period 1949-1977.  Their evidence 
suggests that there is both less variation in profits, and that there is greater profits 
persistence over time for UK firms.  In contrast, evidence for France and West Germany 
                                                          
4 Using the profit history of the largest 1000 US corporations. 
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indicates that firms have larger variations in profits and profit rates tend to converge 
more quickly to the industry average. 
The persistence of profits literature, which builds on the early work of Mueller, 
Geroski and Jacquemin, typically reports large measures of profits persistence which 
differ from the competitive equilibrium of normal profits.  Examples include Cubbin 
and Geroski (1990), Schohl (1990), Droucopoulos and Lianos (1993), Kambhampati 
(1995), Goddard and Wilson (1996, 1999), McGahan and Porter (1999) and Glen et al 
(2001).  A number of studies have incorporated the effects of abnormal profits resulting 
from entry and exit barriers as well as the benefits associated with first-mover 
advantage when measuring the persistence of profits.  The results still indicate that 
profits persistence is too high. For example, Mueller (1990) examines a number of West 
European and North American economies, and concludes that profits do persist across 
time.  Maruyama and Odagiri (2002) examine a selection of Japanese firms and also 
report that profit persistence is too high.  Analysing US firm data, Gschwandtner 
(2005), reports profits persistence for a period exceeding 50 years. 
 Numerous studies that differ according to both country and the time period 
considered have consistently reported persistence of profits.  Such studies include those 
undertaken by Odagiri and Yamawaki (1986, 1990a,b), and Odagiri and Hayawaki 
(1990) and Maruyama and Odagiri (2002) for Japan.  For the UK, authors include 
Cubbin and Geroski (1987, 1990), Goddard and Wilson (1996, 1999), Gschwandter 
(2005), Gschwandter and Hauser (2008) and Cable et al (2001).  Geroski and Jacquemin 
(1988) for the UK, France and Germany, Schwalbach, Grasshof, and Mahmood (1989), 
Schwalbach and Mahmood (1990) and Schohl (1990) for Germany, Khemani and 
Shapiro (1990) for Canada, Mueller (1990a) for many countries, Mueller (1990b), 
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Waring (1996), McGahan and Porter (1999) for the US, Kambhampati (1995) for India, 
Glen et al. (2001) for nine developing countries, Ioannidis, Peel, and Venetis (2003) and 
Yurtoglu (2004) for Turkey.5  Both Yurtoglu (2004) for Turkey and Glen et al. (2001) 
for seven emerging markets6 report levels of persistence no less than those levels 
measured in developed economies.  Table 4.1 presents a brief summary of a selection of 
studies that measure the persistence of profits. 
 When analysing firm level profitability data, the existence of a unit root within 
the series should indicate that any shocks to profitability last indefinitely until the 
occurrence of the next shock.  In this circumstance, differences in profitability remain, 
and are not eliminated via competitive pressures.  The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test, which tests for stationarity, is one such unit root test often used within the 
literature.  However, as noted by Crespo Cuareshma and Gschwandtner (2006), one 
common problem with these tests is the low power they have against a stationary 
alternative.  Yurtoglu (2004) uses Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests that fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in only 56 out of 172 cases. 
A number of studies have considered autoregressive models with lag lengths 
greater than one.  The consensus from this literature suggests that a lag length of one is 
sufficient.  For instance, Goddard and Wilson (1999), using a dataset comprising 335 
UK firms for the period 1972-1991, find support for partial short-run persistence of 
profits (0< for all firms (although they were unable to rule out the possibility of 
zero persistence ( = 0) for up to 15% of firms, or complete persistence ( = 1) for up 
                                                          
5 Mueller (1990a) analyses profit persistence in seven developed countries (Canada, France, Japan, 
Sweden, UK, US, and West Germany). He concludes that profit persistence exists in all of these 
countries.  
6  Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Zimbabwe. 
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to 24% of all firms.  The authors also examine the persistence of long run profit and 
seek to determine whether long run profits rates revert to their competitive equilibrium.  
They conclude that whilst long run profits are normally distributed around zero, their 
results suggest that there is no convergence on long run profit rates for all firms.  
Kambhampati (1995) also finds that coefficients on lags in an autoregressive model 
greater than one were typically insignificantly different from zero.  Geroski and 
Jacquemin (1998) using a dataset comprising UK, French and West German firms, 
found that more than 82 percent of UK, 95 percent of French and 79 percent of West 
German firms had coefficients equal to zero on autoregressive lags greater than one.  
Similarly, Yurtoglu (2000) analysed a dataset comprising Turkish firms and found that 
92 percent had insignificant parameters on lags greater than one. 
Although the above studies suggest that the AR(1) model is the appropriate 
specification and thus applying the AR(1) equation to all firms should not change the 
pattern of results, several studies have nevertheless extended the AR(1) methodology. 
These include Gschwandtner and Hauer (2007), who adopt a fractional integration 
approach in order to analyse the dynamics of profits for 156 US manufacturing 
companies that survived for the period 1950 to 1999, and uncover evidence of long-
range dependency and non-stationarity.  Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006) 
employ a non-linear three-regime threshold autoregressive model with a middle random 
walk regime and symmetric reverting outer behaviour.  Their results suggest lower 
levels of persistence than typically reported in linear modelling.  Cable and Jackson 
(2008) adopt structural time series analysis in order to identify structural breaks, trends 
and cyclical behaviour.  Structural time series is also considered by Cable and 
Gschwandtner (2008) who use the standard AR(1) model on a sample of 156 US 
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companies over a 50 year period to compare results with an alternative model that 
adopts a structural time series approach.  The authors found that both models were able 
to identify firms with profits persistently above or below competitive norms, however 
they report that the structural time series method detects a much higher overall 
incidence of persistence.  Thus, they suggest that the latter model is more suitable than 
an AR(1) model in cases where the profit dynamics are more complex.  McMillan and 
Wohar (2011) estimate a threshold autoregressive model that allows for asymmetry in 
the strength of persistence between above and below mean profits. This enables 
differentiation between entry and exit as the drivers of the competitive equilibrium.  
Gschwandtner (2012) estimates a time varying state space model AR(1), employing a 
method developed by Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2008), whereby the profit 
persistence is allowed to change each period.   
The following section provides a review of those studies that seek to explain, as 
opposed to merely estimate, the persistence of profits.  McGahan and Porter (1999) 
construct a dataset comprising a large number of US companies for the period 1981 to 
1994 in order to examine the persistence of incremental industry, corporate-parent and 
business-specific effects on profitability.  Their results suggest that incremental industry 
effects impacts the longest on profitability persistence.  Furthermore, changes in 
industry structure rather than changes in firm structure have a more persistent impact on 
profitability. 
Yurtoglu (2004) examines firm level profitability in Turkey.  Central to this 
analysis of profit persistence are three questions relating to industry dynamics; (i) are 
excess profits successfully eliminated via competitive forces (ii) how long does the 
process of eliminating excess profits take and (iii) to what factors can observed 
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differences in profit persistence and speed of adjustment to the norm, be attributed?  
The author concludes that the intensity of competition in Turkey is no less than in 
developed countries.  Glen et al.(2001) examine the persistence on profitability and 
competition for a dataset comprising seven emerging markets.  Their results suggest that 
intensity is greater in emerging markets than developed economies. 
Gschwandtner (2005) examines 85 surviving firms and 75 exiters over the 
period 1950-1999 in response to a significant limitation of previous studies, namely that 
they consider only surviving firms.  The author reports that while there is evidence of 
profit persistence for both samples, exiters perform more competitively than surviving 
firms.  Furthermore, the author identifies concentration and growth of the industry, size 
and volatility of profits as factors that have a significant influence on persistence.  When 
examining survivors, Gschwandtner finds that profits generally converge to a 
competitive norm, in line with the existing literature, but there is a considerable degree 
of profit persistence such that even after a fifty year period the adjustment process is 
still not fully completed.  A possible explanation suggested by the author relates to 
industry concentration, whereby highly concentrated industries are potentially able to 
construct entry barriers and therefore elicit a high degree of profit persistence.  Various 
studies have found a positive relationship between concentration and different measures 
of profitability (e.g. Kambhampati, 1995; Yurtoglu 2004).  
 Another industry characteristic that would be expected to impact on profits 
persistence is the size of the industry, measured by the number of firms in the industry.  
Typically, the larger the number of firms in the industry the more competitive it is and 
therefore the lower the persistence of profits.  In addition, the growth rate of the 
industry is also an important factor in explaining profit differentials, although studies 
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have demonstrated that its net effect is ambiguous.  That is, in industries experiencing 
rapid growth it might be harder for firms to maintain their market share and 
oligopolistic discipline and as such profits might decrease.  Conversely though, in 
industries that are experiencing rapid growth, firms are under no pressure to reduce 
prices in order to increase sales and thus profit differentials may be maintained over 
time.  Kambhampati (1995) analysing industry growth and profit persistence, found a 
positive and small, but highly significant, coefficient. Furthermore, Gschwandtner 
(2005) highlights the importance of both firm and industry size and growth in 
determining profit persistence using data from US surviving and exiting firms. 
Droucopoulos and Lianos (1993) investigate convergence in industry-level 
average profit rates for a dataset of 20 Greek manufacturing industries over the time 
period 1963-88.  The speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium (measured by 
) is typically slow.  That is, results for the values of   are found to be relatively high 
for most industries, and in some cases exceed 0.9 (implying that 90% of any abnormal 
return earned in year t persists into year t+1).  Large values for   (long-run 
profitability differences) are also obtained, which range from 11.8% (for the tobacco 
industry) to 38% (for the footwear industry).  In order to determine the factors affecting 
 a cross-sectional analysis is applied to the following model: 
  +        (3.2) 
Where  is the concentration of employment amongst the largest four firms; A/  is 
the advertising expenditures to sales ratio;  is the percentage of manufacturing 
employment accounted for by foreign firms; EX/  is the ratio of exports to sales, and 
 is the number of strikes.  The results indicate a significant negative relationship of 
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 to , A/  and EX/  which suggests that high concentration, high advertising 
intensity and ratio of exports to sales are all instrumental in slowing the speed of 
adjustment to long-run equilibrium profit values. 
Waring (1996) examines industry aggregates for 12,986 US firms for the period 
1970 to 1989.  The author reports that the convergence process is industry specific.  
Furthermore, industry characteristics such as levels of R&D have a significant impact 
on the speed of convergence. 
Eklund and Wiberg (2007) analyse the links between the persistence of profits 
and the systematic search for knowledge.  The authors observe that firms which invest 
in research and development may potentially create products or services that are 
preferred by the market, or potentially develop a more cost efficient method of 
production.  Thus, firms which systematically invest in research and development may 
potentially earn persistently high profits.  Furthermore, the authors argue that profit 
persistence may occur even without the existence of significant entry and exit barriers, 
which they accredit to the systematic search for knowledge through research and 
development. 
Jacobson and Hansen (2001) model the process of competition as reflected in 
the persistence of abnormal returns for both US and Japanese firms.  For the US, the 
authors include accounting data for a total of 1039 firms taken from the 1992 Standard 
and Poor’s Compustat annual industrial file, for companies listed in the NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ stock exchanges.  Inclusion criteria required that a firm reported both its 
net income and assets for the entire 20 year period from 1973 to 1992.  In addition, the 
firm had to be non-financial and have a minimum of three other firms represented from 
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the same industry.  For Japan, annual balance sheet and income statement items come 
from the Japan Development Bank.  Firms included in the sample are part of the First 
Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (of which there are two sections).  A total of 271 
Japanese firms were included in the sample, covering the period March 1973 to March 
1993.   The authors uncover similar aggregate distribution of firm persistence in both 
countries, whilst observing differences in industry persistence across the two countries.  
The authors conclude that both firm specific and industry specific factors influence firm 
persistence.     
Bentzen et al. (2005) employ a dynamic framework in order to examine profit 
persistence for nearly 1600 Danish firms over a twelve year time period.  The authors 
report that, compared to other studies, the speed of convergence towards industry norms 
is relatively high.  Therefore, within industries, the competitive process appears to work 
well; however, the authors also report significant variations in profit persistence across 
industries.  Following the usual two-step methodology e.g. Mueller (1990) and Geroski 
and Jacquemin (1988), the paper reports that firm specific characteristics (for instance 
firm size, market share, type of ownership and ownership concentration) have a mixed 
effect in determining profit persistence.  For instance, the authors report an increase in 
profit persistence if the largest owner of a firm holds up to 50% of the stocks.  Beyond 
this threshold, further owner concentration has a negative effect on persistence, causing 
it to decrease.  Furthermore, the authors report that firm specific characteristics have no 
significant influence on permanent profits, suggesting that unobserved firm 
characteristics are more influential in determining profit levels. 
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3.5.1. Persistence of profits in banking. 
There now exists a large empirical literature which seeks to assess competition in the 
banking industry by examining the persistence of profits.  Early research was based on 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and the subsequent Chicago Revisionist 
School critique.  The former contested that a small number of banks may be able to 
collude (or use independent market power) in order to push prices up, therefore enabling 
banks to earn abnormal profits.  The latter contested that banks may earn abnormal 
profits as a result of increased efficiency gains arising as banks increase in size (thus 
more concentrated markets are inherently more profitable).  The extent to which banks 
are able to earn high profits either through the exercise of market power, or as a 
consequence of superior efficiency, has never been satisfactorily resolved (e.g. Goddard 
et al., 2007; Casu and Girardone, 2006; Dick and Hannan, 2010).7 
Levonian (1993) examines the speed with which abnormal profits are eroded 
within the US banking industry.  The author develops a method which utilises stock 
market and financial accounting data from a cross-section of banking firms, to infer the 
persistence of economic profits.  This method derives a rate of profit adjustment that is 
most consistent with the observed cross-sectional relationship between stock prices and 
profitability.  In this model, a slower implied rate of adjustment suggests that the market 
considers bank profits to be more persistent.  The dataset comprised 83 surviving banks 
and bank holding companies with exchange-traded shares for the period 1986 to 1991, 
obtained from the Standard and Poors’ Computstat database.  Using pooled data, the 
                                                          
7 Other examples of studies that assess the determinants of bank profits at individual or cross-country 
level include Molyneux and Thorton (1992), Berger (1995), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003), Staikouras and Wood (2004), Athanasoglou et al. (2006), Micco et 
al. (2007), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Tregenna (2009) and Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011). 
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author employs a nonlinear least squares technique.  The results show that while the 
expected rate of adjustment tends to be significantly greater than zero, adjustment 
speeds are slower than for nonbank firms. 
Berger et al (2000) analyse persistence in the US banking industry.  This study 
employs a non-parametric methodology in order to examine exogenous propagation 
mechanisms of persistence.  Propagation mechanisms are identified as local market 
power, informational opacity and regional macroeconomic shocks.  Results indicate that 
both local market power and informational opacity are strongly correlated with profit 
persistence.  Furthermore, bank performance is affected by regional macroeconomic 
shocks. Thus, the authors report that US banking industry profit converges to its long-
run average value more slowly than profit convergence within the manufacturing 
industry.   
Roland (1997) uses a two-dimensional model to measure persistence within the 
banking industry.  The performance persistence for individual firms was separated 
according to the tendency for various revenues to persist and the tendency for various 
costs to persist.  The degree of persistence was allowed to differ cross-sectionally.  The 
model produced a unique performance classification system which allows a BHC to be 
categorised according to the level of abnormal profits generated and how persistent 
these profits are.  The dataset comprised quarterly data obtained from the Consolidated 
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9 C) submitted to the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the period June 1986 to December 
1992.  The results suggest that persistent positive abnormal profits appear to be driven 
by revenue generation and not cost control.  Evidence also indicates that, as a result of 
entry barriers, a significant number of BHCs yield persistent negative abnormal profits 
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(although Roland also notes that this may no longer hold true if enough barriers are 
removed as a result of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
of 1994).  
Goddard et al. (2004a) employ a model that incorporates bank-specific variables 
such as size, diversification, risk and ownership type to a sample of European banks 
from six countries in order to estimate the persistence of profit.  Commercial banks are 
found to have lower persistence of profits than mutual (savings and cooperative) banks.  
Furthermore, persistence is found to be highest in France, which may be the result of a 
strong regulatory framework that effectively protects banks from the full effects of 
competition.  In another study by Goddard et al. (2004b), the authors employ dynamic 
panel and cross-sectional regressions in order to estimate growth and profits equations 
for a dataset comprising 583 banks; consisting of a sample of commercial, savings and 
cooperative banks from five major European countries during the mid-1990s.  Annual 
observations for growth and profits rates are observed for the period 1992 to 1998, in 
addition to a set of control variables designed to capture the impact of a number of 
characteristics at the firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic level.  The results of 
the growth regressions show little or no mean reversion in bank sizes (i.e. as banks 
become larger in relative terms their growth performance also tends to improve).  
However, the authors find no evidence of any cross-sectional relationship between bank 
size and growth.  The results do indicate that profit is an important prerequisite for 
future growth, banks with higher capital-assets ratios typically experience slower 
growth and furthermore, macroeconomic conditions affect growth also.  Savings and 
co-operative banks appear to have greater persistence of profit than commercial banks.  
High capital-assets or liquidity ratios are typically observed in banks with relatively low 
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profitability; and finally, the authors uncover some evidence of a positive correlation 
between concentration and profitability (lending support to the SCP hypothesis) but no 
significant evidence of a correlation between bank-level x-inefficiency and profitability. 
Knapp et al. (2006) estimate persistence for a sample of US banks and find that 
profit may take five years or so to revert to the industry mean.  Athanasoglou et 
al.(2008) estimate persistence using Greek data, while Flamini et. al. (2009) undertake a 
cross-country study for Sub-Saharan Africa and finds that there is a strong positive 
correlation between strong persistence and bank size, diversification and private 
ownership. 
Bektas (2007) investigates the persistence of profits in the Turkish banking 
sector using a dataset comprising 28 surviving banks for the period 1989 to 2003, and 
finds that profits do not persist in the long run, as any abnormal profits are eroded by 
competitive forces. 
Goddard et al (2010) employ a dynamic panel model to examine the 
determinants and convergence of bank profitability using a dataset comprising eight 
European Union member countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK) for the period 1992-2007.  In line with the literature, 
the authors employ an AR(1) model to estimate bank profitability.  However, in contrast 
to previous bank POP studies, they utilise the excess return on equity (eROE) as the 
dependent variable in order to account for the possibility that the cost of capital varies 
between countries. The results indicate that more efficient and diversified banks have 
higher average profitability in contrast to highly capitalised banks which are 
characterised by lower average profitability.  They also find that excess profit tends to 
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persist from one year to the next.  The authors also consider two sub-periods within the 
data, the first one being from 1992-1998 and the second one from 1999-2007.  
Estimations for these sub-samples indicate that persistence of profit was lower in the 
second period than in the first for all eight countries.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis of an increase in the intensity of bank competition resultant from an increase 
in the integration of EU financial markets following the introduction of the euro in 1999 
and the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan. 
In a more recent paper, Goddard et al. (2011) undertake further cross country 
analysis of the persistence of profit in banking.  The authors find evidence of greater 
profit persistence for banks in developed countries, than for those in developing 
countries.  In particular, they find that banks located in East Asia are characterised by a 
relatively low degree of persistence compared to banks located in North America and 
Western Europe.  They also find greater persistence in markets where entry barriers are 
high and competition low.   
Goddard et al (2009) estimate country-level dynamic panel models for 65 
national banking industries.  They report that the persistence of profit is weaker for 
banks in developing countries than for those in developed countries.  In particular, they 
note that North America and Western Europe display a relatively high degree of 
persistence, whereas East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa are 
characterised by relatively low persistence.  The authors also report that persistence is 
stronger when entry barriers are high and when competition is low according to both 
structure and conduct based competition indicators. 
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Beckmann (2007) seeks to analyse both structural and cyclical determinants of 
banking profitability for 16 Western European countries for the period 1979 to 2003.  
Aggregate annual country data is collected, alongside banking group data for 
commercial, cooperative and savings banks.  The authors employ panel methodology 
using the Hausman-Taylor instrument variable estimator.  Their results indicate that 
financial structure is an important factor.  In particular, they find that there is a positive 
association between a market based financial system and bank profitability.  They also 
find a positive correlation between bank profitability and diversification, while bank 
concentration does not significantly impact on the profitability of banks.  Finally, the 
authors also uncover a pro-cyclical link between bank profitability and lagged change in 
GDP. 
Tregenna (2009) examines the structure and profitability of the US banking 
system, prior to the recent financial crisis, employing a dataset comprising US banks 
over the period 1994 to 2005.  The author reports a strong correlation between bank 
profitability and market concentration. 
Kanas et al. (2011) employ a semi-parametric empirical model in order to 
examine the profitability of US banks for the period 1988 to 2011.  They report low 
profit persistence over this time period.  Furthermore, they find evidence of a non-
parametric relationship between profitability and the business cycle, short term interest 
rates, inflation expectations, credit risk and loan portfolio structure.  
To summarise, the weight of evidence from the above literature suggests that 
bank profits do indeed exhibit persistent behaviour and typically more so than is found 
for industrial firms.  Furthermore evidence suggests that persistence is typically found 
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to be stronger in larger banks and more diversified banks.  Finally, persistence in 
developed countries is found to be greater than that reported for developing countries.  
 
3.5.2. Alternative non-AR(1) Studies Examining the Persistence of Profit. 
While most studies examining the persistence of profits adopt the AR(1) approach, 
several studies have either used alternative approaches or employed longer lags.  This 
section considers a selection of such studies. 
 Gschwandtner (2010) examines the evolution of profit persistence in the US, by 
splitting the last half of the twentieth century into three sub-periods (1950-66, 1967-83 
and 1984-99).  This enables the examination of entry and exit by firms over the entire 
sample period, in contrast to most other studies which only analyse those firms which 
survive for the whole of the time period considered.  The author estimates 
autoregressive processes up to order four, identifying the best lag model for further 
analysis.  This is deemed to be the model with either the lowest Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) or Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (SBC) value.  In addition, the 
author also estimates a state space model developed in Crespo-Cuaresma and 
Gschwandtner (2008), in order to allow for time variation in the persistence parameter.  
Overall, the results indicate that following the removal of barriers protecting the US 
economy from international competition throughout the 1960s to 1980s, a constant 
increase in competition subsequently ensued.  A further example of a paper that used a 
higher order AR model is Glen et al. (2001).  The study considers an AR(2) model in 
order to examine the persistence of profitability for 339 firms in seven emerging 
markets throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.  The principal result uncovered by the 
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authors is that firms in advanced economies exhibit greater persistence than those in 
developing countries. 
 McMillan and Wohar (2010) use a threshold autoregressive model to test for 
asymmetry between above and below normal profits.  Using data for UK firms, they 
find evidence for such asymmetry using both single-equation and panel techniques.  In 
particular, they report that persistence is stronger for above average profit firms and 
suggest this may be due to higher barriers to entry for such firms. 
 Crespo-Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006) report lower levels of persistence, 
using a non-linear three-regime threshold model, than is typically found in linear 
studies.   Gschwandtner and Hauser (2007) find evidence to support both long-range 
dependency and non-stationarity when analysing profit persistence using a fractional 
integration approach. 
  Cable and Jackson (2008) employ trend-based, structural time series analysis to 
a sample of 53 UK companies, and find evidence to support the cyclical behaviour of 
firms.  That is, approximately one third of the firms considered appeared to have 
converged on the competitive norm over the sample period; while roughly 60% of the 
sample exhibited significant above or below norm long run persistence of profit.  The 
authors found little evidence of firms in the process of convergence within the overall 
time frame, although for certain sub-periods, phases of convergence were observed.  
 Cable and Gschwandtner (2008) and Cable and Mueller (2008) undertake 
studies which not only seek to analyse convergence, but also depict the convergence 
profile.  Both of these studies model the adjustment process by employing the standard 
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AR(1) framework, and subsequently employ structural time series analysis in order to 
estimate the underlying trend. 
 Ewing and Thompson (2007) examine the time series dynamics of corporate 
after-tax profits.  They employ the Enders and Granger (1998) momentum threshold 
unit root test to consider the potential for asymmetric behaviour within profit 
persistence.  Their results are supportive of such asymmetric behaviour; in particular, 
they report that corporate profit exhibits greater persistence when the rate of growth in 
profits is falling.  
 Kanas et al. (2011) employ a semi-parametric estimation technique to examine 
US bank profitability.  Specifically, they implement the spline method of Keele (2008) 
and obtain the smoothing parameter using generalised cross validation.  Their results 
indicate that US banks have a low degree of profit persistence. 
Another aspect, considered by recent research, is concerned with the possibility 
that competitive conditions may be affected differently as a result of varying bank sizes.  
That is, small community banks which, in developed nations, tend to serve smaller, 
more localised customers have different competitive advantages than large banks.  For 
example, these small banks are able to provide more retail-oriented rather than 
wholesale-oriented financial services (e.g., DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell 2004). 
Further research examines the different technologies used by different sized 
banks to deliver their services, in order to ascertain how competitive conditions may be 
affected differently by varying bank size.  Findings suggest that large banks may have a 
comparative advantage in lending technologies that are based on ‘hard’ quantitative 
data, such as credit scoring.  On the other-hand, small banks may have a comparative 
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advantage in lending technologies such as relationship lending that are based on ‘soft’ 
information that is difficult to quantify and transmit through the communication 
channels of large banking organisations (e.g., Stein, 2002) and may create agency 
problems that require a closely held organisational structure (e.g., Berger and Udell, 
2002).  In support of these arguments, large banks relative to small banks in the U.S. 
have been found to lend proportionately less of their assets to SMEs (e.g., Berger, 
Kashyap, and Scalise, 1995), to lend to larger, older, more financially secure SMEs 
when they do so (e.g. Haynes, Ou, and Berney, 1999), to charge lower rates, to earn 
lower yields, and require collateral less often on their SME loans (e.g., Berger and 
Udell, 1996; Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge, 2004), to have shorter and less exclusive 
relationships (e.g., Berger and Udell, 2002), and to base their lending decisions more on 
financial ratios than on prior relationships (e.g., Cole, Goldberg, and White, 1999).  
Thus, the literature is strongly consistent with the hypothesis that large banks tend to 
make hard-information-based transaction loans to larger, safer, more transparent 
borrowers, while small banks tend to make more soft-information-based relationship 
loans to smaller, riskier, more opaque borrowers. 
 
3.6. Time-variation in the persistence of profits. 
As noted in the Introduction there has been relatively little work examining time-
variation in the persistence of firm profits. Arguably this arises due to the relatively 
short time series available. Nonetheless, there have been several papers that have 
directly or indirectly considered possible time-variation. 
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Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2013) examine the determinants of profit 
persistence using a model that allows for time variation within the persistence parameter 
and which explicit links persistence to firm and industry factors.  Thus, while previous 
studies which examine the impact of industry and firm characteristics estimate only one 
measure of profit persistence for the entire time span for each company or industry 
considered, in this study the authors allow the profit persistence variable to vary with 
time.  In addition, the authors seek to analyse the effects of both industry and firm 
characteristics on profit persistence. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, studies which examine the persistence of profits 
typically specify the dynamics of company profits as a first order autoregressive 
process, given by the following equation: 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (3.3) 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the short run persistence parameter, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is a white noise disturbance term.  
The long run projected profit rate for firm i is given by 𝜋𝑖
∗ =  𝛼𝑖/(1 − 𝜆𝑖).  Under the 
hypothesis of perfect competition, the long run projected profit rates would be zero, 
however as many empirical studies have shown, there appears to be significant 
differences in 𝜋𝑖
∗ across firms.  In this study, Cuaresma and Gschwandtner seek to 
empirically assess the potential determinants of the differences in both short and long 
run persistence (given by 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜋𝑖
∗ respectively).  The authors propose a simple 
generalisation of equation (3.3) where 𝛼𝑖  and 𝜆𝑖 are assumed to be functions of a set of 
economic variables X𝑖,𝑡 and Z𝑖,𝑡 respectively, such that: 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼(X𝑖,𝑡) +  𝜆(Z𝑖,𝑡)𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                  (3.4) 
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Estimating equation (3.4) therefore allows us to examine both the impact of changes in 
the variables on short-run persistence, by studying the effects of changes in Zi,t on 
λ(Zi,t); and the impact of changes in the variables on long-run persistence, by analysing 
α(Xi,t)/[1-λ(Zi,t)]. 
The authors estimate this equation using profit data and both industry and firm 
characteristics for 156 US companies over the time period 1950 to 1999.  Equation (3.5) 
below shows this econometric specification, in which it is assumed that the α(∙) and λ(∙) 
functions are linear on Xi,t and Zi,t respectively.   
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
?̅?
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +  (𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
?̅?
𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖,𝑡)𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (3.5) 
The authors use the following firm characteristics to explain profit persistence: market 
share (MS), the volatility of the profit rate (RISK), the size of the company (as 
measured by the value of assets, ASSETS) and the growth rate of the company’s sales 
(GRSALES).   The industry characteristics used are concentration (in this case the 
percentage of industry output produced by the 4 largest firms in the industry, CR4), size 
(the number of firms in the industry, NFIRM, and the value of shipments, VS) and 
finally the growth of the number of firms. 
The authors find evidence to suggest that, in terms of industry characteristics, 
both concentration and industry size have a significant effect on profit persistence.  In 
support of the Chamberlinian hypothesis, the results obtained predict that relatively 
small and concentrated industries will display greater profit persistence.  Examining the 
firm level characteristics, the authors report that proxies for market share, firm growth, 
firm size and profit volatility all appear to be significant determinants of short and long 
run profit persistence.    
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Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006) use a dataset comprising of profits 
for more than 150 US companies over a 50 year time span in order to test the widely 
researched competitive environment hypothesis, which states that in the long run the 
competitive process will eliminate any economic profits or losses.   The main 
conclusion from this body of literature is that deviations from the norm tend to be very 
persistent.  Furthermore, the empirical literature examining the competitive environment 
hypothesis typically reports evidence of nonstationary (unit root) behaviour of company 
profits.  Profit time series data is frequently modelled using a simple threshold 
autoregressive model that allows for nonstationary behaviour over subsamples.  
However, it is also well known that univariate methods for testing unit roots have low 
power, especially for relatively small sample sizes, thus consequently several different 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) type tests have been proposed in order to improve the power of unit 
root testing.  In this paper, the authors employ an alternative non-linear modelling 
strategy for company profits, which allows for a ‘band of inactivity’ (as opposed to non-
stationary behaviour in some cross sections) in which profits may present nonstationary 
behaviour.  The model employed is a simple TAR (threshold autoregression) model, 
(with the inclusion of an inaction band where the profit rate is allowed to behave in a 
nonstationary fashion), which allows for testing against pure unit root processes using 
methodology developed by Caner and Hansen (2001).  The authors report statistical 
evidence of non-linear adjustment for a large proportion of firms where the null 
hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected using the DF test.  Furthermore, they report 
that when the existence of non-linearities is not taken into consideration, the persistence 
of profits is over estimated.  That is, when inaction bands are taken into account, the 
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overall evidence on the level of persistence of profits in US companies changes 
significantly.   
In application of the non-linear model, Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006) 
impose symmetry. That is, while they allow for an inner random walk regime, the 
regimes governing mean reversion (the opposite to persistence) have a common 
coefficient. Thus, whether profits are currently above or below normal, the strength of 
persistence (or speed of reversion) is equal. This implicitly assumes the strength of 
competitive pressures are equal regardless of whether entry or exit pressures are more 
prominent. In contrast, McMillan and Wohar (2011) employ an asymmetric 
autoregressive model, using a dataset comprising of 57 UK firms over the period 1980 
to 2007, in order to examine profit persistence.  This model allows the parameter 
governing persistence to vary between positive and negative profits relative to normal 
profits, therefore enabling the authors to differentiate between entry and exit as conduits 
of the competitive model. This also allows testing of whether profits persistence is equal 
irrespective of whether a given firm is faced with potential exit or the threat of entry by 
competitor firms.  Hence, the authors seek to determine whether the threat of entry or 
exit has a greater influence on restoring the competitive equilibrium.  The results from 
this paper suggest asymmetric behaviour in the profits persistence parameter, such that 
persistence is stronger when profits are above normal. This result is robust to both 
estimates on individual firms and two panel model specifications. The results imply that 
the competitive pressures surrounding profitable firms, notably entry, are weaker than 
those surrounding less profitable firms, notably exit.  
  Gschwandtner (2012) uses the standard persistence of profits AR(1) equation 
but splits the full sample (1950-1999) in to three sub-samples (1950-66, 1967-1983, 
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1984-1999). Further, the firms that appear in each sample are the ones that were alive in 
the respective sub-sample. Thus, this implicitly allows for firms to enter and exit. 
Gschwandtner (2012) estimates the AR(1) persistence parameter for each firm in each 
sub-sample and reports that the average value has declined from 0.49 to 0.42 to 0.36 
through the three sub-samples respectively. This indicates that competitive pressures in 
the US have increased over time, which Gschwandtner attributes to changes in firm and 
industry size, industry growth, and more latterly, risk and advertising. 
The literature examining time-variation within profit persistence is very much in 
its infancy. There is a generally accepted view that a constant degree of persistence, 
especially when measured over a time series of twenty years, is an unrealistic one.  
Persistence will change as competitive pressures change due to market evolvution (such 
as in the Schumpeterian view of creative destruction) or due to regulatory change. As 
such, the above work has largely focused on documenting such changes through a 
variety of empirical techniques. That is, using sub-sample analysis, Kalman filter 
techniques, threshold regressions and variable interaction regressions, the above work 
has documented differences in persistence over time. The above work has focussed on 
manufacturing firms, thus, this thesis seeks extends that analysis and fills an obvious 
gap in the literature by considering time-variation in banks. Furthermore, given both 
regulatory change and innovation over the past 25 years or so, we would perhaps expect 
such time-variation to exist. 
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3.7. Competition and Fragility. 
The literature on classical financial structure states that highly leveraged firms, such as 
banks, have an incentive to engage in risky behaviour.  That is, shareholders benefit if 
the gamble works; whereas lenders, not the bank, bear the cost if it does not (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  The charter-value argument presents the view that for large banks, 
with market power, the incentive exists to maximise risk-taking behaviour.  The 
screening theories present the view that these banks also have incentive to improve the 
quality of their assets.  That is, allocative efficiency can improve the quality of a bank’s 
loan portfolio in that banks with market power may have a greater incentive to screen 
loans.  Both sets of theories argue that competition is bad for an economy. 
Keeley (1990) argues that an increase in competition in the banking industry 
contributed to the rise in bank failures in the U.S. during the 1980s.  Numerous authors, 
for example Besanko and Thakor (1993) and Perotti and Suarez (2002), have expanded 
the literature, modelling different factors that affect charter value. Hellman, Murdock 
and Stiglitz (2000) examine charter value in an environment that has capital regulation 
and find that this promotes risk-taking behaviour.  Repullo (2003) models competition 
in the deposit market and finds that a very competitive market, without capital 
requirements, promotes risk-taking behaviour by banks.  Keeley (1990) and Demsetz, 
Saidenberg and Strahan (1996), report that an increase in competition leads to a 
decrease in charter value, which may lead to an increase in bank risk.  Allen and Gale 
(2000) find that an increase in competition leads to an increase in contagion (defined as 
the risk that a credit or liquidity shock to one financial system participant leads to 
substantial shocks to other participants).  Shaffer (1998) argues that an increase in 
competition may result in the deterioration of a bank’s lending portfolio through a 
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higher number of low-quality loans.  Cordella and Yeyati (2002) find that competition 
leads banks to reduce their investment in monitoring.  Salas and Saurina (2002) 
conclude that higher charter values are associated with lower levels of credit risk.  De 
Nicolo (2000) finds that an increase in bank size is associated with a lower charter value 
and higher insolvency risk. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) conclude that 
both concentration and competition increase financial stability.   
 Most of the literature on the relationship between competition and risk seeks to 
analyse the impact that competition has on banks’ incentives to undertake risk.  There 
are two broad approaches, namely theoretical studies versus empirical studies.  The 
theoretical literature can be broadly divided into two opposing views which derive 
different predictions concerning the nature of the relationship between concentration, 
competition and bank risk.  Following on from this, the theoretical literature is 
presented under two sections according to whether the model predicts a negative 
relationship between the variables (competition-stability hypothesis), or whether the 
model predicts a positive relationship between the variables (competition-fragility 
hypothesis).  The empirical literature is also presented under two sections; namely bank-
level studies which focus on one country, versus empirical studies which examine cross-
country data.  Bank-level studies produce ambiguous results concerning the relationship 
between competition and risk, while cross-country studies mostly uncover a positive 
relationship between the variables.  
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3.7.1. Theoretical Literature. 
As noted above, theoretical models offer contrasting predictions regarding the 
relationship between concentration, competition and stability.  The following two sub-
sections divide the literature according to whether the models employed predict a 
positive or negative relationship between competition and stability.   
 
3.7.1.1. Competition-fragility hypotheses. 
Firstly considering the literature which assumes a positive relationship between 
competition and stability, the traditional competition-fragility hypotheses predict that 
more concentrated and less competitive banking systems (with restricted entry), are 
more stable.  It is assumed that less competition allows banks to earn abnormal positive 
profits, which then act as a barrier against fragility, and furthermore provide incentives 
against excessive risk taking.  Conversely, more competition erodes market power, 
decreases profit margins and results in reduced franchise value.  This therefore 
encourages banks to undertake greater risks in order to increase returns (e.g. Marcus 
1984, Keeley 1990, Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 1996, Carletti and Hartmann 
2003).  Known as the “charter value” view of banking, various authors including 
Marcus (1984), Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986), and Keeley (1990) have 
modelled this approach, in which it is assumed that banks are able to choose the risk of 
their asset portfolio.  However, where there is limited liability, bank owners face 
incentives to shift risk to depositors as they face no negative consequences as a result of 
engaging in risk taking behaviour.  In more competitive banking systems in which 
individual banks earn lower profits however, there is a much greater incentive for banks 
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to undertake more excessive risks, thereby resulting in a banking system that is more 
fragile.  Furthermore, in more competitive systems there is less incentive for banks to 
screen borrowers properly, as they earn fewer informational rents from their relationship 
with borrowers.  As Boot and Greenbaum (1993); and Allen and Gale (2000, 2004) 
report, this increases the risk of fragility.   These models predict that as a result of the 
widespread deregulation in the US throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in which many 
barriers to competition were removed, the banking industry would become more fragile 
as a result of increased levels of competition. 
 A number of studies have examined the impact of regulatory policies on stability 
within the banking sector, seeking to identify those policies which enhance banks’ 
charter value and consequently reduce risk-taking.  For instance, Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) argue that deposit insurance can reduce fragility by preventing bank runs, but 
also introduces moral hazard and risk shifting into the banking system.  That is, banks 
may be encouraged to engage in excessive risk-taking behaviour, while at the same time 
market participants have less incentive to monitor bank behaviour.  Therefore, any 
regulatory policy that legislates for more generous deposit insurance designed to instil 
confidence in the banking system and thus prevent bank runs, may actually undermine 
bank stability if incumbents are encouraged to take excessive risks.  Matutes and Vives 
(1996) employ a multiple equilibrium model and report that a systemic confidence crisis 
may be averted under a system in which there are deposit insurance schemes.  While 
deposit insurance schemes can enhance stability in the banking sector, there is also 
evidence that such legislative policy may increase unhealthy competition between 
banks, reduce diversification benefits and subsequently increase the likelihood of bank 
failure with potentially catastrophic consequences for the entire the banking system.  
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Cordella and Yeyati (2002) for instance, show that higher levels of competition arising 
in systems with fixed-rate deposit insurance schemes, increases both interest rates on 
deposits and risk, while also reducing profits.  On the other hand, competitive 
environments in which deposit insurance schemes are risk-adjusted enable banks to 
commit to lower asset risk, thus lowering the cost of funding.  For example, Perrotti and 
Suarez (2002) report that policies which aim to merge failing banks with healthy banks 
encourage banks to act more cautiously regarding the risks they take; as, by definition, 
the last remaining bank following a period of failed bank merger activity, would 
increase its charter value.  Alongside this, policies which encourage new bank entry into 
the system may curb the negative effects associated with an increase in concentration 
resulting from merger activity. 
 Another argument put forward by numerous authors with regard to the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, is that banking systems which are more concentrated 
produce banks which are larger and therefore better able to diversify their portfolios.  
Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), 
Williamson (1986) and Allen (1990), among others, argue that economies of scale are 
present in banking.  Thus, as size increases and larger banks reap economies of scale, 
the banking industry should experience more stability as banks’ risk is spread out 
throughout a more diversified portfolio. 
 A final argument of this hypothesis focuses on the number of banks that 
regulators must supervise.  If a more concentrated banking system produces a smaller 
number (of large) banks, this may give rise to a more stable banking industry as 
regulators have fewer banks to oversee.  Allen and Gale (2000), report that the 
competition-fragility hypothesis is evident in the US.  Here the banking industry is 
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characterised by a large number of banks and has historically been more susceptible to 
financial instability than for instance the UK or Canada, where fewer large banks 
dominate the banking sector. 
 
3.7.1.2. Competition-stability hypotheses. 
This sub-section presents the literature which assumes a negative relationship between 
competition and stability, namely the charter-value hypothesis.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, these studies argue that more concentrated and less competitive 
banking systems are more stable.  In contrast to this, a number of authors have argued 
that banking systems which are more concentrated and less competitive actually result 
in increased bank fragility.  Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) for instance, adopt a different 
view to the standard argument that banks which hold some degree of market power 
(arising in concentrated systems) earn larger profits which therefore leads to greater 
stability (as there is no need for such banks to undertake greater risks in order to 
increase their profits).  The authors argue that this approach does not consider the 
potential impact of banks’ market power on firm behaviour.  That is, the riskiness of 
banks’ assets is not determined by banks themselves, but rather by those who borrow 
from banks, as they choose the riskiness of the investment undertaken with bank loans.  
The authors find that banks’ market power is indeed greater in more concentrated 
systems, thereby enabling them to charge a higher rate of interest on loans.  Higher 
interest rates make it harder for firms to repay loans and may encourage firms to 
undertake greater risks, which in turn increases the likelihood of defaulting on loans.  
The higher interest rate may also result in a riskier set of borrowers as a result of 
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adverse selection considerations.  The authors therefore find a positive relationship 
between concentration and bank fragility, for many parameterisations of the model, and 
thus the probability of systemic distress.   Caminal and Matutes (2002) also report that 
banking systems which are less competitive can lead to less credit rationing, bigger 
loans and an increased probability of failure. 
 Compared to less concentrated banking systems, more concentrated systems are 
typically characterised by fewer banks, thus making the potential for bank failure 
among concentrated systems more of a concern to policymakers, according to advocates 
of the competition-stability view.  Numerous authors, for example Mishkin (1999), have 
therefore argued that banks in more concentrated systems typically receive larger 
subsidies through implicit “too-big-to-fail” policies which may consequently encourage 
risk-taking behaviour, thereby increasing fragility within the banking sector.  
Furthermore, the risk of contagion is more pronounced in more concentrated banking 
systems with larger banks, therefore producing a positive correlation between 
concentration and bank fragility. 
 Advocates of the competition-stability view argue that there is a positive 
correlation between bank size and complexity, such that larger banks are harder to 
monitor than small banks, therefore making more concentrated banking systems more 
difficult for authorities to regulate.  Recent consolidation has further compounded the 
problem facing bank supervisors, as the emergence of financial conglomerates offering 
a range of financial services previously offered by specialised institutions, has increased 
the complexity of these financial institutions.  This argument therefore predicts a 
positive relationship between concentration and fragility. 
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3.7.2. Empirical Literature. 
The following section presents an overview of the empirical studies which seek to 
examine the relationship between market structure, competition and stability.   Again, 
the literature is divided into two sections, namely the more traditional studies which 
sought to examine bank-level data focused only on one country or the comparison of 
two countries; versus the more recent studies which employ cross-country, time-series 
data sets.   
 
3.7.2.1. Bank Level Evidence. 
In a seminal paper, Keeley (1990) examines the relationship between competition and 
risk following the relaxation of state branching restrictions during the 1980s.  The 
author uncovers evidence that competition increased following deregulation, which 
reduced banks’ capital reserves and increased risk premiums (as shown by higher 
interest rates on certificates of deposit).  This may therefore imply that increased 
competition amongst banks in the US, following deregulation during the 1980s, eroded 
charter values and increased bank fragility throughout this period.  Similarly, Dick 
(2006) uncovers evidence that following deregulation during the 1990s, both charge-off 
losses and loan loss provisions increased.  However, in contrast, Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1998) report a sharp decline in loan losses following branch deregulation.   
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), argue that removing interest ceilings on 
deposits, in order to promote competition, erodes franchise value and therefore as a 
result encourages excessive risk taking behaviour by banks.  Jiménez, Lopez and 
Saurina (2007), construct a dataset of Spanish banks for the period 1988 to 2003.  Using 
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the Lerner Index to measure market power, the authors find evidence to suggest that 
banks with more market power have lower non-performing loans.  These findings thus 
lend support to the charter value hypothesis.  However, the authors uncover no evidence 
of a significant relationship between market structure, measured by concentration ratios, 
and non-performing loan ratios. 
 Numerous studies have also undertaken extensive research into the effect of 
market structure and competition on bank fragility.  These studies examine the impact 
on concentration, of the creation of larger banks via merger activity.  Paroush (1995) 
reports that bank stability increases following merger activity, as the resultant 
diversification gains lead to an increase in banks’ market power.  Benston, Hunter and 
Wall (1995) and Craig and Santos (1997) also support this view.  Following bank 
mergers in the US, these authors also indicate diversification gains leading to greater 
bank stability.  In contrast however, empirical work by Chong (1991) and Hughes and 
Mester (1998), finds that the riskiness of bank portfolios increases following bank 
consolidation.  
A few authors have undertaken descriptive studies using data from two countries 
to compare banking market structures and stability.  For instance, Bordo, Redish and 
Rockoff (1996) compare Canadian and US banking systems, and uncover a greater 
degree of stability in the former.  The authors relate this to the fact that Canadian 
banking is defined by an oligopolistic market structure, while the US banking market 
has a higher degree of competition.  However, although Canadian banks have higher 
levels of profitability, this is not necessarily indicative of less competition in the 
Canadian banking system.  Hoggarth, Milne and Wood (1998) report more competition 
and less stability in the UK banking system compared to the German banking system.  
126 
 
Finally, comparing the Spanish and Greek banking systems, Staikouras and Wood 
(2000) report both greater competition and more stability in Spain. 
Reviewing the conclusions from the numerous bank-level empirical studies 
presented above, it is apparent that there exists no overwhelming evidence which would 
support adopting the competition-stability hypothesis in favour of the competition-
fragility hypothesis, or vice versa.  However, the findings do enable two conclusions to 
be drawn.  First, a higher degree of market concentration does not necessarily indicate 
less competition.  Second, there is an important interaction effect between the regulatory 
and supervisory framework on the one hand, and market structure and competitiveness 
on the other hand, in their impact on the stability of the banking system (as predicted 
also by several theoretical theories).   
 
3.7.2.2. Cross-Country Studies. 
In more recent years, large cross-country time-series datasets have become available, 
subsequently instigating a number of studies that seek to test the validity of the different 
theoretical models.   
 Schaeck and Cihak (2007) examine data for 2600 European banks, and report 
that in more competitive environments, banks have higher capital ratios.  Thus, they 
argue that bank capitalisation is one of the channels through which competition fosters 
stability. 
 The cross-country evidence mostly indicates a positive relationship between 
bank competition and stability, but produces mixed results regarding the relationship 
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between bank concentration and stability.  Again, this highlights the shortcomings of 
market structure measures of bank competition such as concentration ratios.  Thus, 
more concentration may improve stability, but this may be though other channels such 
as improved risk diversification, rather than due to the assumed lack of competitiveness.  
Whilst the cross-country studies present a mostly consistent conclusion, evidence from 
country-specific bank-level studies presents much more ambiguous findings.  This can 
be explained by the fact that bank-level studies do not control for the regulatory 
framework.   
 Berger et al. (2009) test the impact of market structure on the risk potential of 
banks using firm-level data for 8235 banks from 23 industrialised countries for the time 
period 1999 to 2005.  The authors employ GMM techniques for a number of regressions 
measuring market power, using three different indicators of risk as the dependent 
variable in order to proxy for financial stability, whilst controlling for a number of other 
variables.  These indicators are first, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (as 
a proxy for loan portfolio risk); second, the Z-index (which provides an inverse measure 
of overall bank risk) and third, the ratio of equity to total assets (which indicates a 
bank’s level of capitalisation).   The authors argue that the competition-stability and 
competition-fragility theories need not necessarily yield opposing predictions on the 
effects of competition and market power on bank stability.  Thus, banks that are deemed 
to be risky in one area of their business, may potentially off-set this risk in another 
portfolio area, thereby maintaining a lower overall level of risk.   The results of the 
study find that banks with a higher degree of market power tend to have less overall risk 
(consistent with the competition-fragility approach).  The authors also find that market 
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power increases loan portfolio risk (which may be partly offset by higher equity capital 
ratios); evidence that lends some support to the competition-stability view. 
 Liu et al. (2012) also examine the impact of competition on bank risk-taking 
behaviour in four South East Asian countries.  The authors report that banks do not 
increase their risk-taking behaviour as a result of competition.  Furthermore, they find 
that concentration is inversely related to bank risk, while there is a positive relationship 
between regulatory restrictions and risk-taking behaviour by banks.  
 Liu et al. (2013) undertake an empirical analysis of competition and bank 
stability for 10 European countries over the period 2000 to 2008, with a focus on 
regional bank competition analysis rather than the traditional national measures of 
competition and macroeconomic activity used to examine performance and risk features 
across banks.  The authors specify a dynamic panel regression model, the purpose of 
which is to capture region-specific competition and economic conditions on bank 
stability.  Also included are a number of bank specific covariates used to examine the 
drivers of bank stability.  Several model specifications are estimated in order to assess 
the impact of regional bank competition and economic conditions on bank stability.  
Overall the authors report that there exists a non-linear relationship between bank 
competition and stability.  In relatively uncompetitive markets increased competition 
appears to improve stability, conversely it increases fragility in markets which are 
relatively uncompetitive.  In addition, the authors report that the stability of banks is 
significantly influenced by regional economic conditions such as unemployment. 
 Beck et al. (2013) also examine cross-country variation in the relationship 
between bank competition and bank stability.  The authors explore market, regulatory 
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and institutional features in order to explain the large variations in this relationship 
across the different countries considered.  The authors estimate a dynamic panel 
regression of risk on competition (as proxied by the Lerner Index) and bank specific 
factors.  They report that an increase in competition will have a greater impact on 
banks’ fragility in those countries that are characterised by stricter activity restrictions, 
lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit 
insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. 
 
3.8. Conclusion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature regarding competition 
in banking.  Understanding competition is important because it is argued that on the one 
hand it encourages greater efficiency, which is an important factor in determining 
economic growth; however, on the other hand it can be argued that too much 
competition may lead to greater instability in the banking sector.  Following 
deregulation, the competitive environment within which banks operate has changed 
significantly, meriting closer examination.  Furthermore, the subsequent impact on both 
bank strategy and performance is also of significant interest due to any potential 
implications for future regulatory and supervisory policy.   
The literature is presented in three sections; namely SCP in Banking, New 
Empirical Industrial Organisation and Other Approaches.  Those studies which adopt 
the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) approach, seek to determine the extent of 
competition within a given market structure based on the assumption that there exists a 
link between market structure and the conduct and performance of firms and industries.  
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Under this approach it is argued that greater industry concentration, resulting in 
increased individual market power of large banks, is more likely to lead to anti-
competitive behavior by banks. 
 The Chicago/ Revisionist critique was subsequently developed in the 1970s, in 
response to the recognised shortcomings of the SCP approach.  At the centre of this 
critique is the efficiency hypothesis which argues that large banks make high profits 
because they are more efficient.  Therefore, high concentration and subsequent high 
prices or profits is a reflection of more efficient performance by banks, rather than an 
indication of more effective collusion within the markets.  As such, a highly efficient 
bank may earn greater profits as a result of its ability to better maximise returns. 
 In response to shortcomings of the SCP and Efficiency Hypothesis paradigms, 
the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approach was developed.  With a 
focus on bank level rather than industry level conduct/strategy, NEIO studies seek to 
examine the response of prices (and in some instances quantities) to changes in 
competitive conditions.  Thus, the extent of competition or collusion within a market 
can be inferred by examining the behaviour of incumbent banks.  The two main 
empirical techniques used to test bank conduct directly are the Panzar-Rosse (PR) and 
Bresnahan-Lau (BL) approaches. 
 More recently, other approaches which seek to examine competition in banking 
by employing various different models have also been developed.  These include 
models to test for price-taking versus price-setting behaviour and demand models based 
on consumer choice under product differentiation.  Models that account for the fact that 
competitive conditions may be affected differently by varying bank size and varying 
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available technologies are also considered.  Most recently, a number of studies have 
examined the role of endogenous fixed cost investments on equilibrium industry 
structure.  These endogenous fixed cost investments are an indication of the 
effectiveness of barriers to entry and thus the level of competition within an industry.  
While it is widely argued that competition in banking is beneficial to consumers, 
overall, there is less consensus within the literature with regard to the preferred degree 
of competition. 
 Also presented in this chapter is a review of the literature which examines the 
relationship between competition and fragility.  The literature on classical financial 
structure states that banks have an incentive to engage in risky behaviour.  The charter-
value argument presents the view that for large banks, with market power, the incentive 
exists to maximise risk-taking behaviour.  The screening theories present the view that 
these banks also have incentive to improve the quality of their assets.  Both theories 
argue that competition is bad for an economy. 
 Most of the literature on the relationship between competition and risk can be 
divided into two broad approaches namely theoretical studies versus empirical studies; 
both seek to analyse the impact that competition has on banks’ incentives to undertake 
risk.  The theoretical literature is also broadly divided into two opposing views; the 
competition-stability hypothesis (which predicts a negative relationship between 
concentration competition and bank risk) and the competition-fragility hypothesis which 
predicts a positive relationship.  The empirical evidence is inconclusive with regard to 
which hypothesis is more dominant.  The empirical literature is also presented under 
two sections; namely bank-level studies which focus on one country, versus empirical 
studies which examine cross-country data.  Bank-level studies produce ambiguous 
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results concerning the relationship between competition and risk, while cross-country 
studies mostly uncover a positive relationship between the variables.   
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Chapter 4. De-Regulation and the Persistence of Profit of US Banks. 
 
4.1. Introduction. 
Examining the dynamics of profit and profits persistence is important in understanding 
the competitive process and the effects of regulatory change and economic upheaval on 
profit and profit persistence. This, in turn, has implications for the conduct and 
effectiveness of competition policy and in particular, whether policies designed to 
increase competition reduce persistence and thus restore the competitive equilibrium 
position. Key examples of studies which examine profit persistence within the banking 
industry include Levonian (1993), Roland (1997) and Berger et al (2000) for the US and 
Goddard et al (2004a, 2004b, 2011) for Europe. 
Structural and conduct deregulation and prudential regulation along with 
technological and financial innovation as well as changes in the economic environment 
have transformed the banking industry.  In the US, geographic and product market 
regulations historically constrained the activity of commercial banks. Over the past two 
decades, however, financial deregulation (which aims to increase competition) eased 
several previous constraints. For example, the McFadden Act of 1927, which prohibited 
interstate branch banking, was repealed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994; while the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which 
prohibited commercial banks from transacting other financial services including 
investment banking and insurance, was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999. This series of deregulatory steps increased 
competition as barriers to entry in many markets were reduced or eliminated. New 
strategic opportunities for enhanced profitability were also created for established 
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banks, which many realized by geographic and product diversification. The net effect of 
such changes on competition and the profitability of incumbent banks is unclear. 
This chapter seeks to understand the degree of profits persistence in US 
commercial banks and the effects on persistence of regulatory changes largely designed 
to increase competition and thus, lower persistence. Furthermore, we provide a 
preliminary look at the effects of the liquidity crisis that began in 2007 on persistence.  
Therefore, this chapter examines the evolution of US bank profitability pre- and post- 
the introduction of Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act and 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act. Specifically, it uses 
econometric models to assess the extent to which entry and exit are sufficiently free to 
eliminate any abnormal profit quickly so that all bank profit rates tend to converge 
towards a long-run average value. The alternative is that some incumbent banks may 
have the capability to prevent imitation, or retard or block entry. If so, abnormal profit 
tends to persist from year to year, and differences in bank-level long-run average profit 
rates may be sustained indefinitely. The degree of first-order serial correlation in profit 
data provides an indication of the speed at which competition causes above- or below-
average profits in one year to converge subsequently towards long-run equilibrium 
values. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by not only examining a larger 
dataset than previously considered, both in the time and cross-sectional dimension, but 
furthermore, explicitly incorporating key changes in the modelling allows us to 
comment on the effectiveness of the legislation.  
This chapter therefore uses a panel model approach to examine the determinants 
of US commercial bank profits using various bank and industry variables as well as a 
persistence parameter over the period 1984 to 2009. Of particular interest, this chapter 
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examines how persistence has changed following two major pieces of regulatory change 
in the US banking sector, namely the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act and the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, using indicator 
variables. Both Acts can be seen as enhancing competition within the banking sector 
through, in the former case, allowing cross-state merger activity and, in the latter case, 
through allowing banks to diversify into other activities, such as insurance and 
investment banking. As such, we may expect to see the effect of each Act in changing 
(reducing) the strength of any profits persistence.  In summary of the results, this 
chapter reports the following key findings. First, the general level of persistence in 
profit is relatively low, moreso than that reported for manufacturing firms and as 
previously reported for US banks by Goddard et al. (2011).  Second, the degree of profit 
persistence fell following the passage of the Interstate Banking Act of 1994.  This may 
indicate an increase in competition arising from cross-state activity. Third, profit 
persistence increases following the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which allowed 
banks to diversify into non-traditional banking activities.  This Act allowed banks to 
generate income from alternative sources and hence diversify their activities, thus does 
not necessarily imply that the Act served to reduced competition.  Finally, persistence 
declined following the financial crisis that began in 2007 when banking industry profits 
fell. 
The persistence of profits approach largely dates back to Mueller (1977, 1986) 
and was subsequently extended by Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) and Geroski (1990).  
This early work employed a first order autoregressive model to measure the degree of 
profit persistence, demonstrating the existence of non-zero persistence measures which 
are inconsistent with the competitive equilibrium model.  From this early work 
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developed the persistence of profits literature as it has come to be known, with a 
number of authors uncovering evidence of profit persistence.  For example Mueller 
(1990) concludes that profits persist in a range of West European and North American 
economies. Maruyama and Odagiri (2002) likewise conclude that profit persistence is 
too high in a selection of Japanese firms. Similarly, Gschwandtner (2005) reports that 
profits persist for a period of over fifty years in US firm data.  While this literature 
largely refers to industrial firms, recent literature specifically examining banks includes 
Claessens and Laeven (2004), Goddard and Wilson (2009), Goddard et al, (2010, 2011) 
and Wilson and Liu (2010).  These studies find evidence of bank profit persistence 
across a range of countries. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.2 presents a 
review of the literature which seeks to examine the persistence of profit.  This includes 
an overview of those studies which analyse profit persistence in manufacturing, at both 
the firm and industry level, as well as the more recent research which specifically 
examines persistence of profit in the banking industry.   Section 4.3 introduces the 
empirical methodology used to test for the persistence of bank profits.  This includes a 
discussion of both the fixed effects panel method and the dynamic panel approaches of 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
This section also includes a brief rationale for the choice of model and motivates the 
choice of variables for inclusion in the empirical exercise.  Data and empirical results 
are presented in Section 4.4.  This includes summary information for the data and the 
results of estimating the different empirical specifications of the model.  Finally, 
Section 4.5 summarises and concludes the results. 
 
137 
 
4.2. Literature. 
As previously mentioned, the persistence of profit (POP) strand of literature emerged in 
the 1970s as a revisionist critique of the prevailing structure, conduct, performance 
(SCP) paradigm put forward by Bain (1956).  Mueller’s seminal contributions (1977, 
1986) paved the way for a body of literature which sought to examine whether company 
profits converge to a single mean value over time in order to test the competitive 
environment hypothesis.  The stochastic time series model developed by Mueller (1986) 
and subsequently extended by Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) and Geroski (1990) 
provided the basis for much of the POP literature.  Most commonly, studies employ an 
AR(1) specification model to measure POP and typically report large measures of profit 
persistence which differ from the competitive equilibrium of normal profits.  A full 
literature review of the POP approach is presented in Section 3.6. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology. 
The following section discusses the model used to test for the persistence of bank 
profits, whilst accounting for the effects of bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic factors on bank profitability.  As Berger et al (2000) argue, 
impediments to market competition, informational opacity and/or sensitivity to 
regional/macroeconomic shocks are all factors that enable abnormal bank profits to 
persist over time, rather than revert to their mean values from one time period to the 
next.  As such, the model employed here is dynamic in nature, via the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors.  Furthermore, a range of variables 
widely used in previous empirical studies that examine bank profitability, are also 
included.  As noted above, of particular interest is the degree of profit persistence and 
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whether that changes following de-regulation designed to increase competition. These 
variables are discussed below. 
The model is specified as: 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝐷𝑡 + λ𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑡  λ𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 i = 1…N; t = 1…T  
(4.1) 
Where 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is the profitability of bank i at time t and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1  is lagged profitability.  𝑋𝑖𝑡 is 
a vector of exogenous bank-specific regressors and 𝑀𝑡 is a vector of industry and 
economic-specific variables.  The common constant for all observations is denoted by α.  
This model allows for individual bank-specific (fixed) effects captured by the dummy 
variable 𝛾𝑖. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a random disturbance coefficient.  In the above equation, the 
dependent variable is expressed as a deviation from the sample mean at time t.  The 
rationale for the fixed effects model is as follows.  Under the null hypothesis that all 
slope coefficients equal zero (i.e. 𝜆, 𝛽1and 𝛽2 = 0) the model would therefore imply that 
all banks have a common profit level given by α.  Clearly all banks across the sample do 
not have a common profit level, thus this does not make sense.  In view of this, the 
model used allows for fixed effects (represented by the term 𝛾𝑖) which allows for the 
bank-specific effects. 
The dependent variable is a commonly used measure of profitability, return on 
assets (ROA), measured as net income over total assets.  The profit rate of bank i at time 
t (𝜋𝑖,𝑡) is measured as the relative deviation from the sample mean at time t.  Therefore, 
the parameter 𝜆 is a measure of the speed at which short-run profit reverts towards long-
run values.  That is, it is a measure of the speed of profit convergence.  The parameter 𝜆 
captures the scope of any persistence in short run profits from one time period to the 
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next.  It is thus a measure of the speed of adjustment at which short run values converge 
towards long run profit levels, and as such provides an estimate of the extent to which 
entry and exit mechanisms are effective in dissipating below or above average levels of 
profitability.  A value of 𝜆 close to zero indicates that the degree of profits persistence is 
small and therefore abnormal profits revert to their mean values quickly.  This is 
typically interpreted as a sign of increased competition. 
 
Regulatory Dummies 
Regulatory changes have affected the competitive environment within which banks 
operate. These changes are introduced into the model using indicator variables. We 
create a dummy variable equal to one for the period after the enactment of the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994, and zero otherwise. For 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 we create a 
second dummy variable which is equal to one after 1999 and zero otherwise.  
In addition to the changes in the competitive environment resulting from 
deregulation in the 1990s, banks have also faced significant challenges from the recent 
financial crisis. It is thus of interest to investigate how the recent financial crisis and its 
aftermath affected bank profitability. To this end an indicator variable that takes a value 
of one for the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise is included in the estimable model. 
The speed at which short-run excess profits are eliminated is also likely to be 
affected by changes in regulation and the recent financial crisis. We introduce 
multiplicative interaction terms between the lagged profitability measure (ROA) and the 
dummy variable in order to capture the impact of regulatory change and recent financial 
crisis on profit persistence.       
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Bank-Specific Regressors 
This section begins by listing the choice of regressors, and then provides a brief 
rationale for their inclusion.  The choice of bank specific (Xit) variables closely follows 
those used elsewhere in the literature.  See for example Liu and Wilson (2010), 
Tregenna (2009) and Goddard et al (2010). 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes a vector of exogenous bank-specific regressors comprising the 
following. Non-interest income divided by total operating income, used as a proxy for 
diversification (DIV).  Loans divided by total assets, which is a proxy for liquidity (LA) 
while equity divided by total assets denotes the capital assets ratio (KA).  Total 
operating cost divided by total income is a proxy for efficiency (CI), while the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans is used as a proxy for credit risk (NPL).  MS 
denotes market share defined as the share of bank i’s assets as a percentage of the total 
assets of all banks within a specified state.  Bank size, as measured by banks’ total 
assets is also included in the vector, as well as bank growth, defined as the change in 
bank size, or change in total assets of a bank. 
Bank size can have either a positive or negative effect on profit.  For instance a 
large bank may have reached its current size as a result of superior performance, in 
which case one would expect a positive relationship between size and profit.  On the 
other hand, large banks may in fact be operating inefficiently, in which case there may 
exist a negative relationship between size and profit.  Furthermore, small banks 
typically extend credit to more risky customers, thus charging a higher risk premium, 
reflected by a higher interest rate margin, which in turn feeds through to higher 
revenues and profits.  In contrast, Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004), argue that banks 
with larger market shares can charge higher rates on loans, therefore boosting revenues 
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and profitability.  Other studies, for instance Yurtoglu (2004) and Gschwandtner (2005), 
find no significant correlation between firm size and profit. 
The change in bank size, i.e. the change in the total assets of each bank, is also 
included in the regression as a proxy for bank growth (following Short (1979) and 
Bourke (1989) among others).  Typically the relationship between bank growth and 
profitability is expected to be positive.  Yurtoglu (2004) reports a positive correlation 
between firm growth and long run profit persistence, significant only at the 10% level.    
As a result of both deregulation and technological innovation, for instance the 
passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the US, banks have been able to 
diversify into areas including insurance underwriting, investment banking and asset 
management.  Thus, non-interest income has increasingly accounted for a larger 
proportion of banks income (Stiroh, 2004b).  Including the DIV covariate in the profit 
equation enables analysis of the relationship between diversification and profitability.  
Numerous authors have examined the relationship between diversification and financial 
performance including DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Carbo-
Valverde and Fernandez, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Mercieca et al., 2007; Lepetit 
et al., 2008.  The consensus from the literature suggests that there appears to be no 
definitive correlation between diversification and bank profitability.   
LA is included in the profits equation to enable us to examine the ability of 
banks to respond to unexpected (exogenous) shocks.  A bank that is less liquid (i.e. one 
with a relatively high loans-to-assets ratio) is less likely to be able to meet liquidity 
needs that arise as a result of unexpected shocks as a high proportion of its assets are 
tied-up in other investments.  Berger et al (2005) argue that the size of banks, their 
ownership structure and the extent to which they are focused on retail banking activities, 
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are all factors that influence the extent to which banks create liquidity.  Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) also report that there exists a significant positive relationship between 
the extent of bank liquidity and bank value.  As a result, one would expect a positive 
relationship between LA and profitability. 
Various authors have examined the significance of LA ratios when used as a 
proxy for lending specialisation.  Freixas (2005) provides evidence which suggests that 
a high LA ratio may provide informational advantages which potentially lower 
intermediation costs and improve profitability.   Degryse and Ongena (2007) examine 
the influence of switching costs (including search costs and informational costs) on the 
development of relationship banking as opposed to transaction banking, given that these 
costs represent a major source of rents for banks.   
Banks that adopt an over-cautious approach when analysing investment 
opportunities, are more likely to overlook such opportunities, thus may forego potential 
returns.  Such banks may exhibit an excessively high capital-assets ratio (KA).  Banks 
with low capital-assets ratios may endure high costs of insurance against bankruptcy.  
Thus, Berger (1995b) suggests there exists a positive relationship between the capital-
assets ratio and bank performance.  An alternative, namely signalling, hypothesis argues 
that managers have access to privy information regarding the future performance of an 
institution as well as a stake in the bank (shares).  Therefore, as Hughes and Mester 
(1998) argue, it may be less costly for managers of low risk banks to signal quality by 
maintaining a high capital-assets ratio than managers of high risk institutions.  Overall, 
there is no clear relationship between KA and profitability. 
The cost-income ratio (CI) is included in the regression as a proxy for bank 
efficiency.  Efficient banks are more likely to be more profitable than inefficient banks.  
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That is, banks that are run efficiently are more likely to have more profitable assets and 
lower cost liabilities.  However, if efficiently run banks pass their lower costs onto 
consumers in the form of lower loan rates and/ or higher deposit rates, the profitability 
of such banks will be reduced.  Berger (1995a) and Goddard et al (2001) find that more 
efficient banks earn higher profits when analysing data for the US and Europe.  This 
evidence suggests that more efficient banks earn higher profits as a result of superior 
management and technology, irrespective of the size of the bank. 
The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is included in the regression in 
order to capture the effects of credit risk on bank profitability.  Numerous authors, 
including Salas and Saurina (2002), Berger and Udell (2004) and Ruckes (2004) argue 
that periods of increased lending may result in an increase in the number of non-
performing loans.  This may be due to the relaxation of stringent lending standards by 
bank managers in response to competitive pressures that arise as a result of short-term 
profit targets set by bank owners.  Rajan (1994) argues that banks that focus on short 
run competition may relax credit standards in order to enhance asset growth and 
profitability.  Guttentag and Herring (1984) and Herring (1999) discuss the occurrence 
of disaster myopia in the context of the ratio of NPL to TL.  Disaster myopia refers to a 
situation whereby banks fail to correctly appraise the effect of a major shock on their 
loan books.  Myopia may be exasperated by the actions of overconfident bank managers 
whereby they may engage in excessive lending in order to fund investments, thus 
potentially leading to an increase in non-performing loans in the future.  Typically, one 
would expect the relationship between non-performing loans and profitability to be 
negative. 
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Previous studies have typically uncovered a positive and highly significant 
relationship between market share and profitability.  For example, Berger (1995a) 
argues that only firms with large market shares, and well differentiated products, are 
able to extend their market power when setting the price of these products.  As such, 
these firms are able to earn above normal profits.  Other examples include Shepherd 
(1972), Mullin et al (1995) and Marion et al (1979).  In order to control for the effect of 
market share on bank profitability, MS (defined as the share of bank i’s assets as a 
percentage of the total assets of all banks within a specified market), is included in 
Equation (1).   However, market share is often employed as a proxy for diversification.  
In this circumstance, most studies find that there exists a negative correlation between 
profitability and diversification (e.g.  Ravenscraft (1983), and Lang and Stulz (1994)).   
 
Industry and Macroeconomic Regressors 
𝑀𝑡 represents a vector of industry and economic-specific regressors comprising the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squares of each 
individual bank’s market share and used as a measure of industry concentration, as well 
as GDP which refers to growth in national gross domestic product. 
The HHI variable, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is a measure of industry 
concentration.  The HHI is calculated as follows, 𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖, in this 
circumstance, is market share of bank i, and N is the total number of banks in the 
industry.  The assumptions underlying much of the earliest research into market or 
industry concentration are based on the SCP paradigm which stipulates a strong causal 
link between market concentration and the performance of firms within the defined 
market.  Incumbents in highly concentrated industries may be able to prevent entry to 
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the market by new firms, and as a result may enjoy a higher degree of profit persistence.  
Numerous authors have reported a positive relationship between concentration and 
various measures of profitability (e.g. Yurtoglu (2004) and Kambhampati (1995)).  
While the traditional SCP approach argues that banks in more concentrated markets set 
lower deposit rates and higher loan and fee rates, it should also be noted that banks in 
such markets may conversely choose to set prices at lower rates in order to prevent 
entry by new banks.  A number of authors have argued that the relationship between 
concentration and profitability is rather mixed and inconclusive (Gilbert (1984), Scherer 
and Ross (1990), Berger (1995b), Berger et al. (2004)).  For instance, the relationship 
may be positive if firms in the industry maintain high prices in order to increase profits.  
Alternatively, there may be a negative relationship if these firms maintain low prices in 
order to deter entry into the industry.  The authors also argue that if these two effects 
cancel each other out, the relationship between concentration and profitability may not 
significantly differ from zero.  In contrast to the SCP approach, numerous authors have 
argued that market concentration may be the result of more efficient banks 
‘endogenously’ gaining larger market shares.  Ravenscraft (1983) and Odagiri (1992) 
have both argued that industry concentration had a negative effect on profitability when 
including market share as an explanatory variable in the model.  Mueller (1986, 1990) 
also uncovers a negative relationship between concentration and profitability when 
analysing US data.  He argues that as concentration increases so too does non-price 
competition, while profits on the other hand decline.  
GDP is included in the regression in order to control for fluctuations in output or 
macroeconomic conditions.  It is expected that profits would follow the economic cycle.  
That is, during periods of economic expansion this would lead to increased bank profits.  
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For example, there would be greater demand for loans from businesses and individuals, 
and greater demand for consulting services.  Equally, during an economic downturn 
banks would have less profit opportunities.  For example, there would be an increase in 
bad loans and a reduction in the demand for fee-based services.  Thus we would expect 
the coefficient on GDP growth to be positive.     
The model specification in equation (1) is subject to two possible, related, 
drawbacks. In particular there is the potential for an endogenous variable contained in 
the vector Xit or Mit to appear on the right-hand side of the equation. Such regressors 
could be correlated with the error term and lead to biased and inefficient estimation. A 
second problem will arise through correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the fixed effects. In particular, where the fixed effect is believed to condition the 
left-hand side variable, then, as a constant, it will also be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side. To circumvent these problems and to act as a 
robustness check on the fixed effects model considered above, we also estimate the 
GMM approach considered by Arellano and Bond (1991) and first proposed by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988). The GMM approach of Arellano and Bond, often 
referred to as the difference-GMM approach transforms the model in equation (1) into 
the following and effectively treats the model as a system of equations, one for each 
time period: 
 
Δ𝜋𝑖𝑡 =  𝐷𝑡 + λ𝑖Δ𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖Δ𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽1Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2Δ𝑀𝑡 + Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡 i = 1…N; t = 1…T   
(4.2) 
 
By transforming the regressors through first-differencing, the bank specific fixed effects 
are removed. The method of Arellano and Bond uses lagged levels of the variables to 
instrument for the difference in equation (2). However, lagged levels may be poor 
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instruments for first differences, especially where there may be a large autoregressive 
parameter.  
To counter this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) described how, if the 
original equations in levels were added to the system, additional moment conditions 
could be brought to bear to increase efficiency. In these equations, both predetermined 
and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first 
differences. Blundell and Bond (1998) articulated the necessary assumptions for this 
augmented estimator more precisely, in particular that first differences of instrument 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. Where the original estimator is referred 
to as difference-GMM, this augmented estimator is referred to as system-GMM, as 
there are two equations one for levels and one for differences. 
Finally, as GMM estimators, the Arellano-Bond estimators have one- and two-
step variants for the GMM weights. Asymptotically, the two-step estimator is more 
efficient, although in finite samples the standard errors can be downward biased. 
Nonetheless, a finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix has been 
derived by Windmeijer (2000). This improves the efficiency of the two-step method, 
especially for system GMM. 
 
 
4.4. Data and Results. 
4.4.1 Profits Data and Summary Statistics. 
The initial dataset was constructed by collecting data for all US banks over the period 
1976 to 2009 from the Report of Condition and Income, referred to as the Call Reports. 
This data is used in presenting summary statistics, although the estimations take place 
over the period 1984 to 2009, due to data availability for some variables.  Every 
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National Bank, State Member Bank and insured Non-member Bank is required by the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) to file a Call Report on 
the last day of each calendar quarter (i.e. the report date).  The FDIC is responsible for 
overseeing insured financial institution adherence to FFIEC reporting requirements 
(which depend upon the size of the bank and whether it has any foreign offices), 
including the observance of all bank regulatory agency rules and regulations, accounting 
principles and pronouncements adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and all other matters relating to a Call Report submission.  The Call Report 
collects basic financial data of commercial banks in the form of a balance sheet, an 
income statement and supporting schedules.  The Report of Condition schedules 
provide details on assets, liabilities and capital accounts.  The Report of Income 
schedules provide details on income and expenses.  As can be seen from the data, the 
total number of US banks has significantly declined throughout the sample period, from 
15264 banks in 1976 to 7572 banks in 2009.  Following Berger et al. (2000), banks with 
total assets of less than $100 000 are excluded from the sample.  The banks are omitted 
as they tend to be short-lived and exhibit very different business behaviour relative to 
other banks (DeYoung, 2003).  Furthermore, in order to minimise the potential impact 
of outliers, we also exclude banks with equity less than 1% of their total assets.  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for bank profits, measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), by year over the period 1976 to 2009.  These 
include mean and median to capture measures of central tendency and the standard 
deviation to measure dispersion.  Examining each statistic in turn, taking first the mean 
values, from 1976 the ROA has increased gradually from 0.008 to 0.011 in 1980.  From 
that period the ROA declines year on year until it reaches a trough of 0.004 in 1986, 
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whereupon it increases again to reach 0.011 in 1993.  From 1993 until 2006 the ROA 
remains approximately constant, fluctuating only between 0.010 and 0.011.  The only 
exception to this occurs in 2001 where ROA is 0.009, this being a recession year.  The 
ROA declines from 2007 to 2009.  This is associated with the liquidity crisis that began 
in the summer of 2007.  With regard to the median, this series largely follows the same 
trends as the mean values.  More specifically we can see it rising over the period 1976 
to 1980, declining steadily between 1981 and 1986.  From this period until the early 
1990s it increases.  From approximately 1992 it fluctuates between 0.010 and 0.011.  
Finally, the median declines in 2007 and 2008, reaching its lowest value of 0.002 in 
2009.  This is again associated with the liquidity crisis.   
With regard to the measure of dispersion, there appears to be no obvious pattern 
in the data over time.  For example, taking the standard deviation for the first four years 
it is approximately 0.07, then it increases in the 1980s from 0.01 up to a high of 0.05 in 
1989, although this increase is not monotonic.  During the 1990s the standard deviation 
is less variable, ranging between 0.02 and 0.03, but becomes more variable in the 2000s, 
ranging from 0.02 to 0.07.   
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics for Profit Measure 
 Return on Assets (ROA) Return on Equity (ROE) 
Year Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
1976 0.0084 0.0092 0.0078 0.1036 0.1190 0.1147 
1977 0.0086 0.0092 0.0069 0.1084 0.1202 0.0918 
1978 0.0093 0.0098 0.0068 0.1158 0.1256 0.0879 
1979 0.0106 0.0109 0.0071 0.1266 0.1354 0.0898 
1980 0.0107 0.0111 0.0078 0.1243 0.1333 0.0999 
1981 0.0104 0.0107 0.0088 0.1152 0.1280 0.1229 
1982 0.0090 0.0103 0.0140 0.0964 0.1235 0.2051 
1983 0.0079 0.0096 0.0120 0.0820 0.1178 0.2366 
1984 0.0065 0.0091 0.0136 0.0626 0.1105 0.2755 
1985 0.0056 0.0090 0.0166 0.0439 0.1092 0.3695 
1986 0.0044 0.0080 0.0179 0.0140 0.0973 0.4331 
1987 0.0052 0.0082 0.0304 0.0219 0.0953 0.3764 
1988 0.0064 0.0088 0.0144 0.0487 0.1017 0.3338 
1989 0.0076 0.0092 0.0462 0.0667 0.1055 0.3598 
1990 0.0064 0.0086 0.0488 0.0493 0.0991 0.3303 
1991 0.0071 0.0089 0.0157 0.0653 0.1016 0.2343 
1992 0.0095 0.0107 0.0322 0.1013 0.1194 0.1975 
1993 0.0111 0.0114 0.0172 0.1131 0.1222 0.1469 
1994 0.0109 0.0109 0.0157 0.1098 0.1176 0.2360 
1995 0.0114 0.0110 0.0394 0.1113 0.1132 0.1359 
1996 0.0110 0.0112 0.0179 0.1105 0.1146 0.0905 
1997 0.0115 0.0113 0.0326 0.1116 0.1130 0.1697 
1998 0.0108 0.0106 0.0314 0.1050 0.1079 0.1514 
1999 0.0105 0.0104 0.0329 0.1079 0.1085 0.1541 
2000 0.0108 0.0103 0.0727 0.1019 0.1037 0.1888 
2001 0.0095 0.0096 0.0420 0.0902 0.0963 0.1419 
2002 0.0104 0.0103 0.0328 0.0992 0.1015 0.1091 
2003 0.0108 0.0101 0.0543 0.0994 0.0988 0.1317 
2004 0.0103 0.0101 0.0239 0.0999 0.0992 0.0984 
2005 0.0105 0.0103 0.0273 0.1038 0.1019 0.0975 
2006 0.0100 0.0100 0.0407 0.0980 0.0970 0.1085 
2007 0.0097 0.0091 0.0509 0.0813 0.0850 0.1525 
2008 0.0062 0.0066 0.2948 0.0544 0.0389 0.5158 
2009 0.0040 0.0031 2.0377 0.0236 0.0218 3.1725 
Notes: Entries are for the mean, median and standard deviation for US commercial bank profits 
as measured by ROA (return on assets) and ROE (return on equity) over the period 1976 to 
2009. 
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There is an abnormally large standard deviation in 2008 of 0.29.  In 2009 the standard 
deviation is 11.89.  Again, these abnormal observations are the result of the financial 
crisis. 
The statistics for the ROE are broadly consistent with those reported for the 
ROA. Of note, for example, we see the same general pattern in mean and median profit, 
with ROE increasing from the start of the sample until around 1980, decreasing between 
1980 and 1986 before increasing again to 1993, where the value largely plateaus. 
Finally, ROE decreases in the liquidity crisis years of 2007, 2008 and 2009.  Elsewhere, 
the standard deviation fluctuates without any obvious pattern, but is generally higher in 
the mid-to-late 1980s and lower in the 2000s, excepting for the crisis years. For interest 
Table 4.2 reports the same summary statistics for the exogenous variables. 
To illustrate some of the more pertinent points above, Figure 4.1 graphs the 
mean and median ROA and the number of banks over the sample period.  To reiterate 
we can see in the graph of mean ROA a gentle increase in average bank profit until 
1980, followed by a decrease until 1986.  Subsequently, average bank profit increases 
until the early 1990s and then plateaus, with a fall in ROA at the end of the sample 
associated with the liquidity crisis.  For comparison, the median value is more stable 
throughout the entire sample period but exhibits the same fall at the end of the sample 
period. 
Figure 4.1 also shows the number of banks over time.  Here we can see that the number 
of banks remains approximately constant between 1976 and 1986, with more than 
14000 banks.  From 1987 the number of observations declines monotonically until 
2008, during which there is an increase in the exit rate of banks as a result of the 
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liquidity crisis. In 2009 the number of banks increases again, but does not reach pre-
crisis levels. 
 
Figure Note: Left Hand Scale presents the series values; Bottom Scale represents time 
period 
 
Also presented in Figure 4.1 is the annual change in GDP.  This is to examine 
the nature of any relationship between average bank profit and the change in GDP.  
More specifically, are the dynamics of bank profit pro-cyclical, acyclical or counter-
cyclical.  Evident from  
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Figure 4.1. Time-Series Plots for Profits, Bank Numbers and GDP
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Table 4.2.  Exogenous Variables Summary Statistics 
 Bank 
Size 
Bank 
Growth 
KA NPL LA DIV CI GDP 
Growth 
Mean 10.9543 0.0926 0.2033 0.0363 0.5554 0.2582 0.4347 0.0281 
Med. 10.8043 0.0703 0.0855 0.0015 0.5696 0.0769 0.3731 0.0315 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.4810 0.2956 13.8648 10.3067 0.1677 19.3562 1.5732 0.0196 
Skew. 0.8023 -0.7072 249.9591 521.4291 -0.542 202.2328 257.6687 -0.859 
Kurt. 5.3888 199.7575 76253.89 276790.9 3.7942 46711.05 94324.58 3.8941 
Notes: Variable definition: Bank size is measured by (log) total assets; bank growth is the 
change in bank size (first difference of log); KA is equity to assets and denotes the capital assets 
ratio; NPL is non-performing loans to total loans and is a proxy for credit risk; LA is loans to 
assets and is a proxy for liquidity; DIV is non-interest income to total income and is a proxy for 
diversification; CI is non-interest expenditure to total income and is a proxy for efficiency; GDP 
growth is the rate of change in GDP and measures overall economic performance. Med. is the 
median value, Std. Dev. is the standard deviation, Skew. is skewness and Kurt. is the kurtosis 
value.  
 
Figure 4.1 is that there has been a change in the nature of the relationship.  From the 
start of the sample period until the early 1990s the relationship was counter-cyclical, 
that is as GDP rises mean bank profits fall and vice-versa.  In the second half of the 
dataset the relationship appears to be pro-cyclical, with GDP and average bank profits 
rising and falling together.  In addition, there appears to be a lead/lag relationship 
between the two variables.  In particular, in the first half of the sample the turning 
points in GDP appear to occur one or two periods before the turning points in average 
bank profits.  In the second half of the sample the relationship appears to be more 
contemporaneous.   
Figure 4.2 shows a graph of HHI plots for all banks in the dataset.  Given that the 
measure is computed for all banks (over 20,000) and for all states (each of which has 
their own legislative framework and competitive environment) the precise estimate 
should not be interpreted in the usual way.  Thus, the graph is for illustrative purposes 
only; however, it does demonstrate the general pattern that this concentration measure 
has taken over the sample period. In particular, from 1979 (which observed a small rise  
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Figure Note: Left Hand Scale presents the series values; Bottom Scale represents time 
period  
 
in the HHI value), concentration has been falling; however, the early 1990s and, 
notably, from 1995, the HHI value has increased quite dramatically. While this rise in 
value slowed during the late 1990s and early 2000s, large increases are again noticeable 
from 2003 onwards. The plateauing at the end of the sample is likely related to the crisis 
and could not be assumed to continue.  See Chapter 2, Sections 2.5 and 2.6, for 
background discussion. 
 
4.4.2. Empirical Results. 
Table 4.3 presents the empirical results for US bank profits based on equation (4.1).  
We consider five different specifications of the basic model. The first includes the key 
determining variables as outlined in Section 3, while model specifications 2-4 extend 
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Figure 4.2. National HHI Measure Over Time
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that model by including the dummy variable are outlined above. In particular, model 
two includes a dummy for the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as the 
Financial Modernization Act) which repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  
As such commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms and insurance companies 
were no longer prohibited from consolidating.  Model three includes a dummy for the 
1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act which repealed the 
interstate restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act (1956).  The 1994 Act 
therefore permitted interstate mergers between banks, subject to a number of criteria.  
Model four includes a dummy for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, triggered by a liquidity 
shortfall in the US banking system.  Finally, model five uses model four but estimated 
using a System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.  
Prior to considering the estimation results, we can see from the specification 
tests at the bottom of the table that for Models 1 to 4 there is weak evidence of residual 
autocorrelation and some evidence of heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test). This 
supports the use of robust t-statistics. The Hausman test supports the use of fixed 
effects, while the R-squared values are relatively low at 6%. For Model 5, the GMM 
estimation, both the autocorrelation test and the J-statistics for the validity of the 
instruments do not support the model. Turning to the coefficient values, the results for 
Model 1 are presented in the first column of Table 4.3. This model presents the results 
of estimating equation (4.1) over the full sample of data. The key parameter in this 
model, for our purposes, is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. This parameter 
measures the degree of persistence in bank profits and while it is statistically significant, 
it has a low value, of 0.094. This suggests that bank profits exhibit very little persistence 
and implies that over the full sample the banking system appears competitive and thus 
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effective in eroding abnormal profits back to their mean values.  To present the same 
information in a more meaningful way we can convert the autoregressive parameter into 
a half-life, which measures the time (in years) that it takes for half of a shock to bank 
profits to dissipate. The half-life is calculated as log(0.5)/log(λ), where λ is the 
autoregressive parameter. The calculated value is 0.29 and suggests that half of a shock 
disappears within under a third of a year. Of the remaining variables four are 
statistically significant and negative (size, growth, loans to assets and non-interest 
expenditure to total income), while one is statistically significant and positive (the 
HHI). The negative coefficient on the bank size variable could suggest that as banks 
become larger so markets become more contestable, putting pressure on profits. Indeed, 
some evidence exists to suggest that while banks become more efficient with size, they 
also sacrifice profit (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004).  
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Table 4.3.  Empirical Results – ROA 
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.017**  
(2.94) 
0.021** 
(3.10) 
0.020** 
(2.70) 
0.020** 
(2.72) 
- 
ROA(-1) 0.094**  
(5.48) 
0.073** 
(3.99) 
0.093** 
(4.20) 
0.093** 
(4.19) 
0.086** 
(16.25) 
ROA(-1) 
*D1999 
- 0.168** 
(3.56) 
[0.241] 
0.206** 
(3.91) 
[0.238] 
0.260** 
(4.56) 
[0.293] 
0.201** 
(9.11) 
[0.215] 
ROA(-1) 
*D1994 
- - -0.061 
(-1.63) 
[0.032] 
-0.060 
(-1.61) 
[0.033] 
-0.072** 
(-12.85) 
[0.014] 
ROA(-1) 
*2007 
- - - -0.224** 
(-2.48) 
[0.069] 
-0.141** 
(-9.28) 
[0.074] 
Bank Size -0.001*  
(-2.19) 
-0.002** 
(-2.45) 
-0.001* 
(-2.14) 
-0.001* 
(-2.17) 
-0.005** 
(-2.49) 
Bank Growth -0.011**  
(-8.83) 
-0.010** 
(-8.52) 
-0.011** 
(-8.54) 
-0.010** 
(-8.30) 
-0.011** 
(-4.18) 
KA -3.60e-06  
(-0.10) 
-2.66e-06 
(-0.08) 
-2.62e-06 
(-0.07) 
-2.86e-06 
(-0.08) 
-0.0001 
(-0.92) 
NPL -1.83e-06 
(-0.06) 
-3.10e-06 
(-0.10) 
-3.09e-06 
(-0.10) 
-3.40e-06 
(-0.11) 
-0.001** 
(-4.52) 
LA -0.006* 
(-2.18) 
-0.007* 
(-2.31) 
-0.006* 
(-2.24) 
-0.006* 
(-2.22) 
-0.056** 
(-5.56) 
DIV -1.75e-05 
(-0.09) 
-1.96e-05 
(-0.11) 
-1.90e-05 
(-0.10) 
-1.89e-05 
(-0.10) 
0.025* 
(2.13) 
CI -0.006** 
(-7.11) 
-0.006** 
(-7.00) 
-0.006** 
(-6.96) 
-0.006** 
(-6.90) 
-0.058** 
(-25.80) 
GDP Growth 0.012 
(0.66) 
0.014 
(0.77) 
0.015 
(0.82) 
0.013 
(0.71) 
-0.0003 
(-0.08) 
HHI 0.028** 
(6.63) 
0.027** 
(6.33) 
0.028** 
(6.29) 
0.028** 
(6.26) 
0.051** 
(6.40) 
Market Share 0.006 
(0.26) 
0.007 
(0.30) 
0.006 
(0.28) 
0.006 
(0.27) 
-0.218** 
(-2.89) 
Dummy 1999 - 0.001 
(0.67) 
0.001 
(0.78) 
0.001 
(0.88) 
0.001** 
(2.56) 
Dummy 1994 - - -0.0002 
(-0.31) 
-0.0002 
(-0.30) 
0.002* 
(2.27) 
Dummy 2007 - - - -0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.0001 
(-0.39) 
R-sq 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Q1 / AR(2) 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Heter / J 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 
Hausman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Notes: The dependent variable is the de-meaned return on assets (ROA). Entries for 
Models 1 to 4 are coefficient values for equation specification (4.1), where each model 
differs by the inclusion of an extra dummy variable (D or Dummy) that takes the value 
zero before the noted date and one afterwards, where the dummy for 2007 represents the 
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financial crisis. Model 5 is given by equation specification (4.2) and is the GMM 
estimation; see discussion and related text (pages 125 and 133). For variable definitions 
see Table 4.2. Numbers in parentheses are t-values robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. Numbers in brackets are the sum of the coefficients where dummy 
variables are used. R-sq is the R-squared value of the model, Q1 (AR(2)) is a test of first-
order serial correlation (second order for the GMM model). Heter is a test for 
heteroscedasticity, while J is the Hansen J test for the validity of the instruments in 
GMM estimation. Hausman is the test for random effects over fixed effects. For these 
latter three tests entries are p-values. * (**) indicate 5% (1%) statistical significance. 
 
This result differs from that of Yurtoglu (2004) and Gschwandtner (2005), for the 
manufacturing sectors, who did not find any significant correlation between firm size 
and profit persistence. Likewise the negative coefficient on bank growth differs from 
Yurtoglu (2004) who reported a positive effect, again for manufacturing firms. 
However, a negative effect could arise from costs associated with growth.  That is, 
profits decline in correspondence with bank growth, as banks reinvest previously 
accrued profit in order to fund growth.  The negative coefficient on the loans to assets 
variables supports the view that banks with larger loans to assets ratio are more 
susceptible to adverse shocks. That is, banks with higher loan to assets ratios are 
relatively more illiquid.  The negative coefficient on non-interest expenditure to total 
income suggests that a bank with a higher cost to income ratio is relatively less efficient 
and thus has a poorer profit performance. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient 
on the HHI supports the view that the more concentrated an industry the higher profits 
will be, in line with the SCP hypothesis. 
The results from estimating Model 2 are presented in the second column of 
results in Table 4.3. Model 2 differs from Model 1 only by including a dummy variable 
for the legislative change in 1999 whereby banks were allowed to merge with other non-
bank organisation, thus allowing banks to provide services that were not traditionally 
associated with banking (insurance underwriting for instance).  The dummy is included 
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by itself but, of more interest to this study, is also included as an interaction term with 
the AR(1) coefficient. To interpret these coefficients, the AR(1) parameter now refers to 
the strength of autocorrelation (profits persistence) in the period up to 1999, while the 
sum of the AR(1) parameter and the AR(1) multiplied by the dummy equate to the 
persistence of profits after 1999 and is given by the number in brackets. Here we can 
see, in comparison to Model 1 that represents the full sample, there is a slight decline in 
profits persistence in the period prior to 1999. However, following 1999 and the repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act, profits persistence increases. This would be consistent with 
the view that the repeal of the Act allowed banks to diversify into other areas of activity 
and increase potential profit streams.8 
The results from estimating Model 3 are presented in the third column of results 
in Table 4.3.  Model 3 differs from the previous model via the inclusion of a dummy 
variable for the legislative change in 1994 which permitted interstate mergers between 
banks (Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act).  Again, the 
dummy is included by itself but is of more interest to this study when included as an 
interaction term with the AR(1) coefficient.  In this model, the AR(1) parameter refers 
to the strength of autocorrelation (profits persistence) in the period up to 1994.  The sum 
of the AR(1) parameter and the AR(1) parameter multiplied by the 1994 dummy equate 
to the persistence of profits in the period post 1994 to 1999.  The sum of the AR(1) 
parameter, the AR(1) parameter multiplied by the 1994 dummy and the AR(1) 
parameter multiplied by the 1999 dummy equate to the profit persistence in the period 
post-1999, again these are represented by the numbers in brackets.   In this instance we 
can see that profits persistence pre-1994 is almost identical to the profits persistence for 
                                                          
8 Although the diversification variable is not significant in the regression, it is felt that diversification may 
impact on persistence rather than profit in this analysis. 
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the full sample (shown in Model 1).  Profits persistence then dramatically declines 
following the passage of the 1994 Act, suggesting that removing interstate banking 
restrictions increased competition.  Following the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
profits persistence increased to the same level as found in Model 2.  Again, this would 
be consistent with the notion that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act increased potential 
profit streams as banks were permitted to diversify into areas of activity beyond 
traditional banking. 
The results from estimating Model 4 are presented in the fourth column of 
results in Table 4.3.  Model 4 differs from, and extends, the previous models through 
the inclusion of a dummy variable for the financial crisis (credit crunch) that began in 
2007.  As in the previous models, the dummy is included both by itself and as an 
interaction term with the AR(1) coefficient, given in square brackets.  Again, profits 
persistence in the period up to 1994 is given by the AR(1) parameter. The sum of the 
AR(1) parameter and the AR(1) parameter multiplied by the 1994 dummy equate to the 
persistence of profits in the period post 1994 to 1999.  The sum of the AR(1) parameter, 
the AR(1) parameter multiplied by the 1994 dummy and the AR(1) parameter 
multiplied by the 1999 dummy equate to the persistence of profits in the period post 
1999 to 2007.  Finally, the sum of the AR(1) parameter, the AR(1) parameter multiplied 
by the 1994 dummy, the AR(1) parameter multiplied by the 1999 dummy and the AR(1) 
parameter multiplied by the CC dummy equate to the persistence of profits in the period 
post 2007.  The results for this model follow the same pattern found in Model 3 as 
profits persistence pre-1994 is similar to that found in the full sample, followed by a 
relatively large decrease for the period post-1994 to 1999. Again following the pattern 
found in Model 3, the profits persistence then experiences a dramatic increase over the 
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period 1999 to 2007 as discussed above. Furthermore, in this instance we can see that 
profits persistence in the period post-2007 then experiences a dramatic fall.  This 
coincides with the financial crisis which began in 2007, and was caused as a result of a 
liquidity shortfall in the US banking system, triggered by a collapse in the housing 
market.  This collapse subsequently resulted in a dramatic decline in the value of 
securities tied in to real estate pricing, affecting the level and volatility of banks and 
other financial institutions around the world (Bech and Rice, 2009; Lee and Rose, 2010; 
De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). 
Model 5 presents the results of estimating the Arellano and Bover system GMM. 
As noted above the inclusion of this approach is motivated by the possibility of bias 
induced in the fixed-effects estimator through possible correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the fixed effects. Flannery and Hankins (2013) undertake a large 
scale Monte Carlo exercise to examine the effect of bias within the dynamic panel 
model and the effectiveness of alternative proposed solutions. For the purposes of the 
study here, Flannery and Hankins find that the fixed effects approach is reasonable 
(biased is minimised) in estimating exogenous variables, while the effect of bias on the 
lagged dependent variable is lessened, when the time series element of the panel is 
greater than twelve years, when there is more than one exogeneous variable, when the 
degree of autocorrelation is low and when the panel is unbalanced with missing 
observations, all conditions present here. Nonetheless, we proceed with the GMM 
estimation as the bias can still be present in the fixed effects model. 
The results from estimating Model 5 are presented in the fifth column of results 
in Table 4.3. As noted above there are several approaches that can be taken in 
estimation.  The results presented in this table are based on the Arellano and Bover 
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system GMM method.  Experimentation with the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference-
GMM approach produced qualitatively similar results. As in the previous models the 
dummy is included both by itself and as an interaction term with the AR(1) coefficient.  
The time periods and corresponding calculations of the persistence of profits are the 
same as those found in Model 4 and therefore will not be repeated here.  The results for 
this model follow the same pattern demonstrated by Model 4.  Profits persistence pre-
1994 is of a similar level (although slightly lower) to that found in the previous models 
(notably for Models 1, 3 and 4, of further interest Flannery and Hankins demonstrate 
that any bias in the fixed effects model would be to underestimate the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable).  Again, there is a decline in profits persistence for the 
period post-1994 to 1999.  This is then followed by an increase in profits persistence for 
the period post-1999 to 2007.  The decline in profits persistence in the period post-2007 
is also observed in this model.  The rationale for the changes in profits persistence over 
the time period discussed remains the same as discussed in the models above. Of further 
interest, the parameter values reported for Model 5 are broadly similar to those reported 
for Model 4. This suggests that any bias in the fixed effects model is moderated as 
suggested by Flannery and Hankins given the dimensions of the panel and the strength 
of autocorrelation. 
Table 4.4 reports the results of estimating the same five models are reported in 
Table 4.3 but using ROE as the measure of profit. As with the results for ROA, the 
specification tests indicate that the fixed effect panel models pass the residual tests but 
have a low R-squared. Again the GMM model does not pass the specification tests. The 
coefficient results in Table 4.4 are broadly consistent with those reported in Table 4.4, 
of particular note, is that persistence is generally quite low.  This is in contrast to the 
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results reported by Goddard et al. (2011) for the US, although more similar to Tregenna 
(2009). Persistence falls after the introduction of the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, increases after the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act and falls again during the liquidity crisis period. Thus, the pattern of results is 
replicated across both measures of profits. With respect to any differences, although 
they are small, the degree of persistence is marginally higher with the ROE, while the 
impact of the 1999 Act appears smaller (except for Model 4). Finally, the results from 
the GMM approach do differ slightly from the fixed effects model, notably, the AR(1) 
parameter is higher. This suggests that any bias in the fixed effects approach may be 
more prevalent when using the ROE measure. This could be related to the ROE results 
exhibiting a slightly higher degree of autocorrelation.   
Overall, in considering the range of results presented here, we can suggest three 
key findings. First, and perhaps at the most basic level, the general level of persistence 
in profit for US commercial banks is relatively low, and typically more so than that 
reported for manufacturing firms. This suggests that over the sample period considered 
the US bank market can be characterised as competitive, albeit not perfectly.  Second, 
that the impact of regulation designed to enhance competition does affect the degree of 
persistence and, hence, competition.  In the sample considered here, we observe that the 
Interstate Banking Act of 1994 lead to a reduction in the degree of profit persistence, 
perhaps indicating an increase in competition by allowing cross-state activity. In 
contrast, profit persistence increased following the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
While taken at face value this may suggest a lower degree of competition.  However, it 
is also possible that this may not be the case, but rather, as the Act allowed banks to 
generate income from alternative sources, persistence may have increased due to banks 
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diversifying their activities. Finally, therefore, the results support the view that profit 
persistence can vary over time in contrast to the usual assumption that it remains 
constant.  The results also suggest, in reference to the results for the 1999 Act dummy, 
that whether changes in persistence imply changes in competition needs to be 
scrutinised and not taken at face value. 
 
4.5. Summary and Conclusion. 
This purpose of this chapter is to examine the influence of regulatory changes on the 
persistence of profits for US commercial banks during the period 1976 to 2009.  More 
specifically, the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
(which permitted interstate mergers between banks, subject to a number of criteria) and 
the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (which allowed the consolidation of commercial 
banks, investment banks, securities firms and insurance companies).  In addition, the 
impact of the recent financial crisis is also examined.   
 
  
165 
 
 
Table 4.4.  Empirical Results – ROE 
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -0.010 
(-0.30) 
0.088** 
(2.37) 
0.074 
(1.80) 
0.092* 
(2.22) 
- 
ROE(-1) 0.131** 
(15.75) 
0.126** 
(14.47) 
0.134** 
(14.35) 
0.135** 
(14.40) 
0.219 
(23.25) 
ROE(-1) 
*D1999 
- 0.046 
(1.82) 
[0.172] 
0.097** 
(2.95) 
[0.169] 
0.221** 
(5.55) 
[0.298] 
0.050 
(2.03) 
[0.089] 
ROE(-1) 
*D1994 
- - -0.062** 
(-2.42) 
[0.072] 
-0.058* 
(-2.28) 
[0.077] 
-0.180 
(-11.34) 
[0.039] 
ROE(-1) 
*2007 
- - - -0.251** 
(-5.60) 
[0.047] 
-0.193 
(-4.76) 
[-0.104] 
Bank Size 0.005 
(1.60) 
-0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.003 
(-0.70) 
-0.004 
(-1.12) 
0.026 
(4.13) 
Bank Growth 0.015* 
(2.16) 
0.018** 
(2.73) 
0.018** 
(2.61) 
0.021** 
(3.02) 
0.068 
(9.26) 
KA 4.58E-07 
(0.002) 
2.42E-06 
(0.01) 
3.47E-06 
(0.02) 
-6.86E-06 
(-0.04) 
0.002 
(0.54) 
NPL -2.32E-05 
(-0.14) 
-2.47E-05 
(-0.15) 
-2.49E-05 
(-0.15) 
-2.50E-05 
(-0.15) 
-0.005 
(-0.97) 
LA -0.052** 
(-3.36) 
-0.065** 
(-4.17) 
-0.063** 
(-4.02) 
-0.065** 
(-4.11) 
0.169 
(5.05) 
DIV -0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0006 
(-0.03) 
CI -0.057** 
(-12.56) 
-0.059** 
(-12.91) 
-0.059** 
(-12.86) 
-0.058** 
(-12.71) 
-0.190 
(-11.47) 
GDP Growth 0.504** 
(5.23) 
0.592** 
(6.04) 
0.606** 
(6.07) 
0.619** 
(6.04) 
-0.070 
(-2.37) 
HHI -0.127** 
(-5.48) 
-0.151** 
(-6.38) 
-0.148** 
(-6.17) 
-0.151** 
(-6.19) 
0.187 
(4.83) 
Market Share -0.016 
(-0.13) 
0.007 
(0.05) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-1.383 
(-3.55) 
Dummy 1999 - 0.024** 
(4.95) 
0.025** 
(4.92) 
0.024** 
(4.82) 
-0.005 
(-2.40) 
Dummy 1994 - - -0.003 
(-0.64) 
-0.002 
(-0.47) 
-0.018 
(-5.97) 
Dummy 2007 - - - 0.005 
(0.70) 
-0.006 
(-2.09) 
R-sq 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Q1 / AR(2) 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.04 
Heter / J 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.04 
Hausman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Notes: The dependent variable is the de-meaned return on assets (ROA). Entries for 
Models 1 to 4 are coefficient values for equation specification (4.1), where each model 
differs by the inclusion of an extra dummy variable (D or Dummy) that takes the value 
zero before the noted date and one afterwards, where the dummy for 2007 represents the 
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financial crisis. Model 5 is given by equation specification (4.2) and is the GMM 
estimation; see discussion and related text (pages 125 and 133). For variable definitions 
see Table 4.2. Numbers in parentheses are t-values robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. Numbers in brackets are the sum of the coefficients where dummy 
variables are used. R-sq is the R-squared value of the model, Q1 (AR(2)) is a test of first-
order serial correlation (second order for the GMM model). Heter is a test for 
heteroscedasticity, while J is the Hansen J test for the validity of the instruments in 
GMM estimation. Hausman is the test for random effects over fixed effects. For these 
latter three tests entries are p-values. * (**) indicates 5% (1%) statistical significance. 
 
An examination of the dynamics of profit and profits persistence is important in 
understanding the competitive process and the effects of regulatory change and 
economic upheaval on profit and profit persistence. This, in turn, has implications for 
the conduct and effectiveness of competition policy and, in particular, whether policies 
designed to increase competition reduce persistence and thus restore the competitive 
equilibrium position.  Previous results for profit persistence in US banks have provided 
mixed results, although there is a general consensus that banks typically display a 
higher level of profit persistence than other non-bank firms within the US.  For 
example, Levonian (1993), Berger et al. (2000) and Goddard et al. (2009 and 2011) all 
find evidence of a high degree of bank profit persistence.  In contrast, Tregenna (2009) 
and Kanas et al. (2011) for example, report evidence of low persistence in US banking.  
It is hoped, therefore, that the results in this chapter will contribute to, and provide some 
clarity in, our understanding of profit persistence in banking and the effectiveness of 
competition within the banking sector.  Furthermore, it is hoped the results here 
contribute to the debate as to whether deregulation designed to promote increased 
competition through the two Acts noted above, did indeed lead to decreased profit 
persistence and thus an enhanced competitive environment. 
 Using panel estimation techniques, including fixed effects and GMM, the results 
show that, first, banks exhibit significant positive persistence.  Second, that persistence 
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varies over time with the regulatory changes.  Notably, increasing following the 1999 
Act and decreasing following the 1994 Act.  The existence of significant persistence 
indicates that, with respect to the competition literature, the competitive equilibrium is 
not restored instantaneously suggesting impediments to the competitive process.  
Furthermore, the 1994 Act that allowed for interstate banking, as noted, led to lower 
profit persistence.  This is consistent with the view that this Act did indeed enhance 
competition, allowing efficient banks to move in to areas previously occupied by less 
efficient banks that were previously protected from competition.  With regard to the 
1999 Act, although this would appear to suggest that competitive pressured had eased 
following the Act, given that profit persistence increased, an alternate view would be 
that banks were able to protect their profits through the diversification opportunities 
afforded by the Act.  That is, banks were able to gain non-interest based income and 
thus obtain greater stability in earnings.   
 With respect to bank specific variables, significant negative relationships were 
only observed for bank size, bank growth, loans to assets and non-interest expenditure 
to total income.  Therefore, this suggests that if banks grow too large or too quickly, 
then bank profits decrease as a result of increased inefficiency.  As banks become less 
liquid (i.e. as their loans-to-assets ratio increases) they are less able to respond to 
changes in market conditions.  As non-interest expenditure to total income increases, it 
follows that banks’ costs increase relative to total income, thus reducing bank profit 
levels.  Finally, there is evidence of a positive relationship between HHI and profits.  
That is, profits tend to be higher with a more concentrated market.  
  Overall, the legislation designed to enhance competition appears to have had 
opposing effects on competition in the US banking sector.  This suggests that the 
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outcome in terms of persistence is not always as expected, although this does not 
necessarily mean that competition has been diminished.  Much of the legislation passed 
in response to the recent financial crisis (for example, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) is 
aimed at maintaining a stable banking sector.  A potentially negative outcome of this 
new legislation however, may be a less effective competitive process within the sector.  
For instance, the introduction of new barriers to competition arising as a result of an 
increase in large bank mergers, may once again lead to an increase in the persistence of 
US bank profit. 
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Chapter 5. Time-Varying Profit Persistence. 
5.1. Introduction. 
The impact of both industry and firm characteristics on profits persistence has been 
extensively analysed (see for example, Schmalensee 1989; Scherer and Ross, 1990; 
Martin, 2002, for reviews of the empirical literature that seeks to analyse the impact of 
industry and firm characteristics on profitability).  Typically these studies share a 
common element to the methodology they employ, in that for each firm or industry 
considered, only one profit persistence measure is estimated for the entire time period.  
In addition, the explanatory variables used in these models are normally just average 
values for the time period under consideration.  The persistence models used in these 
studies all have a significant limitation in that they unrealistically assume that 
persistence is fixed over relatively long periods of time.  The methodology commonly 
applied is the two-step procedure, where time-invariant persistent parameters are 
estimated for individual firms.  In this chapter we estimate an autoregressive 
specification with interaction effects in the persistence parameters. This allows us to 
exploit the time dimension of our dataset and thereby enable us to determine more 
precisely which characteristics, be they industry or bank level, are linked to movement 
in banks profit persistence. 
In common with much of the existing empirical literature examining the 
persistence of profits whether for industrial firms or banks, the previous chapter 
estimates a persistence parameter that covers an extended time series period of over 
twenty years.  That said, in a departure from the existing literature, the previous chapter 
does demonstrate that persistence varies around regulatory changes as well as with the 
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recent crisis. Thus, the previous chapter begins to break down the unrealistic 
assumption of a constant degree of profit persistence by allowing discrete shifts arising 
from regulatory change. As such, the POP approach presented in Chapter 4 is an 
improvement on static studies.  Nevertheless, there are also shortcomings with this 
approach. Notably, that it retains the assumption that persistence is constant over (sub) 
periods of time.  That is, persistence between these regulatory acts is assumed to remain 
constant with shifts only occurring in response to a big shock, such as a deregulatory 
event.  However, this assumption remains unrealistic, recalling that the persistence of 
profits parameter is a proxy for the effectiveness of competitive pressures within the 
market and given that both banks (and all firms more generally) and markets evolve, we 
would expect persistence to change more frequently in response to changes in market 
conditions. Indeed, if we follow the Schumpeterian view of the world where banks 
(firms) are continually innovating and imitating and so gaining and losing market share 
and market power, so we would expect competitive pressures to change over time and 
hence persistence to vary.  
A small number of authors have undertaken studies which utilise more refined 
modelling techniques to examine profit persistence.  These include Gschwandtner 
(2012) who examines how persistence evolves in US industrial firms over three 
different time periods. Thus, the time-variation in persistence is inferred from the 
different parameter estimates across the three samples. This could be seen as akin to the 
analysis in the previous chapter, where the use of dummy variables effectively splits the 
full sample into sub-samples.  Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006) and McMillan and 
Wohar (2011) both consider non-linearity within the persistence of profits equation. 
Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006) estimate a three-regime threshold model, whereby 
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the parameter in the two outer regimes is equal, while the middle regime follows a 
random walk process. This is, whether profits are above or below normal persistence is 
the same, but near normal profits exhibit non-stationary behaviour. McMillan and 
Wohar (2011) also estimate a threshold model, but they allow the persistence parameter 
to differ according to whether profits are above or below norm. Thus, they allow the 
competitive pressures to differ according to whether entry (for above normal profits) or 
exit (for below normal profits) is the main pressure. Finally, Cuaresma and 
Gschwandtner (2008, 2013) attempt to directly model time-variation in the persistence 
of profits parameter. Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2008) use the Kalman filter 
approach to estimate either a random walk or autoregressive process for the persistence 
parameter for six major US firms. While Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2013) attempt to 
link persistence to specific firm and industry factors for a panel of US firms. Thus, with 
the exception of the previous chapter, there has been no attempt to examine time-
variation within the persistence of US bank profits. 
Therefore, the first aim and contribution of this chapter is to examine whether 
there is time-variation in the persistence of profits parameter. This is achieved in several 
ways, including the use of fixed-window rolling and expanding-window recursive 
regressions based around the first-order autoregressive model. This repeated estimation 
approach will allow the ability to obtain a time-series of persistence values. A second 
approach is based around the threshold regression model considered by McMillan and 
Wohar (2011) whereby a different persistence parameter is obtained according to 
different regimes of behaviour around several different threshold parameters.    
The second aim and contribution of this chapter is to examine which bank 
specific and market structure factors as well as economic factors, are linked to changes 
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in banks’ profit persistence. This is examined through the use of interaction effects in 
the persistence parameters of the model.  Thus, we link persistence to specific factors in 
a manner similar to Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2013), which in turn is based on the 
general approach of Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Harvey (1991) in a CAPM 
framework.  Furthermore, we also examine whether the linkages between persistence 
and different bank, market and economic factors may themselves be time-varying. That 
is, the nature of the relationship between persistence and market concentration, for 
example, may change over time due to entry and exit and the effect of regulation. It is 
believed that the results of this chapter, that of whether time-variation exists in the 
persistence of bank profit, whether that time-variation is linked to specific factors and 
whether the nature of the relationship with those factors changes over time, will have 
implications for policy. That is, for example, should bank size or the extent of bank 
diversification have the effect of increasing persistence thus appearing to hinder the 
competitive process, this may then give a steer to regulators.      
This chapter uses Call Report Data for US banks for the period 1976 to 2009, in 
order to test the hypothesis that profits persistence is time-varying as opposed to 
exhibiting discreet changes in response to external shocks such as the implementation of 
new regulation.  In order to do so, we use a variety of techniques including rolling 
regressions and threshold regressions to establish whether there is time-variation, as 
well as a regression involving interaction terms to explain the causes of time variation.  
This will allow us to have a greater understanding of the dynamics of profit persistence.  
In preview of the main results, we reveal through the fixed and expanding window 
regressions that there is notable evidence of time-variation within the persistence of 
profits, which had typically declined over the first part of our sample, before increasing 
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in the late 1990s and early 2000s and declining once again during the crisis period.  The 
existence of time-variation is furthered confirmed through a series of threshold-type 
regressions.  In terms of the determinants of time-variation, our results support the view 
that the variation is linked to bank specific, market structure and economic factors and 
that furthermore, the strength of these relationships also varies over the sample period.  
These results have implications regarding how factors such as bank size, market share 
and market concentration affect competition and demonstrate that there is no simple 
relationship between, for example, reducing bank size and increasing competition. 
Thus, this chapter proceeds as follows; Section 2 reviews the limited literature 
on time-variation in the persistence of profits parameter. Section 3 examines whether 
persistence is indeed time-varying using both rolling and recursive plots and threshold 
estimation. Section 4 considers a model that links persistence to specific factors and 
examines how those factors vary over time. In addition, the analysis in both Sections 2 
and 3 are conducted not only over all banks in the sample but also in sub-samples 
categorised by bank size. Section 4 summarises and concludes.  
 
5.2. Literature and Modelling Time-Variation. 
There has been relatively little work examining time-variation in the persistence of firm 
profits, although several studies have either directly or indirectly considered possible 
time-variation. This work has largely focused on documenting changes in profit 
persistence through a variety of empirical techniques such as using sub-sample analysis, 
Kalman filter techniques, threshold regressions and variable interaction regressions.  
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The above work has documented differences in persistence over time.  See section 3.8. 
for a review of the literature on time-variation in the persistence of profits. 
 
5.2.1. Modelling Time-Variation. 
Modelling time-variation can be done in several different ways as discussed in section 
3.8.  Three broad approaches are considered here, two of which are designed purely to 
identify whether time-variation is present within profit persistence and the third, which 
both identifies whether time-variation exists as well as the causes of such variation. 
A relatively straightforward approach to examine whether there is time-variation 
in bank profit persistence (or indeed any series of interest) is to consider the use of 
rolling (fixed-window) and recursive (expanding-window) regressions. That is, an 
initial sample is selected of, say, five years (t0…t4) and the estimated persistence 
parameter obtained. Under a fixed window rolling scheme this five-year sample is 
moved one observation (t1…t5) and a new estimate of persistence obtained. Under the 
expanding window recursive approach the start of the sample is held fixed and one 
observation added to the end of the sample, which thus increases in size (t0…t5). This 
process continues until the end of the sample and produces a time series of persistence 
values. Rolling and recursive regressions, although relatively simple in construction, 
have been used in a variety of contexts to examine time-variation and often to detect the 
presence of structural breaks. For example, Benerjee et al, (1992) introduced rolling and 
recursive tests for the presence of a unit root in time-series data. With respect to 
structural break testing Pesaran and Timmerman (2007) consider regression windows of 
different lengths to forecast a series post-break, while Giacomini and White (2006) 
175 
 
advocate rolling regressions in this context. Rolling regressions also underlie the 
structural break methodology of Bai and Perron (1998). Rolling regressions have also 
been used to illustrate and examine time-variation in different setting, such as time-
varying CAPM (e.g., Fama and French, 1997; Ang and Chen, 2007), international stock 
market correlations (e.g., Goetzmann et al, 2001) and stock return volatility (e.g., 
Mikosch and Stărică, 2004).  
An alternative way to examine whether there is time-variation within the series 
is to consider some simple regime-switching (threshold) regressions. While threshold 
models (Tong, 1983) have a large literature of their own (see the concise review by 
Hansen, 2011), it should be noted that the purpose of these regressions here is to 
examine whether persistence varies over time and not to obtain a specific data 
generating process around a non-linear function. Furthermore, as it is the contention 
here that the cause of the time-variation could be across bank specific, market structure 
and economic conditions and that this is something that could not be examined in a 
single non-linear setting, nonetheless, evidence of non-linearity would support the 
presence of time-variation and thus we consider a selection of simple threshold models 
following McMillan and Wohar (2011). Thus, we estimate the following: 
πit = α0 + β1πit-1It + β2πit-1(1-It) + εit          (5.1) 
where It = 1 if zt-1 > 0 and zero otherwise, where zt is the threshold variable that takes 
one of four forms in the analysis below. In particular, following an autoregressive 
approach, we first consider lagged profits for the threshold variable. Second, the annual 
growth rate of GDP is used as the switching variable. Third, as it is the contention here 
that a combination of variables truly lies behind time-variation, the fitted value from a 
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linear profits equation, similar to that of equation (4.1) in Chapter 4, is taken. Finally, 
the degree of bank diversification, through the ratio of non-interest income to total 
income is considered as the threshold. The choice of threshold variables is slightly ad 
hoc and the main purpose is to be illustrative and not to determine the best fitting 
model. Nonetheless, the choice of threshold variable can be rationalised, for example, 
the use of the lagged dependent variable (profits) is common within non-linear 
modelling (the resultant model is often referred to as a self-exciting threshold 
regression), see, for example, McMillan and Wohar (2011).  The use of lagged GDP 
growth would be consistent with the belief that competitive pressures and persistence 
will differ according to whether the economy is expanding or contracting. Given that 
profits exhibit pro-cyclical behaviour and risk counter-cyclical behaviour, then market 
conditions are likely to differ across the business cycle. The choice of non-interest 
income to total income is just one measure of the bank specific variables that could be 
considered, but seems reasonable in that we would expect more diversified firms to 
have greater profit persistence than less diversified firms.   Indeed, the argument in 
favour of diversification is to reduce exposure to a shock effecting one aspect of the 
banks business.9 Finally, using the fitted value from the profits regression is a (rough) 
way of incorporating information from all variables into the threshold regression. This 
is pertinent to the belief that time-variation will arise from several sources. Furthermore, 
in the empirical analysis below, a value of zero is imposed for the threshold point. In 
principle, this value could be estimated; however, as this exercise is purely to illustrate 
the possible presence of time-variation, a value of zero is sufficient. 
                                                          
9 As noted above, this variable is only available over the shorter sample period, nonetheless we include it 
here as we believe diversification may be a relevant variable for profit persistence.  
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 The main model estimated in this chapter in order to examine the determinants 
of time-variation within profit persistence is based on that used by Cuaresma and 
Gschwandtner (2011). Here the authors propose a simple generalisation of the first-
order autoregressive process used to examine the persistence of profits given by the 
following equation: 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (5.2) 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the short run persistence parameter, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is a white noise disturbance 
term.  The long run projected profit rate for firm i is given by 𝜋𝑖
∗ =  𝛼𝑖/(1 − 𝜆𝑖).  Under 
the hypothesis of perfect competition, the long run projected profit rates would be zero, 
however as many empirical studies have shown, there appears to be significant 
differences in 𝜋𝑖
∗ across firms. 
 Following methodology used by Cuaresma and Gschwandtner in order to 
examine the potential determinants of the differences in short and long run profit 
persistence, we estimate the following equation 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼(X𝑖,𝑡) +  𝜆(Z𝑖,𝑡)𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                               (5.3) 
Where 𝛼𝑖  and 𝜆𝑖 are assumed to be functions of a set of economic variables X𝑖,𝑡 and Z𝑖,𝑡 
respectively.  Estimating this equation therefore allows us to examine both the impact of 
changes in the variables on short-run persistence, by studying the effects of changes in 
Zi,t on λ(Zi,t); and the impact of changes in the variables on long-run persistence, by 
analysing α(Xi,t)/[1-λ(Zi,t)]. 
 The econometric specification of this equation is given by the following: 
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 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
?̅?
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
?̅?
𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖,𝑡)𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (5.4) 
in which it is assumed that the α(∙) and λ(∙) functions are linear on Xi,t and Zi,t 
respectively.  Cuaresma and Gschwandter use the following firm characteristics to 
explain profit persistence: market share (MS), the volatility of the profit rate (RISK), the 
size of the company (as measured by the value of assets, ASSETS) and the growth rate 
of the company’s sales (GRSALES).   The industry characteristics used are 
concentration (in this case the percentage of industry output produced by the 4 largest 
firms in the industry, CR4), size (the number of firms in the industry, NFIRM, and the 
value of shipments, VS) and finally the growth of the number of firms. 
The series of bank and market specific variables used in our model, as well as 
output (GDP) growth which was obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Activity 
Website), are the same as those used in Chapter 4.  These include measures for bank 
size, growth and market share (based on total assets), capital structure or leverage 
(based on the equity-to-assets ratio) and liquidity (based on the loans to assets ratio). In 
this chapter we also make use of the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman index) measure based 
on total assets as calculated in the previous chapter. In order to maximise the time series 
element of the data set for the main regressions below we do not include those variables 
from Chapter 3 that are only available over the shorter time period of 1984-2009.  This 
includes the measures of diversification (non-interest income to total income) and costs 
(non-interest expenditure to total income).   As in Chapter 4, the model is estimated 
using a fixed effects panel approach. 
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5.3. Hypotheses, Data and Evidence of Time-Variation in the Persistence of Profits. 
The aim of this section is to set out the key hypotheses of this chapter and to consider 
whether there exists any evidence, within our data, for time-variation in the persistence 
of profits.  The first hypothesis and the aim of the remainder of this section is that time-
variation does exist.  The second hypothesis, which is the focus of the following section, 
is that such time-variation is linked to specific factors.  The underlying belief is that 
time-variation in profit persistence occurs as banks and markets evolve over time due to 
product innovation, merger and takeover activity, changes to regulation and economic 
shocks.  That is, as bank size and market share changes, or as the market structure 
changes, or as economic conditions change. 
Time-variation, of course, can mean several different things depending on the 
context of the data. The underlying belief in this chapter is that profit persistence varies 
over time and that such variation depends upon bank specific factors, market structure 
factors and economic conditions and thus is not merely due to parameter instability in 
specific sub-samples of the data. Time-variation in the persistence of profits can also 
arise from structural breaks, such as economy shocks or changes in regulatory 
environment. Again, it is the contention of this chapter, that while such breaks can and 
do occur, there also exists less abrupt time-variation arising from evolving bank, market 
and economic conditions. Inevitably, this will include the regulatory environment and 
adjustment processes to external shocks, but will also include more fluid characteristics. 
Furthermore, the nature of those characteristics may be less easy to identify or define 
for policy makers. Indeed, the key distinction between this chapter and Chapter 4, 
which examined the impact of two key regulatory changes on persistence, is that the 
objective of Chapter 4 was to examine the effect of regulation aimed at enhancing 
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competition on persistence, and by implication, the degree of competition. Thus, 
Chapter 4 measures the impact of regulation. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
different factors that may cause time-variation within persistence and how that evolves 
over time. Nonetheless, it may be that the nature of any factor’s influence on persistence 
may guide future regulatory changes. Finally, with respect to approaches to time-
variation, non-linear dynamics within the profits equation could cause persistence to 
vary across time. In this context, such variation would be linked to a specific variable or 
process that alters the regime of behaviour. For example, Crespo Cuaresma and 
Gschwandtner (2006) and McMillan and Wohar (2011) examined how persistence 
varied according to the level of profit relative to the norm. Again, while we contend that 
these factors may be important, it is also our belief that time-variation is the result of 
different interacting factors, rather than a single regime-switching variable.  
The data set used in this chapter is the same as that discussed in Chapter 4; that 
is, all the data is collected from the fourth quarter call reports (Report of Condition and 
Income) available from the Chicago Federal Reserve Website. In particular, we obtain 
the profit persistence measures using both return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Again, the full set of data for these measures extends from 1976 to 2009. In 
addition to these profit measures, we have a series of bank and market specific variables 
as well as output (GDP) growth (which was obtained from the US Bureau of Economic 
Activity Website). As in Chapter 4, the bank and market specific variables include 
measures for bank size, growth and market share (based on total assets), capital 
structure or leverage (based on the equity-to-assets ratio) and liquidity (based on the 
loans to assets ratio). In this chapter we also make use of the HHI (Herfindahl-
Hirschman index) measure based on total assets as calculated in the previous chapter. In 
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order to maximise the time series element of the data set for the main regressions below, 
we do not include those variables from Chapter 4 that are only available over the shorter 
time period of 1984-2009.  This includes the measures of diversification (non-interest 
income to total income) and costs (non-interest expenditure to total income).     
To provide an initial examination of whether there is indeed time-variation in 
bank profit persistence, we first consider rolling (fixed-window) and recursive 
(expanding-window) regressions.  As noted above, the purpose of the rolling and 
recursive regressions in this context it to examine whether the persistence series exhibits 
time-variation and not to test for breaks. Thus, we proceed with a graphical analysis of 
our data. Figure 5.1 presents the rolling profits (ROA) persistence parameter, i.e., the λ 
from equation (5.2), estimated using a fixed effects regression over all the banks in the 
sample, with the rolling fixed window set at five years. Figure 5.1 also presents a 
similar exercise based on a recursive expanding window. Evident in both of these 
figures is that persistence has undergone a noticeable amount of time-variation over the 
sample period. In particular, there is noticeable evidence that persistence declined 
during the second half of the 1980s. During much of the 1990s, persistence fluctuated in 
a cyclical pattern around a relatively constant and low level. However, in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s persistence increased and quite dramatically so; indeed on the rolling 
graphs, persistence became larger than at any previous point during the sample. Finally, 
persistence fell at the end of the sample. In trying to explain these movements, we note 
that Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argued that deregulation undertaken during the 1980s 
increased competitive pressures in the banking market which could therefore explain the 
decline in profit persistence. Equally, and in accordance with Chapter 4, there is a small 
decline in persistence after 1994 and the interstate branching act. The large increase in 
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persistence from around the end of the 1990s and start of the 2000s, is consistent with 
the introduction of universal banking and ability for banks to diversify into other areas 
in order to stabilise earnings. Finally, the financial crisis that began in 2007 saw profit 
persistence decline dramatically. Both of these latter two points also confirm the 
findings of Chapter 4.  
To further examine time-variation within profit persistence, we reconsider the 
above two exercises but this time separate the banks in to size quartiles based on total 
assets. We do this in order to examine whether the overall results in Figure 5.1 are 
driven by only a subset of the data (e.g. big banks) or whether the time-variation is 
common to all size strata of banks. Therefore, Figure 5.2 presents the rolling persistence 
coefficients for small, below median, above median and large firms; while Figure 5.3 
presents the same information but based upon recursive regressions. Evident within 
these two figures is that the persistence of profits between small and large banks differs 
from that found for medium-sized banks. In particular, small and large banks follow the 
general pattern reported for all banks above, albeit with less evidence of a decline in 
persistence due to the financial crisis. But elsewhere the patterns are similar, with a 
decline in persistence in the late 1980s and a rise in persistence in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Medium sized banks, in contrast, have generally seen a decline in 
persistence throughout the entire sample. This is most noticeable for banks sized above 
the median (quartile three).  A possible explanation for this occurrence is because this 
particular group of banks may have been squeezed by the dominance of larger banks. 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 present the same rolling and recursive estimates for all banks 
and by bank size, but this time using ROE as the measure of profits. The patterns 
observed in persistence basically follow the same shape as reported for ROA profits  
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Figure 5.1. Rolling and Recursive Persistence - All Banks
184 
 
 
 
Left Hand Scale presents the series values 
Bottom Scale represents time period 
 
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Small Banks (Q1)
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Below Median Banks (Q2)
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Above Median Banks (Q3)
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Large Banks (Q4)
Figure 5.2. Rolling Persistence Values by Bank Size
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above. In particular, there is a decline in persistence during the late 1980s (more 
noticeable with the rolling regressions), followed by an increase in persistence in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Further, the general pattern found for all banks is most 
replicated in the graphs for both small and large banks, while medium banks appear to 
have declining persistence for most of the sample.  
An alternative way to examine whether there is time-variation within the series 
is to consider the threshold regression approach. As such, four versions of the simple 
threshold regression (TR) model used in McMillan and Wohar (2011) are considered. 
Table 5.1 reports the results of the threshold model for all banks using the four alternate 
threshold variables. Evident from Table 5.1 is that there is significant statistical 
evidence for time-variation within the persistence parameter, such that it differs 
according to the state of the threshold variable. With respect to lagged profits, however, 
there is no statistical evidence of asymmetry in the model and hence time-variation. 
That is, although the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly higher is the negative 
profits regime is it both similar in value to the positive profits regime but crucially not 
significantly different. Notwithstanding that, for the remaining three measures there is 
evidence of a statistical difference between the parameter estimates across the two 
regimes. Furthermore, for each of GDP growth, fitted profits and the ratio of non-
interest income to total income, the positive regime coefficient is greater than the 
negative regime coefficient. This is most noticeable for the non-interest income 
threshold variable, but applies to all three. Therefore, profits persistence appears higher 
when GDP growth is positive, such that the economy is expanding. Profits persistence is 
also higher when fitted profits is positive, hence, it could be argued that competitive 
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pressures are more pressing when profits are below norm.10 Finally, profit persistence is 
higher, the greater the degree or level of non-interest income as a ratio of total income, 
and thus the greater the degree of diversification. From an economic standpoint these 
results appear broadly consistent with what one would expect; that banks are able to 
sustain profits better in a growing economy, when profits are high and when they are 
well-diversified. With regard to the specification tests, the R-squared value remains 
relatively low (as also reported in Chapter 4), while the residual autocorrelation test is 
passed for three models at the 5% level but not for the fitted threshold model. 
Table 5.1. Threshold Regressions – All Banks 
Threshold 
Variable 
β1 β2 Wald Test R-squared Q1 
Lagged Profit 0.181 
(6.13)** 
0.218 
(3.65)** 
0.30  
(0.58) 
0.09 0.38 
Lagged GDP 
Growth 
0.191 
(7.09)** 
0.125 
(2.01)* 
5.72 
(0.02)* 
0.04 0.13 
Lagged Fitted 
Value 
0.243 
(23.73)** 
0.195 
(11.73)** 
4.25 
(0.04)* 
0.08 0.04* 
Lagged Non-Int 
Inc 
0.218 
(5.30)** 
0.072 
(1.34) 
4.77 
(0.03)* 
0.05 0.09 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values and autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics in parentheses of equation (5.1), where bank profits are assumed to follow a 
threshold autoregression of order one. The first column represents the threshold 
variable, which in turn is, lagged profit, lagged output growth, the lagged fitted value 
from the profits equation from Chapter 4 and lagged non-interest income. The second 
column is the coefficient value when the threshold variable takes a positive value. The 
third column is when the threshold variable takes a negative value. The Wald test, in the 
fourth column, is for the equality of the two slope parameters, i.e., H0: β1=β2, with 
resulting p-values in parentheses. The regressions are conducted over the period 1984-
2009 for all banks in the sample. * (**) denotes 5% (1%) statistical significance. Q1 is 
the p-value for a first-order residual autocorrelation test. 
  
                                                          
10 Note that this is similar to the results for UK industrial firms in McMillan and Wohar (2011), although 
differs from the first results in Table 1. This may be due to the inherent smoothing that takes place in 
obtaining the fitted value from a regression. 
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Table 5.2 presents the same results but separates banks according to their size based on 
total assets; thus, four quartiles are generated. From this analysis we can see that there 
are noticeable differences between profit persistence, bank size and the causes of time-
variation. With respect to small firms (quartile 1), in terms of the threshold models, the 
only threshold variable which exhibits significant evidence of asymmetry (and thus 
time-variation), is the non-interest income as a ratio to total income. Furthermore, the 
coefficient in the positive regime is greater than the coefficient in the negative regime, 
supporting the view that more diversified banks have a higher degree of profits 
persistence. With respect to small-medium sized banks (quartile 2) all the threshold 
regressions exhibit statistically significantly different coefficients across the two 
regimes. Furthermore, for each of these four threshold regression, the coefficient 
associated with the positive regime is greater than the coefficient associated with the 
negative regime. Therefore, persistence is higher with higher profits, higher GDP 
growth and greater diversification. For medium-large banks (quartile 3) there is a 
noticeable difference with only fitted profits as the threshold indicating a significant 
difference in coefficients across the two regimes. However, again, it is the coefficient 
associated with the positive regime that is greater. Finally, for big banks (quartile 4) we 
do notice a difference in how persistence behaves over the regimes. Statistical 
differences in profits persistence are noted for the fitted profit and non-interest income 
threshold variables. However, what is noticeable is that persistence is now higher in the 
negative regimes. That is, for banks in this category, profit persistence is lower when 
profits are above the norm and when the degree of diversification is higher than 
average. This may be consistent with the view that large banks may have a tendency to 
over-diversify, or to take on greater risk and as such profits exhibit less persistence or 
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faster mean-reversion. In terms of the specification tests, we can see that the R-squared 
values for these size categories are higher than for all banks but that the residuals fail 
the serial correlation test, indicating that perhaps longer lag lengths are required.    
Table 5.2. Threshold Regressions – By Bank Size 
Threshold 
Variable 
β1 β1 Wald Test R-Squared Q1 
Small Banks (Quantile 1) 
Lagged Profit 0.018  
(0.36) 
0.048 
(0.39) 
0.05 
(0.83) 
0.14 0.01* 
Lagged GDP 
Growth 
0.024  
(0.49) 
-0.17 
(-0.7) 
0.59 
(0.44) 
0.16 0.03* 
Lagged Fitted 
Value 
0.043**  
(6.05) 
0.041** 
(2.37) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
0.61 0.04* 
Lagged Non-Int 
Inc 
0.118  
(1.32) 
-0.15 
(-1.5) 
4.08* 
(0.04) 
0.10 0.01* 
Below Median Banks (Quantile 2) 
Lagged Profit 0.874** 
(32.3) 
0.177** 
(3.88) 
164.3** 
(0.00) 
0.59 0.03* 
Lagged GDP 
Growth 
0.688** 
(29.2) 
0.397** 
(4.01) 
8.48** 
(0.00) 
0.59 0.01* 
Lagged Fitted 
Value 
0.853** 
(33.8) 
0.212** 
(5.04) 
167.7** 
(0.00) 
0.47 0.04* 
Lagged Non-Int 
Inc 
0.846** 
(25.3) 
0.287** 
(5.35) 
79.38** 
(0.00) 
0.32 0.01* 
Above Median Banks (Quantile 3) 
Lagged Profit 0.487 
(1.88) 
0.069 
(0.44) 
1.71 
(0.19) 
0.42 0.03* 
Lagged GDP 
Growth 
0.183 
(1.40) 
0.324 
(0.68) 
0.09 
(0.77) 
0.42 0.03* 
Lagged Fitted 
Value 
0.332** 
(24.1) 
0.083** 
(10.1) 
231.7** 
(0.00) 
0.83 0.01* 
Lagged Non-Int 
Inc 
-0.11 
(-0.5) 
0.340 
(1.66) 
2.40 
(0.12) 
0.28 0.01* 
Large Banks (Quantile 4) 
Lagged Profit 0.254** 
(4.58) 
0.351** 
(5.82) 
1.25 
(0.26) 
0.52 0.04* 
Lagged GDP 
Growth 
0.292** 
(7.33) 
0.382** 
(2.72) 
0.39 
(0.53) 
0.52 0.03* 
Lagged Fitted 
Value 
0.267** 
(25.2) 
0.302** 
(26.26) 
4.89* 
(0.03) 
0.50 0.04* 
Lagged Non-Int 
Inc 
0.196** 
(8.41) 
0.369** 
(13.2) 
23.43** 
(0.00) 
0.040 0.02* 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values and autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics in 
parentheses of equation (5.1), where bank profits are assumed to follow a threshold autoregression of order 
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one. The first column represents the threshold variable, which in turn is, lagged profit, lagged output growth, 
the lagged fitted value from the profits equation from Chapter 4 and lagged non-interest income. The second 
column is the coefficient value when the threshold variable takes a positive value. The third column is when 
the threshold variable takes a negative value. The Wald test, in the fourth column, is for the equality of the 
two slope parameters, i.e., H0: β1=β2, with resulting p-values in parentheses. The regressions are conducted 
over the period 1984-2009 for all banks in the sample. * (**) denotes 5% (1%) statistical significance. Q1 is 
the p-value for a first-order residual autocorrelation test. 
 
Overall, the aim of this section was to examine the hypothesis that there is time-
variation in profit persistence. The examination of this issue was achieved in two ways; 
first, by considering fixed window rolling and expanding window recursive plots, 
second, by considering some simple threshold regressions. Furthermore, the analysis 
was conducted on all banks in the sample but was also considered on bank size 
quartiles. The results do indeed suggest evidence of time-variation. Both the rolling and 
recursive plots reveal substantial movements in the persistence parameter, with a 
noticeable decline in persistence from the late 1980s and an increase in persistence from 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, before exhibiting a decline associated with the financial 
crisis. This is largely replicated across the different size categories of banks, albeit with 
individual nuances.  The exception to this is quartile 3 (above median, medium-large) 
banks, where persistence fell in the late 1980s and remained low. This perhaps suggests 
that this category of banks have experience greater pressure on profits. Evidence from 
the threshold regressions also supports time-variation as there are a number of 
significant models whereby the parameters above and below the threshold variable are 
statistically different. Furthermore, and in general, the positive regime coefficient is 
greater than the negative regime coefficient, suggesting the persistence is higher with 
above normal profits, positive GDP growth and above average degree of diversification. 
They only key exception to this is for large banks where persistence is higher in the 
negative regime when using fitted profits and diversification as the threshold variables. 
193 
 
Taken together with the evidence from the previous chapter, we proceed to examine 
what factors may explain the time-variation.  
 
5.4. Results from Modelling Time-Variation. 
The previous section highlighted the presence of time-variation in bank profit 
persistence. Thus, the aim of this section is to examine which factors may contribute to 
the time-variation. In order to do this we follow the general approach considered by 
Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2013) but which dates back to Harvey (1991). We begin 
with the usual fixed effects regression as considered in Chapter 4: 
πit = α + γi + λ πt-1 + ∑j=1J βj xjit + ∑k=1K δk zkit +Σp=0P θpΔyt-p  + Σi=12 κi Di + εit;  (5.5) 
Where 𝜋𝑖𝑡 represents the profitability of bank i at time t and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1  is lagged 
profitability, which measures the degree of persistence. Contained within the vector xjit 
is a set of J exogenous variables that related to bank specific behaviour. Similarly, 
contained within the vector zkit is a set of market related variables, while Δyt represents 
the change in annual GDP. The Di terms relate to dummy variables that may affect bank 
profits following regulatory changes in 1994 and 1999; equally, a dummy is included 
for the crisis period. A common constant for all observations is denoted by α, while the 
fixed (bank-specific effects) are given by γi. Finally, εit represents the random error 
term. 
As noted above, we believe that persistence, λ is time-varying and thus could be 
written as: 
λt = μ + ∑n=1N φn xjt + ∑k=1K ψk zkt + Σp=0P ςpΔyt-p  + uit.   (5.6) 
194 
 
That is, we believe the persistence itself depends upon bank specific, market structure 
and economic variables. However, the time-varying λ is not observable; hence we 
substitute equation (5.6) into equation (5.5): 
πit = α + γi +  λπt-1 + ∑n=1N λn πt-1 xnit + ∑k=1K λk πt-1 zkit +∑ρΡ λρ πt-1 Δyt-p    (5.7) 
+ ∑j=1J βji xjit + ∑k=1K δki zkit + Σp=0P θpΔyt-p  + Σi=12 κi Di + εit. 
Table 5.3 reports the results of estimating equation (5.7) for all banks over the 
sample period.11 In addition, we also split the sample into four roughly equal sub-
samples, as we believe the different factors may have different impacts on persistence 
over time due to, for example, regulatory changes. Further to this, we also report in 
Tables 5.4-5.7 the same results where banks are separated by size according to total 
assets. In estimating these models the bank specific factors are bank size, growth, 
equity-to-assets ratio, loans-to-assets, market share and the change in market share. The 
market structure factors are the change in the number of banks, market concentration as 
proxied by the HHI and the change in HHI. The economic factors are current and one 
period lagged annual GDP growth. These factors differ slightly from those in the 
previous chapter to ensure the longest possible time-series available. Furthermore, as we 
are examining time-variation in persistence, we include the change in two key 
measures; market structure, which effectively represents the success of the bank’s 
operations, and HHI, the degree of market concentration. That is, we believe the 
dynamic of profit persistence will depend upon the dynamics of these variables as well 
as their levels.  
                                                          
11 For ease of presentation, we only report the interaction terms. 
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The results in Table 5.3 suggest that all three general factors, bank specific, 
market structure and economic, play a role in determining the time-varying persistence 
of bank profit. Furthermore, the nature and strength of that role changes through time. 
Examining the column that represents the full sample, we can see that bank specific 
factors are important, with market share, growth and loans/to-assets ratio all having a 
negative impact, while equity-to-assets ratio and size has a positive effect. With respect 
to market structure, the change in the number of banks has a small positive effect, while 
the change in concentration (HHI) has a negative effect. Finally, GDP growth has a 
positive effect on persistence, although with a lag. Before trying to provide a rational for 
effects, we can see in the remaining columns of results that there is noticeable time-
variation in the factors that cause time-variation in persistence. In the period between 
1976 and 1983 we can see that market share had a positive effect on persistence, while 
in the remaining periods the effect was either negative or not significant. Regarding the 
change in market share, the effect was negative over the period 1976-1983 but positive 
over the period 1984-2000. One argument that could be made here is that in the earlier 
period there were restrictions on bank activity and the extent to which they could 
expand. Thus, market share could change as the number of banks changes. However, in 
the latter periods, which allowed inter-state banking, the change in market share could 
be seen as the outcome of bank strategy. With regard to other bank specific 
characteristics, we can see that bank size always has a positive relationship with 
persistence, while growth always has a negative relationship. The equity-to-assets ratio 
typically has a positive coefficient. Thus, as banks have higher amounts of equity and 
lower debt, so persistence increases. Banks with lower debt ratios (higher equity) would 
typically be seen as safer. Furthermore, debt capacity could allow them to grow quickly 
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if needed. The only exception to this is during the period 1984-1991, this is when de-
regulation began and it may be banks used lower equity ratios to capture market share. 
Finally, the loans-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for liquidity, has a positive relationship over 
the first half of the sample, whereby more banks with large loan portfolios had higher 
persistence. However, this changed to negative such that more liquid banks have higher 
persistence as they could be regarded as being more flexible. With regard to the market 
structure variables, the number of banks has a small and positive effect throughout the 
sample period. The variable relating to market concentration (HHI) is typically 
negative. As such, a higher degree of market concentration and less banks leads to a 
lower degree of profit persistence. Where less banks and greater concentration may 
suggest a lower degree of market competition, this suggests that less competition may 
lead to more risk-taking and hence more volatile profits; or it may lead to complacency 
and lower efficiency. One exception to this is the period 1984-1991, where market 
concentration had a positive relationship. This is also a period in which deregulation 
began. Indeed, this result could be seen as consistent with the observation of Stiroh and 
Strahan (2003) where less efficient banks where being pushed out by more efficient 
banks, thus the greater concentration here came with higher profits. Finally, GDP 
growth has a positive effect on profit persistence, although this is sometimes with a 
lag.12 Regarding the specification tests, we can see that for the sub-samples the model 
explains a reasonable amount of the movement in profit. However, it is noticeable that 
the explanatory power of the model is reduced in the period that covers the financial 
                                                          
12 As noted above we did not include in this regression the measure of diversification as it is only 
available over a short time series (from 1984). Nonetheless, when including this variable it is statistically 
significant and positive. That is, persistence is higher with a more diversified bank. This result is 
consistent with the view that a more diversified bank that has greater income streams can in part insulate 
itself from a shock to one such earnings stream.  
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crisis. Each model passes the first-order residual serial correlation test, although again 
for the crisis period there is some marginal evidence for such correlation. 
 
Table 5.3. Time-Varying Persistence – All Banks 
 All 1976-1983 1984-1991 1992-2000 2001-2009 
Profit(-1) -0.698** 
(-8.28) 
-0.590** 
(-14.29) 
-0.617** 
(-11.18) 
0.013 
(0.17) 
-0.986** 
(-2.71) 
*Mkt Share -3.644** 
(-3.24) 
3.23** 
(5.12) 
-2.034** 
(-3.09) 
0.452 
(0.76) 
-11.626* 
(-2.24) 
*Ch. Mkt. 
Sh 
1.179 
(0.699) 
-13.98** 
(-4.60) 
16.028** 
(8.03) 
6.16** 
(4.88) 
1.89 
(0.36) 
*HHI 0.010 
(0.13) 
-0.472** 
(-6.65) 
0.965** 
(7.17) 
-0.497** 
(-14.49) 
0.306 
(0.86) 
*Ch. HHI -0.688** 
(-5.05) 
-0.501 
(-1.42) 
5.353** 
(9.49) 
-0.266* 
(-2.06) 
-0.995** 
(-2.56) 
*Ch. GDP -0.707 
(-1.26) 
2.232** 
(13.47) 
4.679** 
(13.95) 
-2.035** 
(-2.57) 
-0.282 
(-0.09) 
*Ch. LGDP 5.959** 
(10.06) 
2.459** 
(17.80) 
-4.268** 
(-6.75) 
16.129** 
(40.49) 
7.751** 
(2.81) 
*Ch. No. 
Bks 
0.001** 
(16.40) 
0.001** 
(4.65) 
0.002** 
(4.72) 
0.001** 
(23.79) 
0.002 
(1.29) 
*E/A 0.011* 
(2.31) 
1.807** 
(38.68) 
-0.399** 
(-23.13) 
0.055** 
(2.52) 
0.010 
(0.87) 
*Size 0.117** 
(13.48) 
0.037** 
(9.47) 
0.079** 
(13.71) 
0.028** 
(4.24) 
0.128** 
(3.67) 
*Growth -0.464** 
(-32.77) 
-0.143** 
(-12.12) 
-0.467** 
(-44.67) 
-0.589** 
(-76.41) 
-0.416** 
(-8.72) 
*L/A -0.219** 
(-5.35) 
0.221** 
(8.65) 
0.108** 
(4.10) 
0.024 
(0.89) 
-0.495** 
(-2.59) 
R-squared 0.09 0.57 0.45 0.52 0.14 
Q1 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.08 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) for equation (5.7), 
where bank profits are regressed on lagged bank profits and the interaction terms given 
by: Mkt Share is market share by total assets, HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 
GDP is gross domestic product, E/A is the equity-to-assets ratio, Size is given by total 
assets, growth is the change in total assets, L/A is the loans-to-assets ratio, Ch 
represents the change and L the natural logarithm. These terms are also entered in the 
regression individually but are not reported. Q1 is the p-value for a first-order residual 
autocorrelation test. * (**) denote 5% (1%) statistical significance.  
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Tables 5.4 to 5.7 present the same results but for banks separated by size according to 
their total assets. Before examining the individual coefficient values we can look at the 
specification tests. It is noticeable that the explanatory power of the model varies across 
the sample both temporally and in terms of bank size. Of particular interest is that the 
period including the financial crisis has higher explanatory power for the separate 
groups of banks than for other periods. This could arise as banks of similar size were 
affected similarly and hence the model is able to capture this behaviour. We also, again, 
report tests for first-order residual correlation, which is the key test when trying to 
understand the temporal nature of the data. The models suggest no remaining such 
correlation although the test only passes marginally in some cases. 
Table 5.4 presents the same results but this time for small banks only (quartile 
1). In comparison with the all banks results in Table 5.3, while we can see some 
similarity in the results, there are also noticeable differences. With regard to market 
share and change in market share, it is apparent that over the full time sample the effects 
are negative, suggesting that profits change as market share is gained or lost. The 
negative effect appears in most sub-samples, although as with all banks, we see a 
positive coefficient for market share in the earliest part of the sample when banking 
restrictions were strongest and a positive effect with the change in markets share during 
the 1980s when deregulation began. As with all banks, growth always has a negative 
effect, while size always has a positive effect (with the exception of the 1976-1983 time 
period). Similarly, the loans-to-assets ratio has changed from positive at the beginning 
of the sample to negative. As with all banks this suggests that profit persistence was 
affected positively by having a large loan portfolio at the beginning of the sample but 
positively by having a higher degree of liquidity at the end of the sample. Capital 
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structure, through the equity-to-assets ratio has a negligible effect over the full sample, 
albeit the response is similar to all banks in the first two sub-periods. That is positively 
in the first sub-period and negatively in the second. With regard to the market structure 
variables, again the number of banks typically has a positive relationship (except in the 
period 1984-1991 where it is not significant).  For market concentration, the effect here 
is positive in the second half of the sample, although the change in concentration is 
negative. This latter result is the same as for all banks, suggesting that increases in 
concentration are associated with lower persistence, but a higher overall level of 
concentration leads to higher persistence, in contrast to all banks. It may be at this end 
of the market, more concentration may lead to greater stability and less volatility in 
profits. As before, the effect of GDP growth is positive, although the lagged effect is 
more pronounced. 
Table 5.5 presents the results of equation (5.7) but this time just for small-
medium banks (quartile 2). In comparison with the all banks results in Table 5.3, again 
while we see some similarity in the results, there are also some differences. With regard 
to market share and change in market share, this variable is now predominately 
insignificant in the sub-samples, although over the full sample, we can see that the level 
of market share has a positive effect and the change in market share a negative effect. 
From the sub-samples, we can see that this predominantly comes from the 1984-1991 
period, which is associated with the start of deregulation. With respect to other bank 
specific variables, as with the previous results from all banks and small banks, there is a 
negative effect from growth (albeit with the exception of the 1984-1991 period) and 
again we see the effect of the loans-to-assets ratio change from positive at the start of 
the periods to negative by the end of the sample. However, in contrast to previous 
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results, we now see the effect on size as being negative, such that the larger banks in 
this category have lower profit persistence. As before, the equity-to-assets ratio is 
positive over the same period but exhibits less significance in the sub-samples. Thus, as 
with small banks, the effect of capital structure is more subdued than reported for all 
banks. With regard to the market structure variables, there is no significant effect in the 
first sub-period, but subsequent to that the level affect is negative but the change is 
positive over the period 1984 to 2000. In the final sub-period, the level effect becomes 
positive. This supports the view that greater levels of concentration lowered persistence 
for this category of bank, although changes in market concentration had a positive 
effect.  Again the number of banks typically has a positive relationship (except in the 
period 1984-1991 where it is not significant).  These results suggest that this category of 
bank, higher market concentration, in conjunction (in part) with higher market share 
may have led to complacency or some other behaviour that subsequently resulted in 
lower profit persistence. It can also been seen in the rolling and recursive plots that for 
the middle two quartiles persistence declined during the 1980s and did not increase in 
the way that persistence rose for small and large banks. Finally, we can see that GDP 
growth has a positive effect over the first half of the sample, but the effect is mixed 
thereafter.  
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Table 5.4. Time-Varying Persistence – Small Banks (Quantile 1) 
 All 1976-1983 1984-1991 1992-2000 2001-2009 
Profit(-1) -0.166** 
(-17.75) 
0.050 
(0.47) 
-0.198 
(-1.19) 
-0.426** 
(-17.36) 
-0.470** 
(-6.38) 
*Mkt Share -18.617** 
(-5.56) 
43.691** 
(3.16) 
-13.514** 
(-3.64) 
-10.610** 
(-8.03) 
30.378 
(1.08) 
*Ch. Mkt. 
Sh 
-29.943** 
(-5.96) 
-57.817** 
(-6.62) 
52.850** 
(3.41) 
-20.692** 
(-16.48) 
23.635 
(0.86) 
*HHI 0.337** 
(5.17) 
-0.574** 
(-5.43) 
0.163 
(0.58) 
0.351* 
(2.20) 
2.096** 
(6.54) 
*Ch. HHI -1.569** 
(-8.48) 
1.020* 
(1.96) 
11.86** 
(9.02) 
-1.509** 
(-5.11) 
-2.915** 
(-6.31) 
*Ch. GDP -1.114** 
(-2.57) 
3.314** 
(12.40) 
11.270** 
(15.30) 
-2.233 
(-1.23) 
3.601 
(0.93) 
*Ch. LGDP 6.203** 
(14.20) 
2.744** 
(13.03) 
-8.643** 
(-6.71) 
16.670** 
(15.69) 
14.683** 
(7.74) 
*Ch. No. 
Bks 
0.001** 
(31.82) 
0.001** 
(4.80) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
0.001** 
(11.92) 
0.001** 
(3.44) 
*E/A 0.009 
(1.42) 
2.158** 
(32.69) 
-0.829** 
(-23.56) 
0.041 
(0.72) 
-0.010 
(-0.86) 
*Size 0.236** 
(19.99) 
-0.054** 
(-4.54) 
0.042* 
(2.02) 
0.516** 
(18.71) 
0.403** 
(5.75) 
*Growth -0.646** 
(-47.65) 
-0.026 
(-1.40) 
-1.609** 
(-46.42) 
-0.799** 
(-29.75) 
-0.418** 
(-6.18) 
*L/A -0.340** 
(-7.65) 
0.271** 
(7.41) 
0.105 
(1.90) 
0.127 
(1.10) 
-0.394* 
(-2.06) 
R-squared 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.79 0.95 
Q1 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.16 0.34 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) for equation (5.7), 
where bank profits are regressed on lagged bank profits and the interaction terms given 
by: Mkt Share is market share by total assets, HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 
GDP is gross domestic product, E/A is the equity-to-assets ratio, Size is given by total 
assets, growth is the change in total assets, L/A is the loans-to-assets ratio, Ch 
represents the change and L the natural logarithm. These terms are also entered in the 
regression individually but are not reported. Q1 is the p-value for a first-order residual 
autocorrelation test. * (**) denote 5% (1%) statistical significance.  
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Table 5.5. Time-Varying Persistence – Below Median Banks (Quantile 2) 
 All 1976-1983 1984-1991 1992-2000 2001-2009 
Profit(-1) 0.223* 
(2.04) 
0.198** 
(5.83) 
0.239** 
(9.50) 
0.216** 
(8.47) 
-0.495 
(-1.33) 
*Mkt Share 20.776 
(0.82) 
8.112 
(1.43) 
28.78** 
(4.60) 
-17.505** 
(-2.50) 
12.336 
(0.48) 
*Ch. Mkt. 
Sh 
-17.173 
(-0.38) 
-7.913 
(-0.32) 
-53.78** 
(-19.37) 
-7.381 
(-0.58) 
-9.462 
(-0.40) 
*HHI -0.266 
(-1.29) 
-0.159 
(-0.91) 
-0.568** 
(-4.68) 
-1.934** 
(-18.54) 
1.031** 
(2.53) 
*Ch. HHI -0.685** 
(-2.37) 
-0.819 
(-0.98) 
1.303** 
(2.88) 
4.049** 
(24.10) 
-0.228 
(-0.47) 
*Ch. GDP -8.188** 
(-5.99) 
1.801** 
(5.56) 
4.303** 
(12.99) 
-3.989** 
(-4.89) 
-4.178 
(-1.61) 
*Ch. LGDP -0.430 
(-0.29) 
1.489** 
(5.16) 
3.391** 
(6.49) 
-4.305** 
(-11.73) 
5.235** 
(3.15) 
*Ch. No. 
Bks 
0.001** 
(8.22) 
0.001** 
(5.88) 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
0.001** 
(10.56) 
0.001 
(1.88) 
*E/A 0.013* 
(1.98) 
-0.292 
(-1.35) 
0.169 
(1.41) 
-0.446** 
(-13.96) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
*Size -0.089 
(-0.85) 
-0.209** 
(-6.45) 
-0.262** 
(-11.11) 
-0.161** 
(-6.86) 
0.554 
(1.54) 
*Growth -0.449** 
(-9.29) 
-0.243** 
(-6.23) 
0.244** 
(11.49) 
-0.042** 
(-3.73) 
-0.376** 
(-3.88) 
*L/A -0.750** 
(-8.03) 
0.183** 
(3.14) 
0.058 
(1.46) 
0.485** 
(21.93) 
-1.359** 
(-4.78) 
R-squared 0.48 0.69 0.68 0.89 0.92 
Q1 0.08 0.11 0.61 0.16 0.24 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) for equation (5.7), 
where bank profits are regressed on lagged bank profits and the interaction terms given 
by: Mkt Share is market share by total assets, HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 
GDP is gross domestic product, E/A is the equity-to-assets ratio, Size is given by total 
assets, growth is the change in total assets, L/A is the loans-to-assets ratio, Ch 
represents the change and L the natural logarithm. These terms are also entered in the 
regression individually but are not reported. Q1 is the p-value for a first-order residual 
autocorrelation test. * (**) denote 5% (1%) statistical significance. 
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Table 5.6 presents the results of equation (5.7) for the medium-large category of banks 
(quartile 3). As before, the results are a mixture of similarities and differences with 
those reported for all banks and the previous size categories. Over the full sample 
period, market share has a negative effect, while the change in market share has a 
positive effect. However, the evidence from the sub-samples appears to show this 
relationship changes over time with the sign of the coefficients often switching. This is 
similar to that reported previously although there are differences in the degree of 
significance. In general though, increases in market share are consistent with increases 
in persistence, but the overall level suggests a negative relationship. As with the smaller 
category of medium sized banks, the relationship with size and growth is no longer 
consistent across both the full and sub-sample periods. For all banks, we saw size as 
being positive and growth negative; here growth switches between a positive and 
negative effect, while size is less consistent and insignificant in two sub-periods. The 
loans-to-assets ratio is positive over the full time sample and in three of the four sub-
samples, only being negative in the period 1992-2000. This differs from previous results 
where there was a switch from positive to negative across the sub-samples. Here the 
final sub-sample is positive. This suggests that, for this category of bank, a larger loan 
portfolio leads to higher profit persistence. In contrast to all banks and the smaller 
medium sized category, the equity-to-assets ratio is insignificant over the full sample. 
Further, it is negative in two of the sub-samples. Thus, as with the previous two 
categories, the effect of capital structure is more subdued than reported for all banks. 
With regard to the market structure variables, although there remains a small positive 
effect from the change in the number of banks, there is very little in the way of a 
statistically significant effect from market concentration through the HHI and change in 
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HHI variables. The main exception is for the time period 1992-2000, where both the 
level and change in HHI is associated with a positive effect on persistence. Finally, we 
can see that GDP growth has a positive effect over the first half of the sample, but the 
effect is largely negative over the second half of the sample. Again, we could read these 
results in the context of the rolling and recursive plots for this size category, where 
persistence declined in the 1980s and remained low relative to the other size categories.   
Table 5.7 presents the results for large banks (quartile 4). In relation to the bank 
specific factors, market share has an overall insignificant effect, which is positive and 
significant over the sub-periods 1976-1983 and 1991-2000, while it is insignificant 
between 1984-1990 (although the coefficient is positive) and negative between 2001-
2009. Thus the overall coefficient value masks noticeable variation. In general, 
therefore, a higher market share is associated with higher persistence for this category of 
bank. However, the change in market share is associated with a negative effect on 
persistence in the periods 1976-1983 and 1991-2000, perhaps as a trade-off for the gain 
in market share. In contrast to the overall results in Table 5.3, size predominantly has a 
negative effect with persistence, as to does growth.  This is more consistent with the 
overall results, albeit that there is a positive result over the period 1984-1999 and not 
significant in the final sub-period. The loans-to-assets ratio and the equity-to-assets ratio 
are insignificant over the whole period, but this masks periods of a positive effect for 
the former and a negative effect for the latter in different sub-samples. These 
associations are consistent with the view that a larger loan portfolio and a smaller 
equity/debt ratio are consistent with higher profit persistence. Noticeably, both these 
effects are insignificant in the final sub-sample, where, ex post, greater liquidity and 
equity capital have proved necessary.  With regard to the market structure variables, the 
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number of banks typically has a positive relationship in the first two sub-samples but is 
insignificant and negative in the latter two sub-samples. This suggests that as the 
number of banks has fallen, the incumbents in this size category are able to increase 
profit persistence and maintain their position. This is supported, to a certain extent, by 
higher market concentration also increasing persistence. Thus, large banks in a 
concentrated part of the market are able to maintain profit performance. Finally, GDP 
growth typically has a positive effect on persistence; furthermore, the current level of 
GDP growth is more important than lagged values as occurred, for example, with small 
banks. 
Overall, the results presented in this chapter have demonstrated that profit 
persistence in US commercial banks is time-varying and that this time-variation is 
linked to bank specific and market structure factors as well as economic conditions. 
Moreover, the results show that not only is there time-variation in profit persistence but 
that there is also time-variation in the factors that cause time-varying persistence. 
Furthermore, this variation in the factors occurs across both time and size categories of 
banks. Given this, it is difficult to generalise when commenting upon the effects of the 
bank specific, market structure and economic factors on persistence. 
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Table 5.6. Time-Varying Persistence – Above Median Banks (Quantile 3) 
 All 1976-1983 1984-1991 1992-2000 2001-2009 
Profit(-1) 0.876** 
(7.14) 
-0.876** 
(-4.37) 
-0.195 
(-0.73) 
0.977** 
(37.70) 
-0.473 
(-1.33) 
*Mkt Share -5.406* 
(-2.20) 
0.619 
(0.21) 
-5.403** 
(-2.40) 
52.719** 
(14.89) 
-16.613 
(-1.88) 
*Ch. Mkt. 
Sh 
5.403* 
(1.96) 
75.73** 
(4.89) 
-22.821 
(-1.80) 
-102.879** 
(-25.08) 
29.731* 
(2.15) 
*HHI -0.232** 
(-2.97) 
0.309 
(1.44) 
-0.084 
(-0.64) 
0.987** 
(11.27) 
-0.182 
(-0.75) 
*Ch. HHI 0.588** 
(5.09) 
0.608 
(0.57) 
-0.169 
(-0.30) 
0.524** 
(2.96) 
0.157 
(0.59) 
*Ch. GDP -0.936* 
(-2.28) 
3.127** 
(7.36) 
2.791** 
(7.55) 
-7.141** 
(-7.44) 
-16.105** 
(-7.30) 
*Ch. LGDP 2.237** 
(5.60) 
2.526** 
(6.29) 
3.900** 
(6.16) 
-3.378** 
(-8.21) 
2.805 
(1.20) 
*Ch. No. 
Bks 
0.001** 
(3.15) 
0.003** 
(9.15) 
0.001** 
(2.98) 
0.003** 
(5.59) 
0.002** 
(2.35) 
*E/A 0.001 
(0.23) 
-1.789** 
(-11.53) 
-0.003 
(-0.01) 
-0.138* 
(-2.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
*Size -0.180** 
(-7.54) 
0.153** 
(3.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.808** 
(-36.24) 
0.121 
(1.22) 
*Growth -0.026** 
(-2.44) 
-0.635** 
(-10.29) 
0.036** 
(2.93) 
-0.426** 
(-29.44) 
0.245** 
(4.69) 
*L/A 0.666** 
(26.95) 
0.639** 
(8.16) 
0.233** 
(8.23) 
-0.259** 
(-7.37) 
0.867** 
(9.18) 
R-squared 0.96 0.70 0.66 0.73 0.98 
Q1 0.14 0.24 0.38 0.08 0.73 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) for equation (5.7), 
where bank profits are regressed on lagged bank profits and the interaction terms given 
by: Mkt Share is market share by total assets, HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 
GDP is gross domestic product, E/A is the equity-to-assets ratio, Size is given by total 
assets, growth is the change in total assets, L/A is the loans-to-assets ratio, Ch 
represents the change and L the natural logarithm. These terms are also entered in the 
regression individually but are not reported. Q1 is the p-value for a first-order residual 
autocorrelation test. * (**) denote 5% (1%) statistical significance. 
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Table 5.7. Time-Varying Persistence – Large Banks (Quantile 4) 
 All 1976-1983 1984-1991 1992-2000 2001-2009 
Profit(-1) 0.105 
(1.04) 
0.619** 
(2.77) 
0.440** 
(3.34) 
0.614** 
(5.03) 
0.346 
(1.36) 
*Mkt Share -0.317 
(-1.26) 
2.134** 
(4.05) 
0.087 
(0.30) 
1.267** 
(5.89) 
-1.712* 
(-2.17) 
*Ch. Mkt. 
Sh 
-1.639** 
(-4.15) 
-5.236* 
(-2.22) 
1.414 
(1.58) 
-1.051** 
(-2.39) 
-1.247 
(-1.44) 
*HHI 0.455** 
(8.62) 
0.763** 
(2.92) 
0.038 
(0.21) 
-0.406** 
(-3.74) 
0.805** 
(7.43) 
*Ch. HHI 0.017 
(0.33) 
-4.025** 
(-3.35) 
0.611 
(0.98) 
1.417** 
(9.28) 
-0.267* 
(-2.26) 
*Ch. GDP 2.106** 
(4.72) 
1.853** 
(3.31) 
1.285** 
(2.53) 
3.174** 
(3.13) 
7.979** 
(5.63) 
*Ch. LGDP -0.413 
(-0.79) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-1.993* 
(-2.14) 
-3.745** 
(-8.96) 
1.471 
(0.73) 
*Ch. No. 
Bks 
-0.001** 
(-2.51) 
0.003** 
(7.40) 
0.002** 
(5.36) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.001** 
(-2.34) 
*E/A -0.009 
(-0.60) 
-2.070** 
(-4.84) 
-1.360** 
(-20.14) 
0.035 
(0.59) 
-0.017 
(-0.65) 
*Size 0.010 
(1.21) 
-0.030 
(-1.94) 
-0.020* 
(-2.05) 
-0.045** 
(-5.60) 
-0.037 
(-1.82) 
*Growth -0.105** 
(-13.55) 
-0.420** 
(-8.19) 
0.030** 
(2.52) 
-0.036** 
(-3.88) 
-0.059 
(-1.80) 
*L/A -0.024 
(-0.94) 
0.144 
(1.38) 
0.512** 
(10.26) 
0.219** 
(8.17) 
-0.124 
(-1.85) 
R-squared 0.083 0.70 0.59 0.57 0.94 
Q1 0.05 0.09 0.59 0.06 0.12 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) for equation (5.7), 
where bank profits are regressed on lagged bank profits and the interaction terms given 
by: Mkt Share is market share by total assets, HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 
GDP is gross domestic product, E/A is the equity-to-assets ratio, Size is given by total 
assets, growth is the change in total assets, L/A is the loans-to-assets ratio, Ch 
represents the change and L the natural logarithm. These terms are also entered in the 
regression individually but are not reported. Q1 is the p-value for a first-order residual 
autocorrelation test. * (**) denote 5% (1%) statistical significance. 
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However, we can nonetheless make the following salient points. First, as stated 
above, profit persistence is time-varying and linked to explicitly identifiable factors.  
Second, GDP growth typically has a positive effect on profit persistence, although this 
may be lagged, especially for small banks. This supports the view of greater stability 
within banking during economic expansions. Third, bank size generally has a positive 
effect, although this breaks down with bigger banks, while growth has a negative effect. 
This is consistent with the view of greater stability within large banks, which are able to 
diversify, while bank growth inevitably involves additional costs that affect profit.  
Fourth, the equity-to-assets ratio is typically positive for smaller banks but becomes 
negative or insignificant for larger banks. Fifth, the size of the loan portfolio is also 
typically negative especially in the later part of the sample and for smaller banks. For 
larger banks and the earlier part of the sample, the relationship is often positive. As 
noted, these results suggest the increased need to liquidity and an equity buffer in the 
later part of the sample. Finally, the effect of market share and concentration differ quite 
substantially over the sample period and with bank size, although the change in the 
number of banks typically has a positive effect on persistence. Notwithstanding this, 
and in terms of the policy debate, there is no clear evidence that greater concentration 
leads to higher persistence (and lower competitive pressure).  
 
5.5. Summary and Conclusion. 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the presence and source of time-variation within 
the profit persistence parameter. In particular, it is important, from a policy perspective, 
to know whether time-variation exists within persistence and what factors determine 
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any such variation. That is, policy-makers need to know how different factor may 
interact with persistence before enacting regulatory changes, given the belief that the 
degree of profit persistence is a proxy for the strength of competition within the 
industry.  
In order to determine whether profit persistence exhibits time-variation, we first 
considered rolling fixed window and recursive expanding window regressions for the 
persistence parameter.  Evidence from these two approaches revealed substantial time-
variation, with persistence declining in the late 1980s and rising in the late 1990s/early 
2000. Persistence also falls during the financial crisis period. In examining the rolling 
and recursive persistence parameter according to the size of banks, we see that both 
small and large banks follow this same general pattern. However, medium sized banks 
have seen persistence decline during the 1980s and generally stay low and even decline 
further for the remainder of the time period. Nonetheless, the rolling and recursive plots 
provide evidence of time-variation. 
To further examine whether time-variation exists in profit persistence. The 
chapter also considers some simple non-linear threshold regressions. These are designed 
to determine whether the persistence parameter changes over time, between different 
regimes of behaviour according to some specific threshold variable. In particular, we 
considered four different threshold variables: lagged profit, lagged GDP growth, lagged 
fitted profit from a regression and lagged ratio of non-interest income to total income. 
As with the rolling and recursive plots, these regressions were run for all banks and also 
separated by bank size. The regression results from these threshold models are largely 
supportive of time-variation as the persistence parameter does indeed vary over 
different regimes of behaviour. In particular, for all banks we see that persistence is 
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higher when GDP growth is positive, that is, when the economy is expanding, when 
fitted profits are positive (above normal) and when the degree of bank diversification is 
above average. This suggests that competitive forces impact less on banks when GDP is 
growing, as banks are more diversified and when banks are more profitable. This 
general pattern appears also to hold for most size categories of banks, with the key 
exception of large banks. Here, it is noticeable that persistence is higher with a lower 
degree of non-interest income to total income. This may suggest that such large banks 
have a tendency to over diversify and this contributes to the volatility of profits. 
Nonetheless, the main aim of this exercise was to consider whether time-variation could 
be supported in the persistence of profits parameter and the results suggest that it can 
be.  
Given the presence of time-variation within persistence, we then consider what 
factors may affect such time-variation. We consider the possibility of bank specific, 
market structure and economic environment factors. Should these contribute to 
persistence, and hence the underlying competitive pressures, then this would have 
implications for policy. Again, we consider these effects for all banks and also separated 
by bank size. Furthermore, we also separate the sample in to four roughly equal sub-
periods to examine whether the influence of these factors has themselves changed over 
time. The regression results suggest two key results. First, that time-variation is related 
to all three of bank specific factors, market structure factors and economic factors. 
Second, that there is noticeable time-variation within the effect of these different factors 
on persistence. Further, that both of these hold in the regression for all banks as well as 
the regression organised by bank size. Given the substantial variation in results over 
time, it is difficult to generalise the effects or to summarise them succinctly. However, 
211 
 
generally, GDP growth has a positive effect on persistence. This means that profit 
persistence is higher when the economy is expanding. This would seem intuitive as an 
expanding economy would present more profit opportunities for banks. With regard to 
the market structure, the number of banks tends to have a positive relationship with 
persistence, although this does vary to a certain degree with bank size and time, it does 
suggest that more banks does not necessarily mean more competition. Although one 
exception to this is the large bank category, hence, more large banks could lead to 
greater competition. The variable relating to market concentration (HHI) is typically 
negative. As such, this suggests that a higher degree of market concentration and less 
banks leads to a lower degree of profit persistence. Where less banks and greater 
concentration may suggest a lower degree of market competition, the results here 
suggest that less competition may lead to more risk-taking and hence more volatile 
profits or it may lead to complacency and lower efficiency. Hence, profit persistence 
becomes lower. However, there are variations to this result, for example, over the period 
1984-1991, where market concentration had a positive relationship. This is also a period 
where deregulation began and thus, this result may arise as more efficient banks begin 
to capture market share of less efficient banks. Hence, the market becomes more 
concentrated while persistence for incumbent banks increases. With regard to bank 
specific factors, bank size generally has a positive effect, although this breaks down 
with bigger banks, while growth has a negative effect. The equity-to-assets ratio is 
typically positive for smaller banks but becomes negative or insignificant for larger 
banks. This suggests that the capital structure and equity buffers effects differ with bank 
size. The size of the loan portfolio is also typically negative especially in the later part 
of the sample and for smaller banks. For larger banks and the earlier part of the sample, 
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the relationship is often positive. These results perhaps suggest that profit persistence 
was associated with banks that had a large loan portfolio early in the sample, but 
emphasise the increased need for liquidity and a larger equity buffer in the later part of 
the sample. 
Overall, and from a policy perspective, these results suggest that, where profit 
persistence is a proxy for the outcome of market competition, the relationship between 
competition and bank and market factors is complex. First, the results highlight the 
importance of economic growth on persistence (and hence the competitive nature of the 
market). Second, that there is no simple relationship between, for example, bank size, 
market concentration or the amount of equity capital and persistence. Thus, policy must 
be conducted in the context of such variation.    
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6. Competition and Risk in US Banking 
6.1. Introduction. 
Competition in the banking sector has far-reaching implications for the stability of this 
industry.  Banks function as intermediaries between firms and borrowers and operate 
maturity-transformation in their asset-liability management, thus banks play an 
important role as providers of liquidity to depositors.  However, this also exposes banks 
to runs and systemic crises.  Furthermore, there exists a severe agency problem between 
banks and depositors.  This occurs as a result of the fact that a large proportion of funds 
are made up of deposits, however as banks are subject to limited liability, they do not 
bear the downside of risk but rather may have strong incentives to choose risks that are 
excessive from the viewpoint of depositors.   
 The issue of how competition affects the stability of the banking system, as well 
as the effectiveness of regulation, has yet to reach a consensus in the research literature.  
Indeed, the desirability of competition in the banking sector has been questioned for a 
long time.  In response to the crises of the 1930s, competition was limited in order to 
promote stability within the banking sector.  As deregulation was implemented 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, restrictions on competition were lifted, resulting in 
more opportunities for banks to expand their investments into, arguably, riskier 
activities and new locations.  This increase in competition was widely regarded as the 
main reason for the ensuing instability that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s, 
following a wave of bank failures.  For instance, Keeley (1990), found that the decline 
of banks’ margins and charter values further exasperated the agency problem between 
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banks and depositors (or deposit insurance fund), thereby encouraging banks to engage 
in excessive risk taking, leading to a much greater probability of bank failure.   
 Earlier research throughout the 1990s, into the relationship between competition 
and risk has, on balance, uncovered a negative correlation between the two.  However, 
more recently research has shown the relationship to be much more complex than 
previously assumed.  For instance, a number of studies outlined in the literature review 
section, have sought to examine what the trade-offs between competition and risk are; 
how the competitive environment impacts upon banks’ incentives to take risks as well 
as their vulnerability to runs; and finally the impact of competition on regulatory policy 
designed to promote stability.  This has led to the development of two opposing 
hypotheses, the competition-stability hypothesis and the competition-fragility 
hypotheses. As the names of these hypotheses suggest, the former posits that an increase 
in competition leads to a more stable banking system as competition reduces interest 
rates on loan and the likelihood of default; while the latter hypothesis states that 
increased competition reduces a banks’ ability to withstand negative shocks as capital 
buffers are reduced.   
In related but distinct work, Köhler (2014) focuses purely on the role of 
diversification (non-interest income) in overall bank risk. Examining data from the 
German banking system, Köhler argues that an increase in diversification reduces risk 
for a retail-focussed bank but increases it for an investment-focused bank. Instead, 
investment-focussed banks could diversify into interest income activities as further 
increases in non-interest income may cause over-diversification. In contrast, retail-
focussed banks, which generate most of their income from interest income activities, 
would benefit from the diversification effect of non-interest income activities. The 
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purpose of this chapter is to focus on the relationship between several types of risk and 
market structure for all commercial banks as a whole. That is, this chapter seeks to 
begin with an overall perspective on the issues relating to risk and competition before 
any consideration of finer disaggregation of banks. Nonetheless, a further examination 
of the risk for different bank types is worthy of future investigation. 
This chapter seeks to add to the literature examining the relationship between 
bank competition and bank risk by building on the work of Berger et al. (2009) which 
examined the cross-sectional relationship between market structure and bank risk for a 
range of countries. In particular, these authors averaged their data across all banks in 
their sample period to implement cross-sectional analysis. The aim of this chapter is to 
build on this basic framework but to examine the relationship between market structure 
and bank risk in a panel structure for US banks. That is, we examine a panel dataset for 
the period 1984 to 2009, thereby including all banks, survivors and non-survivors, 
throughout the time period.   In particular, we consider three measures of risk, relating 
to loan risk, total risk and the equity buffer and examine the relationship with market 
structure while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. In addition to examining 
this relationship for all banks, we further consider whether the risk characteristic differs 
between banks of different size.  
Furthermore, in the model employed in this chapter, we seek to examine the 
impact of a key regulatory change on bank risk.  In particular, a dummy for the 1999 
Financial Modernisation Act is included in our analysis; hence, one focus of the 
modelling here is to examine the impact of this 1999 regulatory change on banks’ risk.13  
                                                          
13 A dummy was also included for the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act; however, the results revealed little of any 
significance and are thus not discussed again. 
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This is of interest, given the global events relating to banking that have occurred since 
the 2007 financial crisis began.  The analysis of this chapter therefore seeks to gain an 
insight into an issue that has re-emerged as an important policy debate within the 
banking literature.  That is, whether or not the effective repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
implemented in 1933, increased risk within the banking sector.   Recent debate has 
surrounded the issue to once again separate commercial and investment banking, and 
the possible introduction of narrow banking.  A term which refers to a system in which 
the activities banks can engage in are narrowly defined.  That is, such banks can obtain 
deposits from the public which are backed by liquid and safe assets, typically 
government bonds.  These banks are prohibited from investing in equities, derivatives 
and complex structured products.  Such activities can only be performed by investment 
banks and other financial institutions which cannot fund these investments from the 
deposits of either the public or commercial banks.  For further discussion see Ghosh and 
Saggar (1998), Wallace (1996) and De Grauwe (2009). 
 In preview of the results, we find that there is a difference in the nature of the 
relationships between loan risk and other measures of risk.  Notably, the results for loan 
risk appear to support competition-stability hypothesis, with higher competition leading 
to a lower level of non-performing loans. Whereas, increases in competition appear to 
lead to lower z-score values (greater risk) and lower equity-to-asset ratios, which 
support the competition-fragility view. This appears to suggest that banks view the risks 
associated with different aspects of bank behaviour differently. Furthermore, there also 
appears to be a distinction between small and medium sized banks on the one hand and 
large banks on the other. That is, the relationship between risk and market structure is 
similar for small and medium sized banks (albeit with some differences in the 
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magnitude of the response). However, for large banks, there appears to be no 
relationship with market structure, suggesting that competitive pressure per se do not 
affect risk. The risk behaviour of such banks is predominately affected by the state of 
the economic cycle, while it is also noticeable that they are characterised by riskier 
behaviour overall, with a lower z-score and equity-to-asset ratio than other sized banks. 
Finally, a further examination of bank risk behaviour according to whether the bank 
exhibited above or below profits or whether the bank exhibited positive or negative 
growth reveals less differences between banks. However, across all categories of banks, 
GDP growth is an important factor.  
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as such. Section 6.2 presents a summary 
of the key literature, Section 6.3 introduces the empirical methodology, Section 6.4 
presents the empirical results and Section 6.5 summarises and concludes.  
 
6.2. Literature. 
Most of the literature on the relationship between competition and risk seeks to analyse 
the impact that competition has on banks’ incentives to undertake risk.  There are two 
broad approaches, namely theoretical studies versus empirical studies.  The theoretical 
literature is presented in two sections.  Namely, competition-stability hypothesis for 
which the model predicts a negative relationship between the variables and competition-
fragility hypothesis whereby the model predicts a positive relationship between the 
variables.  The empirical literature is also presented in two sections according to 
whether the studies are at the bank-level with a focus on one country, or whether they 
examine cross-country data.  With regard to the relationship between competition and 
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risk, bank-level studies produce ambiguous results, whereas cross-country studies 
mostly uncover a positive relationship between the variables.  A review of the literature 
examining the relationship between competition and bank risk is presented in section 
3.7. 
 
6.3. Empirical Methodology. 
The empirical analysis in this chapter broadly follows the methodology introduced by 
Berger et al. (2009). This model relates bank risk primarily to market structure, which is 
introduced in a non-linear fashion following Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), but 
also includes measures relating to bank-level and economy-level factors. Following 
Berger et al. (2009), the model takes the following general form:14 
Bank Riski = α0 + α1Market Structurei + α2Market Structurei2 + Σj βj Bank Controlsij +  
Σkγk Business Environmentk        (6.1) 
That is, bank risk is a non-linear function of market structure and a linear function of 
bank specific control variables and the general business (or economic) environment. We 
can use this general model to examine the nature of the relationship between market 
structure (or competition) and bank risk, hence we can consider the competition-
stability and competition-fragility hypotheses. Here, the former would imply that a more 
competitive market structure would lead to lower bank risk, while the latter would 
imply that a more competitive market structure would lead to higher bank risk.  
We use three different measures of risk as the dependent variable. The three risk 
measures are complimentary to each other, capturing different aspects of bank 
                                                          
14 Berger et al (2009) use the term financial stability in equation (6.1), but we prefer to use bank risk as 
that is the dependent variable being directly estimated.  
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behaviour. Thus, we hope to identify whether market structure affects different areas of 
bank risk. The first measure is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs). 
This proxies for the riskiness of banks’ loan portfolios. As such an increase in this ratio 
would indicate an increase in risk. Evidence of a positive relationship, for example, 
between this measure and market structure would imply that as the banking industry 
becomes less competitive and more concentrated (increasing market power), so banks 
increase the riskiness of their loan portfolio. Such a relationship would support the   
competition-stability hypothesis, where greater competition would imply less risk. The 
second risk measure used is the Z-score, which is an inverse measure of overall bank 
risk. As such, a greater value of the Z-score would imply lower risk. Hence, in this case 
a positive relationship between market structure and the Z-score would support the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, where a higher degree of market power leads to greater 
bank stability. Our final risk measure is the ratio of equity to total assets (E/TA). This 
effectively measures the extent of the equity capital cushion that a bank may hold, 
perhaps to guard against any loss from a risky loan portfolio. As such, a positive 
relationship with market structure would imply that greater market power leads to a 
high cushion, while greater competition would result in increased risk, again supporting 
the competition-fragility hypothesis.  
 As noted above, the Z-score is an inverse proxy for the bank’s probability of 
failure, it combines profitability, leverage and return volatility in a single measure and is 
given by the following ratio: 
  𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝐸 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡⁄
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 
               (6.2) 
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Where ROAit is the return on assets for bank i at time t (note that while Berger et al, 
averaged this, and other value(s) over the sample period, we allow for time-variation), 
E/TAit is the ratio of equity to total assets for bank i at time t and σROAit is the standard 
deviation of return of assets over the sample period.15 A higher Z-index reflects greater 
stability, which can arise from increased profitability and/or capitalisation levels. 
Conversely, the Z-index decreases (and hence risk increases) with unstable earnings as 
indicated by a greater standard deviation of return on assets.  The Z-index is calculated 
at the bank level, thus providing an indicator of financial soundness for individual 
banks.   
In order to proxy for market power we use two approaches. Indeed, as argued by 
Inklaar et al (2012), measuring market structure is a literature in its own right with no 
single consensus on the preferred approach.16 Thus, following Berger et al (2009) and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2010) we adopt two procedures; first the HHI measure 
calculated in the previous chapter and second the Lerner index. The HHI measure 
follows from the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, which postulates that fewer 
and larger firms tend towards uncompetitive behaviour. However, it does not 
necessarily follow high concentration leads to less competition as market contestability 
is also important. That is, if barriers to entry and exit are low then incumbents may be 
forced to act competitively. Therefore, we also consider the Lerner Index, which is a 
non-structural and direct measure of market power whereby the degree of competition is 
inferred from bank behaviour. The Lerner Index represents the mark-up of price over 
                                                          
15 Specifically, we use each period’s values for ROA and E/TA, while the standard deviation is updated in 
a recursive fashion and each new time period becomes available. 
16 Indeed, as an example of this, while we consider the HHI and Lerner index measures as also considered 
by those cited above, Liu et al (2012) in examining risk in South-East Asian commercial banking utilise 
the Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistic. 
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marginal costs, thus providing an indicator of the degree of market power afforded by 
banks. As such, therefore, a higher Lerner index indicates a higher degree of market 
power and lower levels of bank competition.  Therefore, we consider the Lerner index 
below. That specification used here for the Lerner Index broadly follows that in Berger 
et al (2009), Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2010) and Liu and Wilson (2013).17  
The Lerner index is calculated as follows: 
 Lernerit = (PTAit – MCTAit) / PTAit              (6.3) 
Where PTAit is the price of total assets, which is proxied by the ratio of total revenues 
(interest and noninterest income) to total assets, for bank i at time t; and MCTAit is the 
marginal cost of total assets for bank i at time t.  The Lerner Index is calculated for each 
individual bank and is averaged over the sample period.  MCTAit is calculated using the 
following translog cost function: 
ln Costit = β0 + β1lnQit + 
β2
2
lnQit
2 + β3 lnW1 + β4 lnW2 + β5 lnW3 + β6 lnQit lnW1 + β7 
lnQit lnW2 + β8 lnQit lnW3 + β9 lnW1 lnW2 + β10 lnW1 lnW3 + β11 lnW2 lnW3 + β12 Trend 
+ β13 Trend2 + β14 lnQit Trend + β15 lnW1 Trend + β16 lnW2 Trend + β17 lnW3 Trend + εit
                    (6.4) 
 
where Qit is a proxy for bank output (total assets) for bank i at time t (e.g.  Shaffer, 
1993; Berg and Kim, 1994; Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Pérez, 2007).  Wk,it 
represents three input prices.  Specifically, W1,it corresponds to the input price of labour, 
calculated as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets.  W2,it indicates the input 
                                                          
17 As an aside, various papers including those cited above as well as Koetter et al (2012), all have slightly 
different specifications, with no agreed consensus.  
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price of funds, calculated as the ratio of interest expense to total deposits.  Finally, W3,it 
denotes the input price of fixed capital and is calculated as the ratio of other operating 
and administrative expenses to total assets. The trend terms are included to capture 
technical changes in the cost function over time. In practical application of the above 
equation it has been suggested (e.g., Turk-Ariss, 2010) to scale costs and the input 
measures by W3, we find this makes little difference to the final outcome. The cost 
function is estimated for each firm to allow for differences in their respective 
technologies and marginal cost is then computed as: 
MCit = 
Cost
Q
[β1 + β2lnQ + β6 lnW1 + β7 lnW2 + β8 lnW3 + β14 Trend]           (6.5) 
The Lerner Index included in the regression of equation (6.1), is calculated for each 
individual bank.  While the Lerner Index does not capture risk premia in the prices of 
banks’ product and services (association with monopoly rents), it is however, the only 
measure of competition that is computed at the bank level. 
In addition to the market structure variable, we also include further variables to 
capture both bank specific effects and the market environment. To this end, therefore, 
we include in the regression measures for bank size and bank growth, the ratio of loans 
to assets (to capture liquidity) and the ratio of non-interest income to total income (to 
capture the effects of diversification). Finally, we also include annual GDP growth to 
measure the position (in the business cycle) of the external market environment.  
Subsequent to this, we also re-run the regression to include dummy variables for both 
the 1999 Financial Modernisation Act and the liquidity crisis (credit crunch) that began 
in 2007. Here, we wish to consider whether the change in regulation as well as the 
severity of the crisis affected risk.  
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Econometric Issues 
As in the previous chapter a consideration prior to estimation is that of endogeneity in 
the regression. In contrast to the previous chapter there is no lagged dependent variable 
in this regression and thus that eliminates one potential source of complication. That is, 
in a fixed effects regression where the fixed effects partly determine the dependent 
variables then they will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable.  
However, two potential sources of endogneity remain. First, there is the 
potential for correlation between the explanatory variables. We control for this, 
following Liu and Wilson (2013) by including the explanatory variables in lag form. 
Second, there exists the potential for the direction of causality between the market 
power terms and the dependent variables to be reversed. As noted by Berger et al 
(2009), while our regression suggest that market power has explanatory power for bank 
risk, there exists the potential for reverse causality.  For example, a growing bank that 
expands its loan portfolio and the risk associated with that may also seek to gain a 
higher degree of market power. Similarly, a bank that is growing and perhaps increasing 
its level of debt may also capture a higher degree of market power. The use of lags 
outlined above will help control for such endoegeneity.18  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 A GMM approach was also considered with results qualitatively similar to those reported. 
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6. 4. Data and Empirical Results. 
6.4.1. Data. 
The dataset used in this chapter is the same as used previously and thus much of the 
data has already been presented. That is, the data is collected from the Call reports for 
individual banks over the full time period of 1976 to 2009, although specific data 
availability means the sample size in estimation is often shorter (starting 1984).  
Further, we include all bank data available (including new banks and those that died 
during the sample period), giving a total number of cross-sections at 23,129. As in the 
previous chapter, small banks are excluded as are banks with equity to total asset ratios 
of less than 1%. Again, non-continental US banks are also excluded (except Alaska). 
Some simple summary statistics for the three risk measures are presented in Table 1, 
while Figure 1 presents an average across all banks of the Lerner Index. 
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Table 6.1. Summary Statistics for Measures 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
Z-Score Equity/Assets 
Mean 0.0098 0.4152 0.1492 
Median 0.0015 0.2585 0.0879 
Standard Deviation 0.3807 0.2940 0.3476 
Notes: Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans measures loan portfolio risk.  Z-Score 
measures overall bank risk and is calculated as the return on assets plus equity to total 
assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of return on assets over the sample 
period.  Equity/Assets ratio is an inverse measure of leverage. See Section 6.3 for 
discussion and construction of risk measures. 
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The pertinent points arising from Table 6.1 are that non-performing loans to total loans 
and equity to total assets both exhibit a relatively small mean but a larger standard 
deviation.  This suggests a large degree of variation amongst banks in their loan 
portfolio risk and their equity buffer.  The results are very similar to those found in 
Berger Table 2.  Figure 6.1 presents the average Lerner Index across all banks and 
 
Figure notes: Left Hand Scale presents the series values; Bottom Scale represents time 
period 
includes the average HHI across all banks for comparison.  While the Lerner Index is a 
direct measure of market power or concentration, via the examination of the price mark-
up, the HHI is merely a measure of industry structure via the formulation of 
concentration ratios.  What we can see from these graphs is that both measures broadly 
exhibit the same upward trended pattern suggesting that concentration has increased.  
However, there are some noticeable differences especially with respect to the financial 
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Figure 6.1. Average HHI and Lerner Index Values
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crisis period.  While concentration has increased, price mark-ups have fallen.  With 
respect to the period surrounding 1999 (GLB Act) there is some evidence of an increase 
in market power but there is no obvious step change in 1999.  This suggests that the 
effects of the Act took several years to become noticeable in the data. 
 
6.4.2. Empirical Results. 
6.4.2.1. Results for All Banks. 
Estimation results of the fixed effect panel model for each of the three risk measures 
and for two different measures of market structure are presented in Tables 6.2 to 6.3.  
Table 6.2 shows the results of Equation 6.1, excluding the dummies.  Prior to discussing 
the coefficient values, we can see that according to the specification tests, there is 
residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity for most of the models, while 
explanatory power is relatively modest. These residual tests again support the use of 
robust t-statistics. In terms of the relationship between risk and market structure, the 
evidence presented in Table 6.2 demonstrates that there is a positive relationship 
between market structure proxied by the Lerner Index or HHI and non-performing loans 
as a ratio of total loans.  This means that as market power increases (markets become 
more concentrated) banks undertake more risk in their loan portfolios. That is, as market 
concentration increases or as individual banks exert greater market power they are 
willing to increase the risk associated with their loan portfolio. This may arise as such 
banks feel able to cover any losses from other parts of their activities. Furthermore, this 
would be consistent with the competition-stability hypothesis.   
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However, of course loan risk is only one aspect of bank risk, thus we also 
examine the Z score as a measure of overall bank risk. Here the results in Table 6.2 
demonstrate a positive relationship with market structure.  Thus, as market 
concentration or market power increases overall bank risk decreases (shown by a higher 
Z-score, which indicates a lower degree of risk).  Where the Z score includes both 
profits, equity to assets and the standard deviation of profits, a higher Z score can be 
achieved by a higher value for the former two and a lower value of the latter. As noted 
in the previous chapter there exists a positive relationship between profit and 
concentration and as can be seen below there is also a positive relationship between 
concentration and power and equity-to-assets. Equally, it is likely that a bank with 
greater market power may be able to stabilise earnings in a way a bank with less power 
could not (e.g., through diversification). This therefore, supports the competition-
fragility hypothesis in contrast to the previous results. However, as indeed noted by 
Berger et al (2009) such seemingly contradictory results are not necessarily 
incompatible as a bank with greater market power will often charge higher loan rates, 
thus increasing loan risk, while maintaining a lower overall degree of risk.  
Finally, with respect to the equity to assets measure of bank risk which captures 
the extent of a bank’s equity buffer used to guard against losses, the results again show 
a positive relationship.  This suggests that as bank market concentration (and individual 
bank market power) increases, banks accumulate a larger safety net of capital.  This is 
consistent with the previous Z score results, whereby banks with greater market power 
generally undertake less risk and one route through which they can do that is ensuring a 
greater capital buffer. Again, therefore, these results support the competition-fragility 
hypothesis. 
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Overall, these results point to an interesting context in bank risk.  That is, as 
markets become more concentrated and banks gain greater market power then risk in 
the loan portfolio increases, suggesting greater competition would lead to less risk in 
this aspect of bank behaviour and indicative of the competition-stability hypothesis. 
However, that said, the evidence from the Z-score and the equity-to-assets ratio suggests 
that as bank market concentration increases, so banks overall appear less risky and thus 
appeals to the competition-fragility hypothesis. Indeed, the results appear to imply that 
legislation aimed at increasing stability within the banking industry, need to be tuned 
for difference aspects of bank activities.   
 The remainder of Table 6.2 shows the nature of the relationship between our 
measures of risk and various bank-specific and market variables.  The loans to assets 
ratio, which proxies for liquidity, exhibits a positive relationship with each of our 
measures of risk.  This means that as loans increase it suggests that a higher proportion 
of these loans will become non-performing.  This means that lower liquidity leads to 
higher loan portfolio risk.  With respect to the other two measures of risk as liquidity 
decreases (loans to assets increases) banks are taking other measures to insulate against 
this risk.  Overall risk decreases and the equity buffer increases.  Indeed, part of the 
explanation for the decrease in overall risk is the increase in the equity-to-debt ratio as 
means of providing a safety provision against loan loss. The results for non-interest 
income to total income ratio (which measures diversification), suggests a positive 
relationship such that diversification typically leads to less risk. Again, this can be 
explained through the different components of the Z score as greater diversification 
should lead to a lower standard deviation of profits.   However, none of these results are 
statistically significant thus we cannot be confident in the nature of the relationship. 
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 As banks become bigger and grow quicker (i.e., the bank size and growth 
measures), there is a negative relationship with all measures of risk.  That is, as banks 
increases in size and growth rate the loan portfolio becomes relatively safer, however 
other aspects of the bank become more risky.  This suggests that bank growth may, in 
part, be achieved through risk in non-traditional activities.  One aspect of the results is 
that bigger banks have relatively lower equity buffers, suggesting that in times of crisis 
these banks may be more at risk.19  The final row shows the relationship between the 
change in GDP and our measures of risk.  These results show that as GDP increases, the 
loan portfolio becomes relatively safer but the total level of risk increases and the equity 
to assets buffer decreases.  This suggests that during economic boom banks take on 
more overall risk but have a lower loan portfolio risk, while during recessions the 
converse is true with bank loans becoming more risky but increased equity buffers mean 
banks become safer overall.  
  
                                                          
19 Indeed, several large banks have been substantially affected during the course of the credit crisis and it 
has been suggested that such banks did not have adequate capital buffers to deal with the losses incurred 
in investment activities. 
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Table 6.2. Empirical Results for Bank Risk and Market Structure 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
Z-Score Equity/Assets 
 HHI Lerner HHI Lerner HHI Lerner 
Mkt Struc. -0.009 
(-0.39) 
-0.795** 
(-5.78) 
0.0243 
(0.41) 
-26.053** 
(-7.79) 
0.094 
(0.41) 
-9.171** 
(-7.23) 
Mkt 
Struc2 
0.154 
(4.03) 
1.219** 
(5.94) 
7.816** 
(7.68) 
44.211** 
(8.85) 
2.960** 
(7.66) 
15.410** 
(8.13) 
Loans/Ass 0.002 
(0.29) 
0.013 
(1.60) 
0.505** 
(2.65) 
0.912** 
(4.54) 
0.189** 
(2.61) 
0.328** 
(4.30) 
Non-
Int/Tot. 
Inc 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.001 
(1.51) 
0.003 
(0.24) 
0.012 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.005 
(0.86) 
Size -0.033** 
(-2.42) 
-0.006** 
(-3.83) 
-0.105** 
(-2.87) 
-0.181** 
(-4.52) 
-0.042** 
(-2.99) 
-0.062** 
(-4.08) 
Growth -0.030** 
(-9.86) 
-0.060** 
(-21.01) 
-0.891** 
(-10.88) 
-1.487** 
(-21.34) 
-0.342** 
(-10.99) 
-0.563** 
(-21.32) 
GDP Gr. -0.266** 
(-5.93) 
-0.446** 
(-9.08) 
-11.225** 
(-9.43) 
-16.835** 
(-14.09) 
-4.281** 
(-9.47) 
-6.360** 
(-14.04) 
R-squared 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Q1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.54 0.01 
Heter. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values for the modelling approach given by equations 
(6.1) to (6.5) and related text where the dependent variable is a proxy for risk given by 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the Z-score or the equity-to-assets ratio. 
From equation (6.1) market structure is given by either HHI or the Lerner Index. Bank 
controls are given by Non-Int/Tot. Inc, which is non-interest income to total income and 
measures diversification, size (total assets) and growth (change in total assets). Business 
environment is given by the change in GDP. Numbers in parentheses are t-values robust 
to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. * (**) indicates 5% (1%) statistical 
significance. The estimation sample is 1984 to 2009. 
 
Table 6.3 presents the same regression models as for Table 6.2 but includes dummy 
variables both individually and as interactions with the market structure variables. In 
particular, we include dummies for the 1999 Financial Modernisation Act and the 
liquidity and ensuing financial crisis period.  The results in this table show that there is 
no statistical effect arising from the 1999 dummy, however, the financial crisis dummy 
is significant throughout and indicates a stronger response from market structure to the 
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risk measures.20 More specifically, we see little evidence of the dummy associated with 
1999 having any significant effect on the relationship between market structure and 
bank risk.21 Again, as noted in Figure 6.1, there is no evidence of a step-change around 
this period indicating that the Act has little immediate effect on bank market structure. 
The effect of the Act may be dispersed over several years. The results from the liquidity 
crisis dummy do indicate more significance, and support the view that banks have 
sought to reduce risk following the onset of the crisis.  In particular, we can observe an 
increasingly positive relationship between market structure and both the Z score and 
equity-to-assets ratio. However, results are not consistent across both measures of 
market power and it maybe that more data post-crisis is required before a full analysis 
can take place. 
To further examine bank risk and the effect of both market structure and other 
variables on such behaviour, we again run the regression in equation (6.1) but now 
consider different sub-samples of banks. In particular, Table 6.4 examines the 
relationship in equation (6.1) where banks are separated in size categories by quartile. 
This will allow us to examine whether bank behaviour differs across size.  More 
specifically, we believe that risk behaviour may differ across banks of different sizes 
because such banks may effectively face different market conditions.  That is, for small 
banks their main risk is more likely to come from lending activities or other aspects of 
traditional commercial banking. In contrast, larger banks, which are likely to be more 
                                                          
20 When we take these results in context with Figure 6.1, the insignificance of the 1999 dummy may 
perhaps not be surprising. This is because the Lerner index (although estimated for each bank for the 
regression analysis and presented as an average in Figure 6.1) shows trending behaviour across the 
different sub-samples and little evidence of the variability necessary to obtain reliable results. A dummy 
for regulatory changes in 1994 was also originally included, but was likewise statistically insignificant. 
21  As with Chapter 4 we also included a dummy for 1994. However, its level of statistical significance 
was lower than that reported for the 1999 dummy and thus for ease of presentation was excluded from the 
analysis. 
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diversified, will face risk not only in commercial operations but also in investment-
related activities, and thus, be more exposed to market risk. Equally, operational risk is 
more likely to be a concern for a larger bank in comparison to a small bank.  Examining 
bank risk over banks of different size is of inherent interest, particular with reference to 
the behaviour of large banks following the crisis and whether such banks exhibit greater 
risk. 
Table 6.3. Empirical Results for Bank Risk and Market Structure – With Dummies 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
Z-Score Equity/Assets 
 HHI Lerner HHI Lerner HHI Lerner 
Mkt Struc. -0.0537 
(-1.13) 
-0.4875 
(-3.37) 
0.388 
(1.89) 
-2.973** 
(-4.08) 
0.906 
(1.89) 
-5.045** 
(-3.78) 
Mkt 
Struc2 
0.0089 
(0.06) 
0.6690 
(2.99) 
-0.739 
(-1.28) 
7.147** 
(4.29) 
-1.782 
(-1.27) 
8.104** 
(3.93) 
Mkt 
Struc.* 
Dum 1999 
0.0719 
(1.41) 
0.0805 
(0.67) 
-1.436 
(-1.06) 
-1.121 
(-0.90) 
-0.537 
(-1.04) 
-0.300 
(-0.27) 
Mkt 
Struc2 * 
Dum 1999 
0.0563 
(0.39) 
-0.1914 
(-0.62) 
4.252 
(1.12) 
3.249 
(0.95) 
1.584 
(1.10) 
0.908 
(0.32) 
Mkt Struc. 
* Dum 
2007 
0.1998 
(6.18) 
-0.3978 
(-2.83) 
4.486** 
(6.06) 
-10.265** 
(-2.99) 
1.540** 
(3.13) 
-3.309** 
(-2.55) 
Mkt 
Struc2 * 
Dum 2007 
0.1287 
(1.54) 
1.2718 
(3.58) 
6.094** 
(3.47) 
35.609** 
(4.12) 
3.866** 
(4.60) 
12.006** 
(3.66) 
Loans/Ass -0.0020 
(-0.27) 
0.0036 
(0.43) 
0.294 
(1.52) 
0.608** 
(2.97) 
0.109 
(1.48) 
0.212** 
(2.72) 
Non-
Int/Tot. 
Inc 
-0.0002 
(-0.33) 
-0.0002 
(-0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.003 
(0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
Size -0.0046 
(-2.90) 
-0.0092 
(-4.70) 
-0.176** 
(-4.17) 
-0.283** 
(-6.10) 
-0.069** 
(-4.27) 
-0.103** 
(-5.83) 
Growth -0.0278 
(-8.95) 
-0.0635 
(-16.68) 
-0.788** 
(-9.54) 
-1.403** 
(17.70) 
-0.302** 
(-9.64) 
-0.527** 
(-17.53) 
GDP Gr. -0.1010 
(-2.13) 
-0.2072 
(-3.88) 
-5.587** 
(-4.44) 
-5.633** 
(-4.24) 
-2.141** 
(-4.48) 
-2.200** 
(-4.37) 
R-squared 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 
Q1 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.01 
Heter. 0.04 0.38 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Notes: Entries are coefficient values for the modelling approach given by equations 
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(6.1) to (6.5) and related text where the dependent variable is a proxy for risk given by 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the Z-score or the equity-to-assets ratio. 
From equation (6.1) market structure is given by either HHI or the Lerner Index. Bank 
controls are given by Non-Int/Tot. Inc, which is non-interest income to total income and 
measures diversification, size (total assets) and growth (change in total assets). Business 
environment is given by the change in GDP. Numbers in parentheses are t-values robust 
to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. * (**) indicates 5% (1%) statistical 
significance. The estimation sample is 1984 to 2009. 
 
 
6.4.2.2. Results by Bank Size. 
Table 6.4 presents the results of the estimation of equation 6.1 for each of the three 
measures of risk, when banks are sub-divided into four categories (quartiles) according 
to their size (measured by total assets).  In examining these results we can draw 
comparison with the results presented in Table 6.2 for the whole sample of data. In 
particular, we might expect a difference to emerge between small banks, who may be 
more concerned with loan risk and large banks, who may be more concerned with 
operational and market risk.  In terms of the specification tests we can see that the use of 
robust t-statistics is required with several models reporting residual autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. With regard to the explanatory power of the model, we can see that 
the largest R-squared values occur with the largest banks. 
With regard to the non-performing loans as a ratio of total loans measure of risk, 
we can see in the average value row that while small banks have a slightly riskier loan 
portfolio than other categories of bank, the difference is small. More noticeable is that 
the largest banks have a lower loan portfolio risk. In terms of the relationship with 
market structure, the results for the two middle categories of banks are similar to those 
for the whole sample. For small banks, while the nature of the relationship remains the 
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same, i.e., a positive one, such that increased concentration leads to greater risk, the 
magnitude of the two coefficients are noticeably larger. Indeed, the coefficients exhibit 
a declining value as bank size increases. As noted above, this may be due to smaller 
banks being more exposed to credit risk, while larger banks are typically more 
diversified. Indeed, for the largest category of banks, there is no significant relationship 
between loan portfolio risk and market structure. In terms of the other variables, small 
banks behaviour is affected by the ratio of non-interest income to total income, which is 
a measure of diversification.  This suggests that as small banks attempt to diversify they 
take greater risk in the loan market.  Size and growth are also important for small bank, 
with size exhibiting a positive relationship with risk, but growth a negative relationship, 
perhaps as banks seek to grow other parts of their business.  Across, all bank size 
categories, GDP growth is important, whereby as growth increase, so loan portfolios 
decrease in riskiness.  Taken across the four bank sizes, these results suggest that small 
banks have a stronger interaction between market structure and risk, while middle size 
banks exhibit the same behaviour as reported for Table 2.  Large banks, which may be 
more diversified, have no statistical relationship between market structure and loan risk. 
Thus, the results for these latter banks are consistent with the competition-stability 
hypothesis in loan risk.  Again, of particular interest, large banks appear to be 
unaffected by market structure.    
 With regard to the Z-score measure of bank risk, we can see that the average Z-
score value is similar for the small and medium sized banks, but is noticeably lower for 
large banks, suggesting that while they have slightly lower loan risk, they exhibit 
greater risk overall. With regard to the results of equation (6.1) by bank size, we can see 
that small and medium banks have a similar response to market structure, in that there is 
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a positive relationship, although coefficient magnitudes differ to some degree. This 
supports the view that increased concentration leads to less risk and the competition-
fragility hypothesis. In contrast, although the sign of coefficients for big banks remains 
the same, the coefficients are not statistically significant. This again suggests that 
market structure for the biggest banks does not affect risk behaviour. Elsewhere, size, 
growth and GDP growth also have significant effects on risk, with the same sign as 
reported in Table 2.  Of particular note, therefore, is that Z-scores decline (risk 
increases) during economic expansions. Overall, these results again suggest that big 
banks act differently to other banks, while small banks, who differed in their loan risk 
behaviour, now exhibit similar behaviour to medium sized banks. 
 The final set of results in Table 4 refers to the regression results for equity-to-
assets by bank size. Again, looking at the average values for the equity-to-assets ratio 
by quartile bank size, we can see that while small and medium sized banks have similar 
value, the corresponding number for large banks is noticeably smaller. This indicates 
that large banks hold a smaller (relative) equity buffer and thus are associated with more 
risk. With respect to the regression results, small and medium sized banks have the 
same coefficient signs as reported in Table 2 for all banks, indicating support for the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, where increased competition would lead to greater 
risk.  As before, large banks appear to have no relation with market structure variables. 
With regard to the remaining variables, again bank size, growth and, especially, GDP 
growth are important, where there is evidence of increased risk (lower equity buffers) 
during economic expansions and bank growth. 
Overall, these results provide confirmatory evidence across the different risk 
measures, whereby large banks appear to exhibit different characteristics from other 
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sized banks. In particular, while they have slightly safer loan portfolios, they are, 
overall, more risky in the sense of lower Z-scores and equity-to-asset ratios, indicating 
greater risk in non-traditional banking activities. Furthermore, large banks appear 
unaffected (not statistically significant) by market structure and their behaviour is 
predominantly affected by the business cycle. Small banks also indicate some 
differences, in particular, related to the magnitude of the coefficients, thus indicating a 
stronger reaction between market structure and risk. This is most noticeable for loan 
risk, which is perhaps the most prominent risk factor for small banks. The results for 
medium firms are similar to those presented in Table 2 for all banks. Finally, it is 
noticeable that for all categories of bank size, bank growth and GDP growth are 
important. This suggests that phases of the business cycle are a key determinant of bank 
risk; as are phases of the bank (firm) cycle as they attempt to grow and consolidate. In 
sum, these results appear to support the view that big banks operate differently to small 
and medium sized banks, and exhibit riskier behaviour overall. In terms of the 
competition-fragility and competition-stability hypotheses, these results suggest that 
different sized banks respond to competition pressures differently in different parts of 
their business. As such, no single hypothesis dominates.  However, taking overall bank 
risk (Z-Score), the competition-fragility hypothesis dominates, as it does with the 
equity-to-assets measure; but loan risks suggest the opposite, especially for small banks. 
Again, large banks appear to operate with less concern for market structure.    
In sum, the results in this chapter suggest the following conclusions, which in 
turn can contribute to the policy debate. First, with respect to the competition-stability 
and competition-fragility hypotheses there is no simple answer.  However, there is a 
clear distinction depending upon the measure of risk, with the competition-stability 
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view supported in loan portfolio risk and competition-fragility in total risk. This would 
appear to suggest that competition is beneficial in ensuring a well-functioning loan 
market, competitive interest rates and lower default; but harmful as a whole where 
competition may prevent banks for obtaining and maintaining sufficient buffers against 
bad shocks. Second, large banks appear to be less affected by market structure but are 
more affected by economic conditions. This may arise as such banks are engaged in, for 
example, investments or merger activity and large scale loans which are more cyclical 
in nature.   
Table 6.4. Empirical Results for Bank Risk and Market Structure - By Size 
 Non-Performing 
Loans/Total Loans 
Z-Score Equity/Assets 
 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 
Average 
Value 
0.012 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.35 0.162 0.161 0.161 0.124 
Mkt 
Struc. 
-1.6* 
(-5.9) 
-1.2* 
(-6.1) 
-0.9* 
(-3.4) 
-0.23 
(0.58) 
-14* 
(-8.1) 
-34* 
(-8.5) 
-6.52 
(-1.5) 
-1.90 
(-0.4) 
-15* 
(-2.6) 
-17* 
(-3.3) 
-40* 
(-3.5) 
-1.32 
(-0.8) 
Mkt 
Struc2 
2.99* 
(6.30) 
1.57* 
(5.24) 
1.14* 
(3.21) 
0.36 
(1.15) 
26.3* 
(8.78) 
51.1* 
(9.39) 
3.74 
(1.68) 
4.68 
(0.84) 
25.4* 
(2.60) 
27.9* 
(3.59) 
54.6* 
(3.29) 
1.21 
(1.01) 
Loans/ 
Assets 
-0.23 
(-1.5) 
0.03* 
(3.82) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.4) 
1.22* 
(3.59) 
1.84* 
(2.69) 
-0.23 
(-0.6) 
0.06 
(0.38) 
0.48 
(1.95) 
-0.10 
(-0.1) 
0.366 
(0.60) 
0.006 
(0.06) 
Non-
Int/Tot. 
Inc 
1.34* 
(3.38) 
-3.30 
(-1.0) 
-0.01 
(-0.2) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
-2.7* 
(-2.5) 
-5.2* 
(-3.7) 
-0.04 
(-0.7) 
0.005 
(0.96) 
3.21* 
(4.81) 
-14* 
(-7.7) 
-0.03 
(-0.4) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
Size 0.15* 
(2.10) 
0.66 
(1.04) 
0.039 
(1.0) 
-0.01 
(-0.4) 
0.64* 
(2.06) 
-1.6* 
(-2.7) 
0.51* 
(2.97) 
-0.4* 
(-2.8) 
0.4* 
(2.43) 
0.96* 
(2.06) 
0.27 
(1.06) 
-0.1* 
(-2.7) 
Growth -0.4* 
(-4.1) 
-0.2* 
(-4.5) 
-0.6* 
(-7.5) 
-0.01 
(-0.5) 
-1.1* 
(-5.9) 
-1.9* 
(-5.9) 
-2.8* 
(-8.9) 
-0.3* 
(-2.7) 
-1.6* 
(-7.9) 
-0.9* 
(-4.3) 
-3.9* 
(-15) 
-0.1* 
(-3.3) 
GDP 
Gr. 
-0.4* 
(-3.1) 
-0.2* 
(3.98) 
-0.7* 
(-5.5) 
-0.25 
(-4.7) 
-9.6* 
(-4.4) 
-18* 
(-5.1) 
-8.6* 
(-3.9) 
-7.1* 
(-7.6) 
-11* 
(-5.6) 
-17* 
(-4.6) 
-9.3* 
(-2.9) 
-3.4* 
(-6.6) 
R-sq. 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.61 0.15 0.21 0.25 0.40 0.46 0.09 0.11 0.47 
Q1 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.84 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 
Heter. 0.06 0.75 0.36 0.12 0.64 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 
Notes: 1 etc Q refers to the first etc quartile by size (total assets). Entries are coefficient values 
for the modelling approach given by equations (6.1) to (6.5) and related text where the 
dependent variable is a proxy for risk given by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, 
the Z-score or the equity-to-assets ratio. From equation (6.1) market structure is given by the 
Lerner Index. Bank controls are given by Non-Int/Tot. Inc, which is non-interest income to total 
income and measures diversification, size (total assets) and growth (change in total assets). 
Business environment is given by the change in GDP. Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. * indicates 5% (or higher) statistical 
significance. The estimation sample is 1984 to 2009. 
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6.5. Summary and Conclusion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between bank competition 
and risk.  The analysis examines the impact of market structure on US bank risk, in a 
panel setting, for the period 1984 to 2009.  Furthermore, we examine the impact of 
regulatory change on the risk in banks, via the inclusion of a dummy for the 1999 
Financial Modernisation Act, which effectively repealed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act.  
The focus of regulatory impact on banks’ risk is confined to the 1999 Act, in an attempt 
to determine whether the effective repeal of the 1933 Act was directly responsible for 
the increased risk that banks undertook.  The relationship between competition and the 
fragility of banks in terms of the amount of risk is an important issue to consider within 
banking.  That is, the competitive environment within which banks operate is key to 
determining the levels of risk that banks may be free to under-take.  If banks engage in 
excessive risk taking, the negative consequences may be far-reaching throughout the 
entire economy, as the potential for bank failure undermines public confidence in the 
system as a whole.  Thus the collapse of a single bank may lead to the collapse of other 
banks creating huge instability throughout the entire banking industry, given the pivotal 
role that banks play.  Furthermore, fragility within the banking sector may potentially 
affect banking markets in other economies, given the global interbank nature of banking 
today. 
 Using a fixed effects panel estimator we consider the effect of market structure, 
as measured by the HHI and Lerner index, as well as other variables such as bank 
liquidity, diversification, size, growth and GDP growth on three measures of bank risk. 
Specifically, we examine loan risk (ratio of non-performing loans to total loans), the Z 
score, as a measure of overall risk and the equity-to-assets ratio, which measures the 
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extent of capital buffer held by the bank. In addition to the issues discussed above, it is 
hoped that the results here will also contribute to the literature on the competition-
stability and competition-fragility hypotheses. That is, whether increased competition 
results in banks taking greater risks or whether it engenders greater stability within the 
banking sector.  
 The results presented here suggest that there is a difference in the nature of the 
relationships between loan risk and other measures of risk.  Specifically, the results for 
loan risk appear to support competition-stability hypothesis, whereby, increased 
competition leads to a lower level of non-performing loans. In contrast, increased 
competition leads to lower Z score values (greater risk) and lower equity-to-asset ratios. 
This appears to suggest that banks view the risks associated with different aspects of 
bank behaviour differently. That is, where increased market concentration leads to 
greater credit-risk but lower overall risk and greater capital buffers. The implication 
therefore, is that competition policy needs to be fine-tuned for different aspects of bank 
behaviour and while increasing competition in the retail aspects of banking may be 
beneficial, it is not necessarily true that this will hold in all aspects of bank behaviour.  
 Building upon this result, however, there appears to be a key distinction between 
small and medium sized banks on the one hand and large banks on the other. More 
specifically, while small banks demonstrate a large response to market structure the 
basic relationship is similar to that of medium sized banks and as discussed above. 
However, the risk of large banks appears to exhibit no relationship with market 
structure, suggesting that competitive pressures per se do not affect risk. The risk 
behaviour of such banks is predominately affected by the state of the economic cycle, 
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while it is also noticeable that they are characterised by riskier behaviour overall, with a 
lower Z score and equity-to-asset ratio than other sized banks.  
 Finally, across all categories of banks, GDP growth is an important factor. In 
particular, positive economic growth is associated with lower loan risk but increased 
overall (z-score) risk and lower equity-to-asset ratios. The results of this analysis, 
suggest that there remains a role for policy-makers in controlling bank risk, but that it is 
not purely achieved through changing market structure, but rather also through perhaps 
altering requirements to coincide with different phases of the economic cycle.   
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Chapter 7. Summary and Conclusion. 
 
This thesis has undertaken an extensive empirical analysis of the effects of competition 
on US bank profit and risk.  Understanding competition within the banking sector is of 
great importance because it is argued that competition encourages greater efficiency, 
which is an important factor in determining economic growth.  However, on the other 
hand it can be argued that too much competition could potentially create more 
instability in the banking sector.  In particular, this thesis sought to examine several 
hypotheses regarding the nature of profit and risk within US commercial banks.  First, 
we wish to consider whether US bank profits exhibit any persistence relative to industry 
average profit.  That is, in a competitive market any such abnormal profits should lead 
to entry or exit with profits exhibiting little, if any, persistence.  Second, and related, the 
thesis has sought to examine whether such persistence in bank profit is affected by 
regulatory changes that were designed to enhance competition.  Such Acts should 
reduce the level of persistence within abnormal profit.  Third, we wished to consider a 
broader exercise that examined whether bank profit persistence varies over time.  Given 
continued technological change within the bank sector as well as movements in the 
economic cycle it, might be hypothesised that persistence will change as banks increase 
or decrease market share, or as industry level concentration changes.  The final 
hypothesis sought to consider the competition-stability and competition-fragility 
hypotheses within bank risk.  Particularly, the thesis sought to consider whether 
different measures of risk where affected differently by competition.  This chapter 
continues by summarising each chapter and highlighting the key results in answer to 
these hypotheses.  
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 In Chapter 2 we sought to provide an overview of the structure and performance 
of the US banking system, from the creation of the First Bank of the United States in 
1791, the evolution of the unique dual banking system, to the current banking 
environment which is heavily regulated by extensive interventionary government 
policy.  We discussed the evolution, and impact on banks’ behaviour, of key regulatory 
changes.  Legislation aimed at reducing competition was first introduced in response to 
the Great Depression during the 1930s and remained in place until the 1980s when the 
process of deregulation commenced.  During the 1980s and 1990s a large number of 
mergers and acquisitions subsequently occurred, which both dramatically increased the 
size of the largest US banks enabling them to compete globally, as well as drastically 
reducing the overall number of US banks.  This period was also characterised by a large 
volume of new bank charters.  The impact of technological advances (for instance the 
creation of the ATM) and financial innovation (new financial tools such as MMMFs 
and securitised lending) on the banking sector is also reviewed.  Banks became more 
diversified and were able to generate their income from other areas in addition to the 
traditional fee-based activities, as well as being able to operate more efficiently and 
expand their operations geographically.  Finally, this chapter examines the impact of the 
2007 financial crisis on the US banking industry, including the extent of government 
intervention and the introduction of new legislation.  
In the third chapter we reviewed the literature regarding competition in banking.  
This is presented in three sections.  The first section considers those studies which adopt 
the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) approach to banking.  These studies analyse 
the extent of competition within a given market based on the assumption that a link 
exists between the structure of a market and the conduct and performance of the firms 
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and industries within it, such that greater concentration leads to greater individual 
market power for big banks which results in more anti-competitive behaviour.  In 
response to the shortcomings of this approach, the Chicago/Revisionist critique was 
subsequently developed in the 1970s.  Central to this critique is the efficiency 
hypothesis which argues that big banks make large profits because they are more 
efficient.  Therefore, the high prices or profits associated with higher concentration 
levels, is indicative of more efficient performance rather than effective collusion by 
banks.  The next section considers those studies which adopt the New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation approach to banking whereby the focus is on bank level rather 
than industry level conduct/strategy.  These studies attempt to analyse the response of 
prices (and in some instances quantities) to changes in competitive conditions, from 
which the extent of competition or collusion within a market can then be inferred.  
Breshnan-Lau and Panzar-Rosse are the two main techniques used in the NEIO studies. 
 In Chapter 4, the first of the empirical chapters, we examine both the influence 
of the two main regulatory acts, as well as the 2007 financial crisis, on the persistence 
of U.S. commercial banks’ profits for the period 1976 to 2009.  The dynamic 
examination of profits and profit persistence is undertaken via the use of panel 
estimation techniques including fixed effects and GMM.  As noted above, there are two 
key hypotheses considered in this chapter.  First, whether abnormal profits exhibit 
persistence, which would indicate some impediment to the competitive process; second, 
whether deregulatory acts designed to enhance competition reduce persistence.  Our 
results indicate that first, banks exhibit significant positive persistence thus indicating 
such impediments to the competitive process; and second, this persistence varies over 
time with the regulatory changes.  That is, coefficient results based on a first-order 
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autoregressive parameter for profits are both positive and statistically significant.  This 
suggests persistence in abnormal profits in contrast to a purely competitive market 
where such abnormal profits would quickly disappear. Nonetheless, the parameter is 
relatively small in magnitude indicating that competitive pressures within the market are 
relatively strong. With regard to the effects of deregulation, persistence increased 
following the 1999 Act (indicating that competitive pressures had eased as 
diversification opportunities afforded by the act allowed banks to retain more profit) and 
decreased following the 1994 Act (suggesting that the act was successful in enhancing 
competition).  Overall our results indicate that the legislation designed to enhance 
competition in the US banking sector appears to have had opposing effects, thereby 
affecting profit persistence in a way which might not always be expected. 
 Chapter 5, the second of the empirical chapters, examines the presence and 
source of time-variation within the profit persistence parameter and what factors 
determine any such variation.  Knowledge of whether persistence varies over time and 
the factors that may cause persistence to change would be useful to policy-makers in 
designing regulation to enhance competition. In order to establish whether profit 
persistence exhibits time variation, rolling fixed window and expanding recursive 
window regressions for the persistence parameter are considered.  The results reveal 
substantial time-variation, with persistence declining in the late 1980s and increasing in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Furthermore, we noted that during the financial crisis 
period persistence also declined.  To further examine the existence of time-variation in 
profit persistence, this chapter also considers some simple non-linear threshold 
regressions.  In particular, we considered four different threshold variables: lagged 
profit, lagged GDP growth, lagged fitted profit from a regression and lagged ratio of 
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non-interest income to total income. These were run for all banks and also separated by 
bank size.  The results for these regressions were largely supportive of time-variation as 
the persistence parameter does indeed vary over different regimes of behaviour.  In 
particular, we find that competitive forces impact less on banks when GDP is growing, 
as banks are more diversified and when banks are more profitable.  This appears to hold 
true for most bank size categories with the key exception of large banks, for which is it 
noted that persistence is higher with a lower degree of non-interest income to total 
income.  This may be indicative of a tendency towards over diversification by large 
banks, thereby contributing to the volatility of their profits. 
Having demonstrated the presence of time-variation within persistence, we next 
consider bank specific, market structure and economic environment factors, in order to 
determine what influences affect such time-variation.  Two key results uncovered were 
first, that all three influences just mentioned impact upon time-variation; second, that 
there is noticeable time-variation within the effect of these different factors on 
persistence.  Due to the substantial variation in results over time it is difficult to 
succinctly summarise them; however overall, and from a policy perspective, the results 
suggest that where profit persistence is a proxy for the outcome of market competition, 
the relationship between competition and bank and market factors is complex.  
Furthermore, the results highlight the importance of economic growth on persistence 
and thus the resultant influence on the competitive nature of the market.  Given our 
results also indicate the absence of a simple relationship between bank variables, market 
variables and persistence (all variables considered by policy-makers in the aftermath of 
the recent financial crisis), we also highlight the importance of accounting for the 
247 
 
variable nature of this relationship across different banks and through time when 
considering any policy implementation. 
 In the final of the empirical chapters, Chapter 6, we examine the relationship 
between bank competition and stability and consider the impact of regulatory change on 
the risk-taking behaviour of banks via the inclusion of a dummy for the 1999 Financial 
Modernisation Act.  Using a fixed effects panel estimator, we examine the effect of 
market structure, as measured by the HHI and Lerner Index, in addition to other 
variables (such as bank liquidity, diversification, size, growth and GDP growth) on 
three measures of bank risk; namely loan risk, the Z-Score and the equity to assets ratio.  
Our results suggest that there is a difference in the nature of the relationships between 
loan risk and other measures of risk.  That is, the results for loan risk suggest that 
increased competition leads to a lower level of non-performing loans, in contrast to 
lower Z-scores (greater risk) and lower equity to asset ratios.  This would appear to 
suggest that banks view the risks associated with different aspects of bank behaviour 
differently and as such, increased market concentration leads to greater credit-risk 
taking behaviour but lower overall risk and greater capital buffers.  Therefore, in terms 
of policy implications, our results highlight the fact that while increasing competition in 
the retail aspects of banking may be beneficial, it does not necessarily follow that all 
aspects of bank behaviour will benefit.  Thus there exists an argument for fine tuning 
competition policy to accommodate the different aspects of bank behaviour.  Our results 
also suggest that there is a key distinction between small and medium sized banks on 
the one hand and large banks on the other; that is, there appears to be no relationship 
between large banks’ risk-taking behaviour and market structure, implying that 
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competitive pressures per se do not affect their risk-taking, but rather it is 
predominantly affected by the economic cycle. 
Overall, the implications and contribution of this thesis lie in establishing 
evidence for the persistence of abnormal profits in US commercial banks and that the 
persistence varies with regulatory acts and more generally with bank and market 
specific factors as well as the business cycle.  Furthermore, that there exist differences 
between banks of different size with respect to the extent of persistence and the 
conditioning factors.  Understanding the movement and causes of bank profit 
persistence has obvious implications for the conduct of policy and its attendant 
implications for the nature of market competition. Further, the implications and 
contribution lie in the analysis of different types of bank risk and how they relate to 
competition in respect of the competing competition-stability and competition-fragility 
hypotheses.  Noticeable differences are reported according to bank size.  Again, this has 
implications with respect to the implementation of policy and the need for regulation to 
differ among different bank types.  In terms of the Dodd-Frank regulation, the key 
components with respect to this thesis concern the increase in capital, liquidity and risk 
requirements, the monitoring of ‘too big to fail’ banks and the Volker rule that limits 
speculative trading by banks. The results presented here suggest that no simple 
relationship exists between competitive pressure and risk on the one hand and bank size 
and market concentration on the other.  An increase in equity buffers in consistent with 
reduced risk, but the results show that increased competition leads to lower buffers and 
increased risk.  Further, that the nature of these relationships differ across bank size.  
Similarly, that an increase in bank growth share does not necessarily reduce competitive 
pressures as this can makes markets more contestable.  Finally, following the adoption 
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of universal banking there is no substantial evidence to suggest this has increased risk in 
the banking sector. 
Nonetheless, further work along these research lines could further illuminate the 
debates regarding competition, profit and risk.  The first two empirical chapters reveal 
that there is evidence of profit persistence in US commercial banks, that persistence 
changes with regulatory regimes and that persistence is time-varying.  With regard to 
future research several issues remain.  Along one such research avenue, we could seek 
to extend the evidence base with respect to these issues through examining international 
evidence, both in terms of time-variation and the effects of regulatory change.  Indeed, 
as this work is perhaps the first to examine time-variation in bank profit persistence in 
this manner, further evidence is required in examining the nature and cause of variation. 
Furthermore, where differences are identified along the lines of bank size, this work 
could be further extended by, for example, using finer definitions of bank size.  Another 
potential avenue of interest would be to examine the components of the profit measures 
considered here.  That is, the ROA and ROE measures are constructed as a ratio of net 
income to total assets or total equity.  Individually, we would expect such measures to 
contain a unit root and thus for the ratio to exhibit low persistence there must be a 
cointegrating relationship.  Thus, periods of higher persistence indicate a temporary 
movement away from the cointegrating relationship and it would be of interest to 
examine whether this occurs primarily through changes in net income or total assets or 
equity. 
The third empirical chapter examines the issue of risk and those factors that may 
affect bank risk and notably market structure.  Results indicate some differences 
between types of risk, e.g., loan risk versus overall Z-score risk, as well as according to 
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bank size.  Further evidence for the existence of these distinctions could be sought by 
considering different markets and time periods.  Furthermore, different measure of risk 
could be considered or an attempt to measure the risk of different parts of banks 
operation could be considered, e.g., issues relating to liquidity risk or investment 
portfolio risk.  Extending this, as variables considered in this study are accounting 
based, thus, the use of market based variables could be considered.  In examining bank 
performance and risk, where available, we could use share price information or the 
market risk measures such as CDS spreads.  Further, as with the profit measure, the Z-
score is a ratio containing profits (ROA or ROE), the equity to assets ratio and the 
standard deviation of profit.  While, we examine the behaviour of earnings and equity to 
assets, we could extend this research by also examining the volatility of bank earnings 
and those factors that affect its movement.  That is, we could consider whether the 
volatility of bank earnings is related to bank size and/or market structure as measured 
through concentration or market power.  Again, an understanding of the nature of such 
relationships could help with the conduct of regulation.  Further, as noted in Chapter 6, 
we could follow Köhler (2014) and extend the analysis (across all chapters) to examine 
the effects of competition and market structure on different bank types. 
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